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The Storming on 4^th May 1799 of Tipu Sultan’s palace fortress, leading to the death of Tipu Sultan, ruler of Mysore: A key battle in the conquest of South India by the British and one of the Duke of Wellington’s early actions

32. Podcast on the Storming of Seringapatam: The capture on 4^th May 1799 of Tipu Sultan’s palace fortress: A key battle in the conquest of South India by the British: John Mackenzie’s britishbattles.com podcasts

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War: Fourth Mysore War

Date of the Storming of Seringapatam:  4^th May 1799

Place of the Storming of Seringapatam: On the River Cavery in Mysore, Southern India.

Combatants at the Storming of Seringapatam: An East India Company army, comprising British troops and sepoys of the Bombay and Madras armies, with a contingent from Hyderabad, comprising natives of the area and regiments of the Bengal army, against troops of Tipu Sultan’s Mysore army.

Commanders at the Storming of Seringapatam:  Lieutenant General George Harris, commanding the Madras force was in overall command of the British army. Lieutenant General James Stuart commanded the Bombay force. 

Tipu Sultan, the de facto ruler of the extensive South Indian Kingdom of Mysore, commanded the Mysore army, the garrison of Seringapatam.

Size of the armies at the Storming of Seringapatam: 

General Harris’s East India Company armies comprised a Madras army of 4,381 European troops and 10,695 Native troops: a Bombay army of 1,617 European troops and 4,803 Native troops: a Hyderabad contingent of 16,157 European and Native troops.

Tipu Sultan commanded the Mysore army, comprising 33,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry and rocket men.

Winner of the Storming of Seringapatam: The British captured the fortress of Seringapatam. Tipu Sultan was killed in the fighting.

Background to the Attack on Seringapatam:

The earliest record of Seringapatam was in 1133, when Raja Vishnu Verdana gave the island and the land on each bank of the River Cavery to a Brahmin named Ramana Charlu and his followers.

In 1454, the sect erected a fort and temple in honour of the god Ranga, calling the complex Sri-ranga-patan.

The increasing importance of the town and fortress caused a viceroy to be installed by the ruler of Mysore.

In 1610, the Raja of Mysore took over the island and made it his seat of government.

In 1697, a Mahratta army attacked Seringapatam and was repelled.

In 1761, a Muslim soldier of fortune in the service of the ruler of Mysore, named Haider Ali, took power in Mysore.

Haider Ali conducted a series of wars against the British and other Indian rulers in Northern, Central and Southern India.

Haider Ali died in December 1781 and was succeeded by his son, Tipu Sultan.

Tipu Sultan proceeded to conduct wars against the British, the Nizam of Hyderabad, the Mahratta confederation and Coorg.

In 1791, Lord Cornwallis, commanding the British forces of the East India Company, captured the important Mysore city of Bangalore.

In 1792, Cornwallis began an attack on Seringapatam.

The siege did not go well for Tipu Sultan and, in March 1792, Tipu Sultan signed a peace treaty with Cornwallis by which he ceded half the territory of Mysore to his enemies.

Almost immediately an incident took place in which a French ship from Mauritius sailed into the west Indian port of Mangalore. The master of the ship, Ripaud, claimed to be a French envoy to Mysore.

The upshot was that Tipu Sultan sent envoys to Mauritius, seeking military assistance against the British. Tipu Sultan’s expectation was for a substantial French army to land in India.

Napoleon was in Egypt and corresponded with Tipu Sultan, promising him such assistance.

The governor of Mauritius despatched to Mysore a force comprising only 100 men. At the same time the governor issued a proclamation declaring French support for Tipu Sultan against the British.

Copies of this proclamation reached London and the East India Company authorities in India, triggering alarm.

Military reinforcements were despatched to India from the British garrisons in Gibraltar, South Africa and Portugal.

The new governor-general in India, Lord Mornington (Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Wellesley’s older brother) acted quickly and decisively.

It was clear to the British that Tipu Sultan would not abide by any treaty obligation in his determination to fight the British and should be removed from his position as ruler of Mysore.

An attempt was made to reconstitute the earlier alliance against Tipu Sultan. The Nizam of Hyderabad threw in his lot with the British, but Madajee Scindia, the Mahratta leader, declined to join the alliance.

Mornington appointed General Harris to command the army marching against Tipu Sultan.

One force, comprising troops from the Madras Presidency and commanded by Harris, would march from the east coast to meet a second force, comprising troops from the Bombay Presidency and commanded by General Stuart, thereafter mounting a joint attack on Tipu Sultan’s fortress of Seringapatam, lying approximately in the centre of Mysore territory on the River Cavery.

The troops of the Nizam of Hyderabad would march south and join Harris’s army on its march west.

Composition of the various contingents:

General Harris’s Madras Presidency force comprised:

Cavalry (2,635 soldiers): Major General Floyd;

1^st Brigade (Colonel Stearman, Madras Army): HM 19^th Light Dragoons, 1^st and 4^th Madras Native Cavalry.

2^nd Brigade (Colonel Pater, Madras Army): HM 25^th Light Dragoons, 2^nd and 3^rd Madras Native Cavalry.

Artillery (608 soldiers and 1,483 gun lascars): 2 Cos Bengal Artillery and 1^st and 2^nd Battalions, Madras Artillery.

Infantry (4,381 European soldiers and 10,695 native soldiers):

Right Wing (Major General Bridges, Madras Army):

1^st Brigade (Major General David Baird): HM 12^th, 74^th Highlanders, Scotch Brigade.

3^rd Brigade (Colonel Gowdie, Madras Army): 1^st/1^st, 1^st/6^th, 1^st/12^th Madras Native Infantry.

5^th Brigade (Colonel Roberts, Madras Army): 1^st/8^th, 2^nd/3^rd, 2^nd/12^th Madras Native Infantry.

Left Wing (Major General Popham, Madras Army):

2^nd Brigade (Colonel Sherbrooke): HM 73^rd Highlanders, De Meuron’s Regiment and HM 33^rd Regiment.

4^th Brigade (Lieutenant-Colonel Gardiner, Bengal Army): 3 battalions Bengal Native Infantry.

6^th Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel Scott, Scotch Brigade): 2^nd/5^thand 2^nd/9^th Madras Native Infantry.

1,000 Madras Pioneers.

Lieutenant General James Stuart’s Bombay force comprised:

Right Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel Montresor): 1^st/2^nd, 1^st/4^th, 1^st/3^rd, Bombay Native Infantry.

Centre Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel Dunlop): HM 75^th, 77^th Regiments and 103^rd Bombay Europeans.

Left Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel Wiseman): 2^nd/3^rd, 1^st/5^th, 2^nd/2^nd Bombay Native Infantry.

Infantry and Artillery 11,223 soldiers.

Hyderabad Contingent (16,157 soldiers):

Cavalry: Nizam’s Cavalry 6,000 and Old French Contingent 3621 soldiers.

1^st and 2^nd/10^th Bengal Native Infantry, 2^nd/2^nd, 2^nd/7^th, 1^st and 2^nd/11^th Madras Native Infantry: 1 company of Bengal Artillery.

Advance on Seringapatam:

Following the news of Nelson’s victory at the Battle of the Nile on 31^st October 1798, Lord Mornington opened negotiations with Tipu Sultan. It was soon clear that there was no prospect of a peaceful settlement.

Mornington moved to Madras to supervise the East India Company’s invasion of Mysore.

Information was then received that envoys from Tipu Sultan to Napoleon in Paris had sailed from India on 7^th February 1799.

Harris was given his orders to begin the attack.

There had been considerable difficulty assembling the necessary supplies and transport. Nevertheless, Harris’s Madras force-marched west from Vellore on 11^th February 1799 and was joined at Amboor on 20^th February 1799 by the contingent from Hyderabad.

General Stuart’s Bombay force marched eastwards from Cannanore on the west coast of India on 21^st February 1799, reaching a point 7 miles west of Peripatam on the high road to Seringapatam, 50 miles short of Tipu Sultan’s island fortress.

Urged on by the French officers in his entourage, Tipu Sultan resolved to fight the British.

Battle of Sedaseer on 5^th March 1799:

Tipu Sultan marched west with 12,000 men to attack Stuart’s force, leaving a party to watch Harris’s advance.

Stuart divided his men into 3 divisions.

The leading division, Montresor’s brigade, held a high hill at Sedaseer on the border of Mysore and Coorg.

The other two divisions were 8 to 12 miles further back, a dangerous deployment so near to Tipu Sultan’s headquarters.

In the morning of 5^th March 1799, a reconnaissance party saw a large encampment further east on the road, centred around a large green tent, which indicated the presence of Tipu Sultan.

Montresor was reinforced with a further sepoy battalion.

Between 9am and 10am, Tipu Sultan’s troops advanced through the jungle and attacked Montresor’s brigade in the front and rear.

Montresor’s battalions fought with great determination, but were near to being overwhelmed when Stuart arrived at around 2.30pm with the 77^th Regiment and the grenadier and light companies of the 75^th Highlanders.

30 minutes of volley firing drove off the Mysore troops attacking the rear of Montresor’s brigade.

A further 2 ½ hours of fighting saw the rest of Tipu Sultan’s force melting away into the jungle in precipitate retreat.

Fortescue comments that ‘for his dispositions in the attack, Tipu deserved better success’.

Mysore casualties at Sedaseer were 1,500 killed and wounded, while the Bombay troops lost around 140 killed, wounded and missing.

Battle of Mallavelly on 27^th March 1799:

Harris’s army of Madras and Hyderabad contingents crossed the eastern border of Mysore, reaching Rayacotta, on 4^th March 1799 and, after taking some hill forts, moved to Kelamungalum and on to Bangalore on 14^th March 1799.

Tipu Sultan’s light cavalry were deployed along the route taken by Harris, destroying the crops to hinder his advance.

Provisioning his army was a major problem for Harris.

The army’s transport was provided by a vast array of 120,000 bullocks for which forage had to be found.

Major sources of this forage were the districts of Baramahal and Coimbatore, held by a force of irregular troops.

Nevertheless, the destruction of the crops in advance of Harris’s march was a significant threat to the success of the invasion.

On 16^th March 1799, Harris resumed his advance, turning abruptly south-west into territory not devastated by Tipu Sultan’s cavalry.

The rate of advance of the vast assemblage of troops, pack animals and camp-followers was around 5 miles a day.

The army advanced in two parallel columns, the British and Madras regiments on the right and the Hyderabad contingent on the left. The cavalry marched in the front and the rear. The supply column occupied the centre. The whole formation was 7 miles in length and 2 miles wide.

On 24^th March 1799, Harris reached the River Madoor and encamped on the banks.

Harris crossed the river, receiving news from Stuart of his success at Sedaseer.

On 27^th March 1799, Harris’s army advanced towards Mallavelly.

Following the river crossing, the right column formed the advance with the cavalry.

On 26^th March 1799, Harris’s army encamped 5 miles short of Mallavelly.

On 27^th March 1799, the advance was resumed, with Colonel Wellesley’s division and the Hyderabad contingent on the left wing of the main army.

As the army came within a mile of Mallavelly, Tipu Sultan’s cavalry was seen positioned on the right of the army.

Tipu Sultan’s infantry were on the heights beyond Mallavelly.

Tipu Sultan’s guns could be seen moving along his line to the south, to take Harris’s army in the flank.

Wellesley was instructed to attack Tipu Sultan’s right flank, supported by Floyd’s cavalry, while the British regiments led by Harris attacked the village of Mallavelly.

Under the threat of attack, the Mysore army withdrew to a line of hills further to the rear of Mallavelly.

On General Harris’s orders, the army picquets, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Sherbrooke, with 2 regiments of cavalry, HM 25^th Light Dragoons and a native regiment, commanded by Colonel Stapleton Cotton, went ahead with the Quartermaster-General’s parties to mark out a camp.

2 Mysore guns opened fire on these parties and the Mysore mounted men became more threatening on the British right flank.

Cotton cleared some parties of cavalry and rocket men from 2 nearby villages.

As the Mysore horse advanced, the picquets were formed up to resist them and General Harris ordered a number of guns forward with Robert’s, Baird’s and Gowdie’s Brigades, taking position on the left of the picquets.

Wellesley’s division came up on the left of Gowdie’s Brigade, with Floyd’s cavalry in support.

Harris’s line advanced down the slope from the heights, descending into low uneven ground.

Tipu Sultan’s army thereupon delivered a heavy attack on the left and centre of Harris’s line.

On the British left, Wellesley’s Division was led by the 33^rd Regiment.

Fortescue states that 10,000 Mysore infantry, supported by cavalry, attacked the 33^rd, but were held by the regiment’s volleys, until they were charged by Floyd’s cavalry and driven back in confusion with heavy casualties.

Another force of Mysore infantry attacked the left flank of Baird’s Brigade, but were countered by the 74^th Highlanders, who in turn were threatened by a body of cavalry charging out of the jungle.

Baird halted the 74^th, while the Mysore cavalry were repelled by the 12^th Regiment and the 94^th Scotch Brigade. The Mysore cavalry wheeled and galloped along Harris’s line of native battalions, escaping without a casualty, in spite of volleys discharged at them.

While these piece-meal attacks were taking place, Tipu Sultan withdrew his guns, for the safety of which he was obsessive.

The whole Mysore line then withdrew to another ridge in the rear. Harris’s army followed the Mysoreans for 2 miles and halted.

On 28^th March 1779, Harris resumed his march to the north-west of Mallavelly, but his plan was to change his route and cross the River Cavery at Sosily, 15 miles south-west of Mallavelly. He would thereby be travelling through country unravaged by Tipu Sultan’s cavalry and be enabled to approach Seringapatam from the west, after joining Stuart’s Bombay force.

Harris followed this route, after a reconnaissance confirmed that the ford at Sosily was intact and undefended.

The army crossed the River Cavery at Sosily, finding a substantial quantity of supplies in the fort and village and continued its slow march to Seringapatam, arriving before the island fortress on 5^th April 1799.

The casualties in Harris’s army from the fighting around Mallavelly were around 70 killed and wounded.

Tipu Sultan’s casualties were around 1,000 killed and wounded.

Storming of Seringapatam:

On 5^th April 1799, Harris’s army took up a position on the south bank of the River Cavery to the south-west of Seringapatam.

The army’s right lay on high ground, with its left covered by an aqueduct and the River Cavery.

Along the rear of the army’s position lay a series of deep ravines.

In front, beyond the aqueduct, were several ruined villages and high points from which the British camp could be sniped and which required to be occupied.

On the night of 5^th April 1799, two parties set out to capture the Mysore positions along the aqueduct, 3 battalions under Colonel Shawe and 2 battalions under Colonel Wellesley, including his own regiment the 33^rd.

Neither party was able to achieve its goal until the next morning, when Wellesley returned to the attack, with the Scotch Brigade, 2 native battalions and 4 guns and the Mysoreans were driven from their positions.

On the 6^th April 1799, General Floyd marched with 4 regiments of cavalry and most of the Hyderabad contingent to Peripatam, to bring Stuart’s Bombay army to Harris’s camp at Seringapatam, which he did on 14^th April 1799.

It was now found that the army’s supply of rice was not, as believed, sufficient for 33 days, but only for 18 days on half rations.

This discovery caused Harris to press the siege of Seringapatam with considerable urgency.

After consultations with the army’s engineers, Harris resolved to attack the north-west corner of the fortress.

On 16^th April 1799, Stuart’s Bombay force crossed to the north bank of the River Cavery and, on the next day, Colonel Hart, with the 75^th Regiment and 2 battalions of Bombay sepoys, supported by the 74^th Highlanders and a Madras sepoy battalion, stormed the village of Agrar on the banks of the river.

That night a battery of 6 cannon and 2 howitzers was established in the ruins of Agrar, named Hart’s Post and opened fire on the north-west angle of the fortifications of Seringapatam.

South of the River Cavery, the Mysore troops were forced back from the subsidiary stream of the Little Cavery and an advanced post established called Macdonald’s Post.

A trench was dug from Macdonald’s Post to a ruined village in the rear, called Shawe’s Post, enabling troops to approach the fortifications.

While these operations were under way, General Floyd was despatched with the cavalry and a brigade of infantry to bring up a supply column from Baramahal.

Tipu Sultan’s troops were occupying an entrenched line along the western bank of the River Cavery parallel to the fortress wall.

This entrenchment was subjected to fire from Hart’s Post and from guns positioned by Harris.

On the evening of 20^th April 1799, the British stormed a powder mill on the bank of the River Cavery, with losses to the Mysoreans of 250 killed and wounded.

Taking the powder mill enabled the British to dig a trench to the bank of the River Cavery and establish a battery firing straight across the river into the targeted north-west angle of the fortress walls.

The marking out of a further battery on the north bank of the river caused the Mysore troops to launch an attack, on 22^nd April 1799, on Stuart’s positions.

This attack was beaten off with Mysore casualties of around 600 killed and wounded.

That night a first zig-zag trench was dug from the 8-gun battery to the bank of the River Cavery and batteries established, firing across the river into the wall.

The heavy fire forced the withdrawal of the guns positioned in the towers flanking the proposed breach area.

The zig-zag trench was within 200 yards of the northern end of the entrenchment on the west bank of the River Cavery.

This entrenchment was 800 yards long with a circular redoubt at the southern end.

On the evening of 26^th April 1799, Colonel Wellesley commanded an attack on the entrenchment by two columns, the first of 4 companies from the 94^th Scotch Brigade and the second of 4 companies from the 73^rd, each supported by 4 companies of sepoys from the Bengal and Madras armies.

The trenches were quickly taken but the British troops came under heavy fire from the circular redoubt, which was in turn stormed by Lieutenant Colonel Campbell with companies from the same British regiments.

The redoubt garrison fled across the bridge onto Seringapatam island pursued by Campbell’s contingent, which inflicted a number of casualties and spiked 2 guns before withdrawing.

British and sepoy casualties in this assault were around 300 killed and wounded.

During the morning of 27^th April 1799, the British force established itself on the bank of the Cavery River facing the fortress wall and built new batteries.

On 2^nd May 1799, these batteries opened fire from 29 cannon and 6 howitzers on the area of the fortress wall intended to be breached and across the fortress interior.

One of the howitzer rounds hit a rocket magazine in the fortress, which exploded with a wild display of pyrotechnics.

On the evening of 3^rd May 1799, the breach was pronounced practicable and Harris prepared his plans for the final assault.

Command was entrusted to General Baird.

Baird had been a prisoner of Tipu Sultan in Seringapatam for a number of years and an officer in the 1792 siege of the island fortress by Lord Cornwallis. From these experiences Baird knew much of the layout of the fortress.

The attacking column, comprising 2,862 Europeans and 2,003 native troops, was divided in two. Both sections would storm the breach and then divide, one section attacking along the rampart to the left and the other to the right.

The left attack, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Dunlop, comprised the flank companies of his regiment, the 77^th, the 75^th and the 103^rd, with the whole 12^th and 33^rd Regiments, 10 flank companies from Bengal native battalions and a body of artillerymen.

The right attack, commanded by Colonel Sherbrooke, comprised the flank companies of the 94^th Scotch Brigade, de Meuron’s Regiment, the 73^rd and 74^th Highlanders, with 14 flank companies from Bombay and Madras native battalions and some gunners.

Each attack was to be headed by a sergeant and 12 volunteers, followed by 25 men, commanded in the right attack by Lieutenant Lawrence of the 77^th Regiment and in the left attack by Lieutenant Hill of the 74^th Highlanders.

The storming column made its way to the forward trenches in small parties during the night of 4^th May 1799, so as to escape notice by the garrison and was in place at dawn.

The assault was to be launched at 1pm, on the basis that the garrison would not expect an attack at the hottest hour of the day.

The British guns continued to fire on the breach until 1pm, when General Baird ordered the advance.

The distances were short: 100 yards from the trench to the river bank; the river, rocky and varying in depth from ankle-deep to waist-deep, was 280 yards wide; a small stone wall, backed by a ditch 60 yards wide, stood before the breach itself.

A heavy fire of grape, musketry and rockets was levelled from the ramparts, inflicting casualties on the attackers and causing many to leave the passage of the ford, marked out in advance.

Rubble from the bombarded wall filled the ditch, making it easier to cross.

General Baird led the way across the ford and the ditch and the colours of one of the regiments was flying from the rampart within 6 minutes of the commencement of the attack.

On the far side of the breach, the attacking troops were confronted by a further wide ditch, lying between the outer and the inner ramparts.

The two sections of the attacking column divided, the left attack setting off along the north rampart to the left and the right attack to the south.

Each column was followed by a group of Mysoreans on the inner rampart.

The area of the breach was left unattended by the attacking columns and the defenders.

A party of soldiers from the 12^th Regiment, commanded by Captain Goodall, came into the breach and, looking for a way into the fortress, discovered a narrow ramp positioned across the wide inner ditch, left by a Mysore working party.

The ramp was long and extremely narrow, but in the excitement of the attack the soldiers from the 12^th ran across it and found themselves on the unattended inner rampart. They followed the Mysore soldiers along the northern rampart.

In the meantime, Dunlop’s left attack cleared the north-west bastion and the faussebraye, which had provided the deadliest fire on the attacking column.

A further 300 yards along the northern rampart, the attackers were halted by a traverse, held by a force of Mysore soldiers commanded by Tipu Sultan himself.

Several attacks on the traverse, one led by Lieutenant Farquhar of the 74^th, were repelled, Farquhar being shot dead.

Finally, more British troops came up and Tipu’s men on the traverse were outflanked by Goodall’s party running past them on the inner rampart and firing from behind.

The retreat of Tipu Sultan’s men became a route as they attempted to escape the surge along the inner and outer ramparts.

Tipu Sultan was borne along in the rush. He attempted to enter a gateway to reach his palace inside the fortress, but met a surge of Mysore soldiers escaping from the British troops now inside the fortress.

Somewhere in the area of the gate, Tipu Sultan was shot by a British Grenadier attempting to pillage his body of the gold buckle on his sword belt.

Sherbrooke’s right column met little resistance and pursued the Mysore soldiers holding the southern wall of the fortress, until they fled by a ford off the island to the east, pursued by shots from the fortress’ own guns now turned on the garrison by the British attackers.

Sherbrooke’s men continued along the rampart and into the fortress, meeting the men of the left attack, with shouts of triumph.

The fortress of Seringapatam was taken.

A press of the garrison attempting to escape formed in the Bangalore Gateway in the eastern wall of the fortress, where they were shot down by the attacking sepoys. Many died when the gateway caught fire.

British casualties in the assault were 69 Europeans and 12 sepoys killed, with 248 Europeans and 32 sepoys wounded and 4 Europeans and 2 sepoys missing.

The search for Tipu Sultan after the Storming of Seringapatam and his funeral:

As resistance collapsed and the British and sepoy troops rampaged through the fortress, General Baird sent a flag of truce into Tipu Sultan’s palace to summon him to surrender.

Finally admitted to the palace, Baird found only Tipu Sultan’s two young sons with their attendants. The princes were escorted away by a guard.

Baird began the search for Tipu Sultan himself.

After a thorough examination of the palace, Baird went to the northern gateway, where he found a pile of dead Mysoreans, killed in attempting to escape the fortress.

One of Tipu Sultan’s attendants was found there, alive.

The attendant pointed out where Tipu Sultan had been killed.

The British troops and sepoys sifted through the heaps of corpses until a body was found that the attendant identified as Tipu Sultan.

On the next day, 5^th May 1799, Tipu Sultan was buried with due ceremony, his body escorted by British Grenadiers.

Casualties in the Siege of Seringapatam: 

British losses in the Siege of Seringapatam were 22 officers killed and 45 wounded, with 181 Europeans killed, 622 wounded and 22 missing and 119 natives killed, 420 wounded and 100 missing.

Losses in the Mysore army are unknown.

Aftermath to the Storming of Seringapatam:

At the close of the funeral of Tipu Sultan, a heavy storm broke over the fortress and the surrounding camps, killing several officers and soldiers of the Bombay army.

As the storm raged, the British troops and sepoys pillaged the palaces and buildings of Seringapatam.

Prize money was paid to the officers and soldiers of the victorious British and Indian army from the loot taken during the sack of Seringapatam. The sums paid to officers and troops of the European regiments were: to General Harris upwards of £100,000, to each general officer around £10,000, to colonels £4,320, to lieutenant colonels £2,590, to majors £1,720, to captains £864, to lieutenants £432, to warrant officers £108, to sergeants £14, to privates £7.

By the peace treaty that followed the capture of Seringapatam, the state of Mysore was divided, certain areas being taken over by the East India Company, others passing to the Nizam of Hyderabad and the Mahrattas. The rump of the state was returned to the old Hindu dynasty of Mysore.

Tipu Sultan’s army was disbanded and the defence of Mysore taken over by the East India Company against an annual payment.

General Harris made sure that the Madras Army took over Tipu’s establishment of draft bullocks that were of such high quality and had enabled the Mysore army to move about with such facility.

Harris’s and Stuart’s armies were distributed around Mysore as garrisons.

Fortescue comments that the defeat of Tipu Sultan was a key step in establishing the East India Company as the dominant power in South India.

Battle Honours and Medal for the Storming of Seringapatam:

The British East India Company issued a medal commemorating the taking of Seringapatam. The medal was awarded to the officers of Harris’s army.

The medal shows the British lion attacking the Indian tiger.

The Battle of Seedaseer became a battle honour for these Bombay regiments: 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th Bombay Infantry.

The Storming of Seringapatam became a battle honour for the following British and European regiments: HM 12^th, 33^rd, 73^rd Highland, 74^th Highland, 75^th Highland, 77^th Regiments, 94^th Scotch Brigade and 1^st Bombay Europeans.

A number of Bengal, Bombay and Madras native regiments also received the battle honour of ‘Seringapatam’.

Anecdotes and traditions from the Storming of Seringapatam: 

• General Harris received £100,000 in prize money from the capture of Seringapatam. On his return to England, Harris built Belmont House near Faversham in Kent in 1801. He was promoted general in 1812 and, until his death in 1829, was colonel of the 73^rd Highland Regiment (later 2^nd Battalion, the Black Watch).

• General Harris’s army career started in the American War of Independence. Harris fought at Lexington and Bunker Hill where he was severely wounded. He ended his career as General Lord Harris.

• The regiment referred to as the ‘Scotch Brigade’ was a regiment formed in 1794 for service in India from Scottish officers serving in the Scotch Brigade in the Dutch service. The Dutch Scotch Brigade dated from 1586 and saw service in many European wars, until it was dissolved in 1782, on the outbreak of war between Britain and the Netherlands. The title of the regiment, on formation in 1794, was ‘94^th Regiment, Scotch Brigade’. In 1881 the regiment became the 2^nd Battalion of the Connaught Rangers.

• The Swiss Regiment de Meuron was raised in 1781 for service with the Dutch East India Company by Colonel Charles-Daniel de Meuron. With the invasion of the Netherlands by Revolutionary France in 1795, the Prince of Orange directed Dutch colonies to hand themselves to the British. With the Dutch surrender of Ceylon to the British in 1796, the Regiment de Meuron passed into the British service, serving at the Storming of Seringapatam and in the Peninsular War. After service in North America, the regiment was disbanded in 1816.

• The Storming of Seringapatam became a popular subject for British artists, including William Mallord Turner. Several of his pictures of the event appear on this page. The picture by Peter Frafft in 1800 (below) gives a wholly mythical aspect to the subject. There does not appear to have been any such incident and neither side was armed with bows, spears and shields.
• The artist Robert Kerr Porter painted a panorama of the Storming of Seringapatam 120 feet long in 1800, which caused a sensation in London. The picture is shown in two parts, the left part and the right part on this page. The picture was exhibited in the Lyceum Theatre with the description: “THE centre Object is General Baird surrounded by his Staff, and calling his Men to follow Serjeant Graham of the Forlorn Hope, who having snatched the Colours from the Ensign, planted them on the Breach, and as he gave the 3d Huzza of Victory, and Indian with a Pistol shot him through the Heart. – At the Foot of the Bastion is a Party of Tippoo’s Soldiers, who are repulsed by the Grenadiers of the 74th. – Near them is Colonel Macleod, who at the Onset was wounded through the Lungs, leading off by a Serjeant of the Meuron Regiment. – On the Bastion to the Right, stands Colonel Sherbrook animating his Men to the Assault. – Crossing the Cavery is the Remainder of the 73rd. – And behind them the brave Colonel Dunlop borne off wounded, between two Grenadiers. – In front of the Mortar Battery, is Major Allen with Colonel Dallas and Major Beatson. – In the Distance is a View of General Harris and the British Camp. – To the Left of the Grand Breach, lies Lieut. Farquhar, supported as he is Dying, on one of the Tyger Guns, taken from the Enemy; he is upheld by an Artillery-Man, who points to the Indians from whom he received his Death, while the Grenadiers at the Point of the Bayonet are pressing to avenge it. – On the Ramparts stands Tippoo himself, directly above the Gateway under which he fell. – A French Officer, a little further off, is pointing to the Scene on the centre Bastion; – And on the Bridge is the desperate Conflict between the Company’s Troops and Hyder Ally’s Grenadiers: Lieut. Laler of the 73d, who commanded the Sepoys, is wounded, and struggling with his Enemy as he is falling into the Water. – In the Rear of the Artillery-Men, are the Nizam’s Troops pressing forward to the Action, headed by Lieut. Colonel Mignan and flanked by the Gallant Brigade Major Pasley.”

• Tipu Sultan possessed a clockwork model of a tiger attacking a British officer. The model is now in the Victoria and Albert Museum.

• Many traditions and stories relate to the Storming of Seringapatam. It is said that the storming troops, both European and Sepoy, ruthlessly cut down the defenders after discovering that the prisoners taken by Tipu Sultan’s troops had been murdered by having nails hammered into their heads on Tipu’s orders.

• It is said that Tipu Sultan was warned that the assault of the fortress was about to take place and, refusing to believe the information, ordered that his troops be withdrawn from the ramparts to be paid, while he himself dined.

• The warning of the impending attack is said to have been given to Tipu Sultan by Muslim and Brahmin astrologers, who announced that the 4^th May was an inauspicious day. Tipu accepted the warning to the extent of giving lavish presents to the astrologers: including an elephant, bags of seeds, money, a black bullock, a milch buffalo and other items. One of the gifts was an iron pot filled with oil into which Tipu looked so that his face was reflected in the oil, a ceremony used in Hindustan to avert misfortune.

• Tipu Sultan is reported to have been on the northern rampart and to have, himself, shot a number of the attacking European troops. Tipu Sultan was reputed to be a fine shot and to have had a large collection of firearms, which four of his attendants carried for him and reloaded. His head servant, Rajah Cawn, reported that Tipu Sultan shot 3 or 4 Europeans.

• Syed Goffar, Tipu Sultan’s officer in command in the area of the breach, warned Tipu that the assault was about to take place, a warning, it is reported Tipu rejected, on the basis that the assault would not be launched in the heat of the midday. Syed Goffar noticed the ramp by which Goodall’s party would cross the inner ditch and reach the second rampart. Syed was supervising the destruction of the ramp when he was killed, the ramp being left in place.

• The British military authorities were impressed by the rockets used in Tipu Sultan’s army. The use of metal rocket tubes increased range and accuracy. The British Army’s ‘Congreve Rocket’ was developed from the Mysore rocket and used against the French, achieving a European reputation. In fact, the Congreve Rocket was never a satisfactory battle weapon, being inaccurate and unreliable and was actively disliked by the Duke of Wellington.

• Sir David Baird’s senior officers presented Baird with a sword to commemorate his role in the Storming of Seringapatam. The sword is displayed in the National Museum of Scotland.
• Colonel Stapleton Cotton served under Wellesley (later the Duke of Wellington) in the Peninsular War in Spain, commanding the British and Portuguese Cavalry.

References for the Storming of Seringapatam:

History of the British Army by Fortescue Volume IV Part II

Seringapatam Past and Present by Colonel G.B. Malleson

The Last Siege of Seringapatam by Rev E.W. Thompson

Wellington: The Road to the Lion’s Mound 1769-1815 by Daniel Res

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32. Podcast on the Storming of Seringapatam: The capture on 4^th May 1799 of Tipu Sultan’s palace fortress: A key battle in the conquest of South India by the British: John Mackenzie’s britishbattles.com podcasts

The brilliant Peninsular War action fought on 3^rd April 1811 by the Light Division against Reynier’s French Second Corps on the north-eastern border of Portugal during Massena’s retreat to Spain

20. Podcast of the Battle of Sabugal: The Peninsular War action fought on 3^rd April 1811: John Mackenzie’s britishbattles.com podcasts.

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Battle:  Sabugal

War: Peninsular War

Date of the Battle of Sabugal: 3^rd April 1811

Place of the Battle of Sabugal: In North-East Portugal near the Spanish border

Combatants at the Battle of Sabugal: British and Portuguese army against the French.

Commanders at the Battle of Sabugal: Lieutenant General Viscount Wellington against Marshal André Massena, Prince of Essling and Duke of Rivoli.

Size of the armies at the Battle of Sabugal: Wellington’s army was around 37,000 men, of whom only around 2,000 were in action against the French at Sabugal. Massena’s army comprised around 40,000 men of whom only Reynier’s Second Corps and other detached units, some 6,000 men, were involved in the battle.

Uniforms, arms and equipment at the Battle of Sabugal:
The British infantry wore red waist-length jackets, grey trousers, and stovepipe shakos. Fusilier regiments wore bearskin caps. The two rifle regiments, the 60^th and 95^th, wore dark green jackets and trousers.

The Royal Artillery wore blue tunics.

British heavy cavalry (dragoon guards and dragoons) wore red jackets and ‘Roman’ style helmets with horse hair plumes.

The British light cavalry was increasingly adopting hussar uniforms, with some regiments changing their titles from ‘light dragoons’ to ‘hussars’.

The Portuguese army uniforms increasingly during the Peninsular War reflected British styles. The Portuguese line infantry wore blue uniforms, while the Caçadores light infantry regiments wore green.

The French army wore a variety of uniforms. The basic infantry uniform was dark blue.

The French cavalry comprised Cuirassiers, wearing heavy burnished metal breastplates and crested helmets, Dragoons, largely in green, Hussars, in the conventional uniform worn by this arm across Europe, and Chasseurs à Cheval, dressed as hussars.

The French foot artillery wore uniforms similar to the infantry, the horse artillery wore hussar uniforms.

The standard infantry weapon across all the armies was the muzzle-loading musket. The musket could be fired three or four times a minute, throwing a heavy ball inaccurately for a hundred metres or so. Each infantryman carried a bayonet for hand-to-hand fighting, which fitted the muzzle end of his musket.

The British rifle battalions (60^th and 95^th Rifles) carried the Baker rifle, a more accurate weapon but slower to fire, and a sword bayonet.

Field guns fired a ball projectile, of limited use against troops in the field unless those troops were closely formed. Guns also fired case shot or canister which fragmented and was highly effective against troops in the field over a short range. Exploding shells fired by howitzers, yet in their infancy. were of particular use against buildings. The British were developing shrapnel (named after the British officer who invented it) which increased the effectiveness of exploding shells against troops in the field, by exploding in the air and showering them with metal fragments.

Throughout the Peninsular War and the Waterloo campaign, the British army was plagued by a shortage of artillery. The Army was sustained by volunteer recruitment and the Royal Artillery was not able to recruit sufficient gunners for its needs.

Napoleon exploited the advances in gunnery techniques of the last years of the French Ancien Régime to create his powerful and highly mobile artillery. Many of his battles were won using a combination of the manoeuvrability and fire power of the French guns with the speed of the French columns of infantry, supported by the mass of French cavalry.

While the French conscript infantry moved about the battle field in fast moving columns, the British trained to fight in line. The Duke of Wellington reduced the number of ranks to two, to extend the line of the British infantry and to exploit fully the firepower of his regiments.

The inability of the French infantry to fire volleys from a line was particularly disadvantageous in the Battle of Sabugal. The use of the column was inappropriate for such a battle and contributed to their defeat.

Winner of the Battle of Sabugal:
The British attack forced General Reynier into a precipitate retreat. However, Wellington’s scheme to entrap Reynier’s Second Corps did not succeed, partly due to the appalling weather.

British Regiments in action at the Battle of Sabugal:
Hawker’s Cavalry Brigade:

Royal Dragoons

14^th Light Dragoons

Light Division:

43^rd Light Infantry

1^st and 2^nd Battalions 52^nd Light Infantry

95^th Rifles

Third Division:

5^th Regiment

French Regiments in action at the Battle of Sabugal:

2^nd, 36^th, 47^th and 70^th Regiments of the Line

4^th, 17^th and 31^st Light Regiments

Account of the Battle of Sabugal:

In early 1811, Marshall Massena was forced to retreat from the Line of Torres Vedras, where Wellington kept the French from capturing the Portuguese capital city of Lisbon over the winter of 1810-11, back to the Spanish frontier.

The French army was starving, as it marched across the inhospitable mountainous Portuguese hinterland in a north-eastern direction, up the valley of the River Mondego, pursued by Wellington’s British and Portuguese army.

Throughout his retreat, Massena attempted to bring the British and Portuguese to battle on his terms, but was thwarted by his subordinates, principally Ney and D’Erlon, who intended to hurry the march to Spain, where full magazines would replenish their soldier’s food and ammunition supplies.

On 2^nd April 1811, Massena’s army took up positions on the east bank of the north-south flowing River Coa at Sabugal, intending to remain there briefly, before completing the last few miles of the march to Spain.

Reynier’s French Second Corps encamped along the heights to the east of Sabugal, parallel to the River Coa.

To the south of Reynier’s camp, the River Coa turned sharply east, creating a right-angled bend.

Massena did not expect the British to interfere with his short halt, but, late on 2^nd April 1811, Wellington’s divisions began to come up and Reynier reported an increase in the number of bivouac fires opposite his camp, on the far side of the River Coa.

Massena ordered the artillery of the Second Corps to withdraw to Alfaiates. He also suggested that Reynier should follow with the rest of his corps without delay.

Reynier agreed to retreat, but decided to leave his departure until sunset, preferring to move his troops in the dark, so as to be less easily tracked by the British.

Wellington intended to overwhelm Reynier’s corps before it could get away.

Wellington’s plan involved the Light Division and Hawker’s Cavalry Brigade, both commanded by Major General Sir William Erskine, marching along the southern limb of the River Coa, crossing at points well in the rear of Reynier’s left flank and attacking him in the flank and rear.

The rest of the British and Portuguese army would cross the River Coa at various points around the town of Sabugal and launch a frontal attack on Reynier.

The British Third Division would cross the River Coa above Sabugal and attack Reynier’s left flank.

The British Fifth Division would cross the River Coa directly opposite Sabugal, march through the town and attack Reynier’s centre.

The initial assaults were to be those carried out by Hawker’s cavalry brigade on the extreme right, the Light Division, crossing short of Hawker and the Third Division crossing the Coa by a ford a mile above Sabugal.

Only once these initial attacks were launched were the other Divisions to cross the River Coa and force their way into Sabugal or up onto the high ground behind the town.

3^rd April 1811 began with fog and rain storms, not uncommon in that mountainous hinterland of the Iberian Peninsula.

In the early hours, General Erskine’s force set off on the road to Quadrazeas, east-bound along the south bank of the River Coa.

After about one third of the journey, the Light Division turned to the left and marched up to a ford over the River Coa that would put the division well in the left rear of Reynier’s Corps.

At some stage it was realised that Colonel Beckwith’s brigade of the Light Division was not in the column.

Beckwith’s brigade comprised the 43^rd Light Infantry and 4 companies of his own regiment the 95^th Rifles.

A staff officer rode back down the road and found Beckwith’s men formed up, but with no orders as to what they were required to do.

Blame for this omission was, according to Fortescue, laid on Erskine or his staff.

As soon as the staff officer directed Beckwith to march up the road, he did so. But instead of continuing up the main route, Beckwith took his brigade to a nearer ford across the River Coa, some 4 miles above Sabugal.

The ford Beckwith chose was difficult to cross. The river was deep and swollen by heavy rain and the far bank steep and covered with thick vegetation. Possibly, Erskine had rejected this ford for the crossing point, committing the division to marching further along the river to an easier point.

Beckwith’s men crossed the river with the water up to their armpits. A French piquet, guarding the ford, fired on the British as they crossed and hurried off to give the alarm.

The 43^rd climbed to the top of the hill on the far side of the river, where they halted, while the 4 companies of 95^th Rifles followed the retreating French piquet.

Visibility was much reduced by swirling fog and rain.

On receiving news of the British crossing of the River Coa on his left, Reynier sent the brigade of General Sarrut (2^nd and 36^th Regiments) and the 4^th Light from General Merle’s division to block Beckwith’s advance.

At the same time, French cavalry commanded by General Pierre Soult moved to Reynier’s threatened flank.

The companies of the 95^th Rifles attacked the French 4^th Light and inflicted heavy casualties, before falling back on the 43^rd, which was coming up in support.

The French 4^th Light appeared on the heights above the 43^rd, which exchanged volleys with the French and attacked with the bayonet, driving the French off the hill top, across the valley and up onto the next ridge.

On the brigade’s right flank, Captain Hopkins of the 43^rd saw a large French force approaching from the right. This force comprised two regiments of infantry, the 17^th Light and the 70^th of the Line, forming the First Brigade of Heudelet’s Division, called up from Alfaiates to support General Reynier.

Hopkins halted his company on a hill top and awaited the advance of the French.

The French brigade commander launched a strong force against Captain Hopkins’ company, which met it with a volley before driving the French back down the hill. A second volley and charge despatched the French detachment back the way it had come.

In the meantime, Beckwith was leading the rest of his brigade against Genera Sarrut’s brigade.

The fog lifted sufficiently for Beckwith to see the size of the French force he was confronting, outnumbering him probably three to one. Nevertheless, Beckwith launched his attack.

At this point, a heavier shower of rain made all firing impossible and the British troops retired to the hill from which the 4^th Light had been driven, in line with Captain Hopkins’ company.

Beckwith rode over to Hopkins and congratulated him on his conduct, urging him to take any further independent action he found to be necessary.

Sarrut opened fire on the British brigade with two howitzers brought up by Heudulet and sent his skirmishers forward to take up positions along a stone wall to the front of Beckwith’s men.

From the wall, Sarrut launched three columns of infantry to attack Beckwith, while a fourth column prepared to assault Hopkins.

Both sides are described as being by now ‘furiously excited’, the French columns urged on by drummers beating the ‘pas de charge’ and the officers shouting and waving their swords some distance to the front of their men.

The 43^rd and 95^th held their fire until the French were close, discharging several devastating volleys before charging and driving the French columns down the slope.

The British pursued the French back to their starting position and overran one of the two howitzers, the other being removed in time to avoid capture.

The tide of battle almost immediately turned against Beckwith’s men, as General Pierre Soult launched his cavalry against them, driving the British back to the stone wall.

The British rallied behind the wall and as the French troopers rode up and attempted to fire their pistols over the wall, they were met with volleys that left barely a man in his saddle.

In the meantime, a party of French troops was attempting to remove the threatened howitzer, but, with the cavalry disposed of, Beckwith’s men turned their fire on this party and drove it back.

A see-saw action began, with each side attempting to retrieve the stranded howitzer. This continued for an hour, with fighting of a savagery that Fortescue states was not seen again until the Battle of Inkerman in the Crimean War in 1854.

Both sides were now strongly reinforced; the French by the arrival of Heudelet’s second Brigade and the British as General Drummond’s brigade of the Light Division marched up.

The 2^nd/52^nd Light Infantry, a newly raised battalion just arrived in Portugal, came up on Beckwith’s right flank alongside Hopkins’ company.

The British line, in skirmishing order, moved forward through the heavy rain into a wood.

The French tactics of deploying skirmishers mixed with cavalrymen appeared to disorder the inexperienced soldiers of the 2^nd/52^nd.

The rest of Drummond’s brigade came up and formed a second line, together with two guns, which opened fire on the French.

The rain ceased and the mist lifted, revealing to Reynier how small the British force was that was attacking him.

Reynier despatched a force of infantry to attack Beckwith’s unguarded left flank, but his move was too late.

The British Third Division was crossing the River Coa, pushing aside the French vedettes along the hill line. The British 5^th Regiment launched an attack on the French force despatched to take Beckwith in the left flank and drove it back.

Reynier hastily formed a rear-guard of the 31^st Light and 47^th of the Line and drew his Second Corps off towards Alfaiates.

Helped by the appalling weather, Reynier was finally enabled to break off the action and extract his corps.

Casualties at the Battle of Sabugal:

British casualties were around 70 killed and 145 wounded. Half of these casualties were taken by the 43^rd Light Infantry.

French casualties were 760 men, of whom 180 were prisoners taken by the British. The French lost some 60 officers, a high proportion, which suggests that they were not readily followed by their men.

Follow-up to the Battle of Sabugal:
Following the Battle of Sabugal, Massena concentrated his three corps at Alfaiates, short of the Spanish border and that night continued the retreat, the three corps fanning out to enter Spain by different routes; the Second Corps heading north-east, to cover the 20 miles to Fuentes de Oñoro, the others marching in more easterly directions.

While the Battle of Sabugal was a striking display of fighting ability by the British Light Division, the battle was an overall disappointment. Wellington’s plan to trap Reynier’s Second Corps with the outflanking attack failed, Reynier being warned of the attack by Beckwith’s premature crossing of the River Coa.

Blame for the failure was generally placed on General Erskine, although responsibility for ensuring that both Light Division brigades marched at the right time and to the right place would presumably fall principally on the divisional commander.

Anecdotes and traditions from the Battle of Sabugal:

• Lord Wellington described the Battle of Sabugal, in which Beckwith’s brigade attacked and drove back a force around three times its own size, as ‘one of the most glorious that British troops were ever engaged in’.
• Beckwith attributed the success of his brigade in the battle to Captain Hopkins.
• As a major, Thomas Sydney Beckwith commanded the 95^th Rifles that served on the fleet at the Battle of Copenhagen in 1807. Fortescue says this of Beckwith at the Battle of Sabugal: ‘He gave no regular word of command, but signified his wishes by running conversation: ‘Now my lads, we’ll just go back a little, if you please.’  ‘No. I don’t mean that (as the men began to run), we are in no hurry- we’ll just walk quietly back, and you can give them a shot as you go.’ Then, when the men had reached their old position on the hill, ‘Now my men, this will do- let us show them our teeth again’: and, shaking his fist in the face of the advancing columns, he dared them to come on.’ After the war, Beckwith reached the rank of lieutenant-general in command of the Bombay Army. He died of fever in India in 1830.

References for the Battle of Sabugal:

See the extensive list of references given at the end of the Peninsular War Index.

The previous battle in the Peninsular War is the Battle of Redinha or Pombal

The next battle in the Peninsular War is the Battle of Fuentes de Oñoro

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20. Podcast of the Battle of Sabugal: The Peninsular War action fought on 3^rd April 1811: John Mackenzie’s britishbattles.com pod

Sir Robert Napier’s capture, on 13^th April 1868, of the Fortress of Magdala, stronghold of the Emperor Theodore III of Abyssinia

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The next battle in the British Battles series is the Battle of Ali Masjid

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Battle:  Magdala

War: Abyssinian War

Date of the Battle of Magdala: 13^th April 1868

Place of the Battle of Magdala: In Abyssinia, modern Ethiopia, to the east of the present capital, Addis Ababa.

Combatants at the Battle of Magdala: British and Indian troops against the army of the Emperor Theodore III of Abyssinia.

Commanders at the Battle of Magdala:   Lieutenant General Sir Robert Napier, the general officer commanding the Bombay Army against the Emperor Theodore III of Abyssinia.

Size of the armies at the Battle of Magdala:  The British force comprised 13,000 soldiers (2,674 British) from the British and Indian regiments of the Bombay, Bengal and Madras Armies, assisted by 3,000 men of the Bombay and Bengal Coolie Corps.

Emperor Theodore III of Abyssinia commanded a changing army, which at its largest probably comprised some 30,000 men.

Winner of the Battle of Magdala:  The British and Indian army

Uniforms, arms and equipment at the Battle of Magdala:  The British army was undergoing rapid change following the Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny.  British regiments were equipped with new Snider-Enfield single shot breech loading rifles, delivered specifically for the Abyssinian Campaign. The Indian infantry regiments still carried smooth bore muskets.

In the aftermath of the Indian Mutiny, the British authorities chose not to equip Indian regiments with more modern firearms.

The Royal Artillery were equipped with modern Armstrong field guns.

The Abyssinians were armed with a wide variety of ancient and modern firearms, swords, spears and shields. They possessed a number of modern artillery pieces, overseen by German technicians, although apparently reluctantly.

British and Indian Regiments in the Abyssinian Expeditionary Force:

3^rd Dragoon Guards, now the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards

10^th Bengal Native Cavalry

12^th Bengal Native Cavalry

3^rd Bombay Native Cavalry

3^rd Sind Horse

Royal Naval Rocket Batteries

Royal Artillery

Royal Engineers

Bombay Sappers and Miners

Madras Sappers and Miners

1^st Battalion 4^th King’s Own Royal Regiment, now the Duke of Lancaster’s Regiment

26^th Foot, the Cameronians, now disbanded

33^rd Foot, later the Duke of Wellington’s Regiment and now the Yorkshire Regiment

45^th Foot, later the Sherwood Foresters and now the Mercian Regiment

21^st Punjabi Bengal Native Infantry

23^rd Punjabi Bengal Native Infantry

2^nd Bombay Native Infantry (Grenadiers)

3^rd Bombay Native Infantry

5^th Bombay Native Infantry (Light Infantry)

8^th Bombay Native Infantry

10^th Bombay Native Infantry

18^th Bombay Native Infantry

25^th Bombay Native Infantry (Light Infantry)

27^th Bombay Native Infantry (1^st Baluchis)

Background to the Battle of Magdala:  The crisis between Britain and Abyssinia in 1867 arose from the character of Emperor Theodore III of Abyssinia.

David Chandler described the Abyssinian ruler in these terms: ‘The Emperor Theodore was a most complex personality. He was a combination of robber-chief, idealist and madman. Periods of great courtesy and generosity frequently gave place to fits of insensate rage. Deep religious (Christian) convictions contrasted with a complete disregard for human life and suffering. In his last years his moods varied inconsistently and unpredictably from hour to hour, but at no time did his personal courage desert him.’

Rising as a provincial governor, Theodore was crowned Emperor in 1855. Magdala, captured from the Gallas, became his mountain-fortress.

In 1862, the British Government sent Captain Charles Cameron as consul to the Abyssinian Court.

The Emperor wrote to Queen Victoria with various requests. Unfortunately, the Foreign Office in London overlooked the letter and no reply was sent. This discourtesy played on Theodore’s mind.

In 1864, convinced of British hostility, Theodore detained Captain Cameron and a number of European missionaries and traders and their families.

Negotiations took place in attempt to secure the release of the captives and at times it seemed as if Theodore would release them.

In around December 1866, the captives were moved to the palace fortress of Magdala and it became clear that they would not be freed.

A number of British domestic crises were resolved in 1866-7, leaving the British Government free to turn its mind to resolving the issue of the captives in Abyssinia, urged on by increasing public concern.

The main obstacle to action was the lack of knowledge of Abyssinia and its remoteness. The Suez Canal was not completed until 1869 requiring any force sent from Britain to journey around the southern tip of Africa.

The nearest substantial British garrison was the Bombay Army on the west coast of India. It was resolved that an expeditionary force would be sent from Bombay.

The planning and command of the expedition to Abyssinia was conferred on Lieutenant General Sir Robert Napier, the Commander in Chief of the Bombay Army.

Napier exercised his considerable administrative and military experience in organising the expedition to release the captives in Abyssinia.

In particular Napier insisted that a lightening raid by a small force was impractical and that a fully organised expedition was the only solution, in spite of it’s the cost, which Napier warned would be substantial.

A reconnaissance to the Red Sea shore of Abyssinia identified Annesley Bay as the most appropriate place to land the expeditionary force. There were no existing port or transport facilities available.

Napier’s force was confronted with the task of building jetties, camps, storage facilities, a railway line, communications and a water supply.

Some 35,000 baggage animals, mules, donkeys, camels, horses and elephants were acquired from a number of countries and transported to Annesley Bay.

241 ships were used to bring in supplies and the troops.

The advance guard of the expedition arrived in Annesley Bay on 21^st October 1867. Sappers began construction of the camps around the village of Zula, roads to the port area and inland and a tramway.

Work was begun on the surveying and construction of a railway to carry troops and supplies inland.

Napier’s army faced a lengthy march across the lowlands lying inland from the sea and then a long and difficult trek through the hills and mountains to the fortress of Magdala, which lay in the centre of Abyssinia.

Sir Robert Napier arrived on HMS Ocean in Annersley Bay on 2^nd January 1868.

By this time, many of the troops, supply animals and supplies were ashore and accommodated around Zula.

A reconnaissance party was already in the mountains, making contact with local rulers, several of whom could be relied upon to assist against the Emperor Theodore.

A report, dated 18^th December 1867, reached Napier from the interior reporting that the Emperor was moving from Debra Tabor to Magdala with a force of 8,000 warriors, 6 guns and a wagon column of ammunition.

Napier decided to march with his main force and attempt to cover the 400 miles from Zula to Magdala in time to forestall the Emperor Theodore.

The British Government was urging Napier to conduct a ‘rapid dash’ with a small force.

Napier was convinced that a methodical advance by a substantial army, leaving garrisons along the route, was the only safe way of proceeding.

A striking force of 5,000 men, formed as the First Division and commanded by Sir Charles Staveley, Napier’s deputy, set off for the interior on 25^th January 1868.

The remaining troops, forming the Second Division, provided the garrisons for the lines of communication.

The advanced brigade reached Adigrat on 29^th January 1868, the troops finding it a relief to leave the humid coastal region for the cooler mountains. Nevertheless, the going was arduous in the extreme.

Although the army marched from dawn to dusk, the distance covered in a day seldom exceeded 10 miles.

Account of the Battle of Magdala: 

The advance brigade reached Antalo on 14^th February 1868, having travelled 200 miles from the base at Zula.

An extended halt was called at Antalo, as the various formations marched in and Napier re-organised the army’s baggage arrangement.

From this point, no wagon could be used and all supplies and baggage would be carried by the draught animals.

In view of the extreme difficulty of making progress through the roadless mountains, the baggage allowance was reduced several times.

While at Antalo, Napier received news that Emperor Theodore had reached Magdala with his army and artillery, which included the emperor’s pride and joy, a 70-ton mortar named Theodorus.

It was clear that Napier needed to make the ‘final dash’ for Magdala, urged on him by the London and Indian governments for months, the concern being that Theodore would remove his captives to a more remote location.

The Emperor Theodore was in a perilous position. His fortress of Magdala was in effect under siege, thousands of hostile Gallas tribesmen blockading him to the south, with Napier advancing on him from the north.

At the beginning of April 1868, Napier sent a message to the Emperor Theodore, requiring him to surrender. There was no reply.

On 9^th April 1868, the Emperor Theodore watched from the top of Mount Fahla the approach of the distant columns of Napier’s army.

That night, in a blind rage, it is reported that Theodore executed several hundred Abyssinian prisoners, mainly Gallas, throwing them from the top of the cliff, manacled in pairs.

By the next morning, Theodore recovered his composure and marched out of Magdala with his army, now of around 30,000 men, to oppose the invaders from Mount Fahla, where his 7 guns and ‘Theodorus’ were in place.

On 10^th April 1868, Napier’s troops moved down to the Bashilo River.

From there, Napier moved units up to occupy the point where the King’s Road from the north-east emerged from the Aroge ravine onto the Aroge plateau before Mount Fahla.

Other sections of the Second and First Brigades moved onto the Aroge plateau, beyond which lay the crescent of three mountains forming the Magdala chain, Fahla at the western end, Selasse in the middle and Magdala itself at the eastern end.

From his position on Fahla, at about 4pm, Theodore launched an assault across the Aroge plateau of 6,000 men, led by his favorite chief, Fitaurari Gabi and opened fire with his guns.

While the first round landed close to Napier and the British troops, thereafter the Abyssinians gunners lost the range and ceased to present a threat.

The 70-ton mortar, Theodorus, blew up on its first discharge.

Confused fighting developed across the Aroge plateau.

An Abyssinian attack on British guns positioned above the Aroge defile and defended by 2 companies of the King’s Own Regiment was driven off with considerable loss.

Elsewhere on the plateau the British and Indian regiments advanced and the Abyssinians fell back.

The British First and Second Brigades bivouacked at the entrance to the Aroge valley.

The Emperor Theodore was in despair. At midnight he sent a message to one of captives, Mr. Rassam, saying: ‘I thought that the people coming are women; I find that they are men. I have been conquered by the advanced guard alone. All my gunners are dead; reconcile me with your people.’

By dawn the British troops were advancing, when they met a flag of truce. By the evening the captives held by Theodore were released and in the British camp, but Theodore baulked at Napier’s demand for his unconditional surrender.

The British and Indian cavalry circled round Magdala Mountain to prevent Theodore’s escape, while the infantry and guns moved onto Mount Selasse, where some 20,000 Abyssinian troops surrendered.

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The first battle of the British army’s involvement in the Sudan, fought on 29^th February 1884, using modern firearms against Islamist tribesmen armed largely with spears and swords

The previous battle of the War in Egypt and the Sudan is the Battle of Tel-el-Kebir

The next battle of the War in Egypt and the Sudan is the Battle of Tamai

To the War in Egypt and the Sudan index

Battle: El Teb

War: Sudan Campaign.

Date of the Battle of El Teb: 29^th February 1884.

Place of the Battle of El Teb: The East of the Sudan near the Red Sea coast.

Combatants at the Battle of El Teb: A British Army against the Sudanese Jihadist Arabs in revolt against the Khedive of Egypt.

Commanders at the Battle of El Teb: Major General Graham commanded the British troops against the Mahdi’s lieutenant, Osman Digna.

Size of the armies at the Battle of El Teb: British: 3,342 infantry, gunners and sappers, 864 cavalry and 28 guns. The size of the Mahdist army is unknown, but was probably in the region of 15,000 tribesmen and defected Egyptian troops.

Uniforms, arms and equipment at the Battle of El Teb: The British infantry were armed with the Martini Henry single shot breech loading rifle and bayonet. The English infantry wore khaki drill. The Highlanders wore grey jackets and kilts. All wore pith helmets. The cavalry were armed with sword and carbine.

The Mahdists fought with their traditional weapons of the sword, spear and dagger. They wore white robes patched with black cloth and fought under their characteristic black flags. There was no Mahdist cavalry.

The Mahdists also carried rifles, taken from the various Egyptian detachments they had overwhelmed.  They also deployed the Khedive’s Krupp guns captured in the same way, keeping the Egyptian gunners alive to man the guns.

Winner of the Battle of El Teb: The British force.

British Regiments at the Battle of El Teb:
10^th Hussars
19^th Hussars
Mounted Infantry
Royal Artillery with six 7 pounders, ten mountain guns and four 9 centimetre Krupp guns.
Naval Brigade; 162 men with two 9 pounders, six Gatling and Gardiner guns.

1^st Battalion Black Watch
3^rd Battalion King’s Royal Rifle Corps
1^st Battalion Gordon Highlanders
2^nd Battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers
1^st Battalion York and Lancaster Regiment
Royal Marine Light Infantry
Royal Engineers

Account of the Battle of El Teb:

Sudan, lying to the South of Egypt and bordering Abyssinia, in the 19^th Century lay under the rule of the Khedive of Egypt, within the Ottoman Turkish Empire. The Muslim Arab population lived mainly along the banks of the Nile and in the eastern areas up to the shore of the Persian Gulf. To the South and West were the regions of Darfour and Kordofan, with largely African populations. Egyptian garrisons, scattered across the country, occupied the towns. The Muslim religion predominated.

In 1881, a young Muslim boat builder’s apprentice, named Mohammed Ahmed, raised the standard of Jihadist revolt in the Sudan against the Khedive, proclaiming himself the ‘Mahdi’ or saviour. The revolt in the East of the Sudan was led by the Mahdi’s lieutenant, Osman Digna.

On 29^th April 1883, the Mahdi’s army annihilated an Egyptian force, commanded by a retired Bombay Army officer, Colonel Hicks, at Kashgate. The remaining Egyptian garrisons, scattered across the Sudan, lay at the mercy of the Mahdi and his tribesmen.

In January 1884, a British officer, Baker Pasha, took an Egyptian force to Suakin, on the coast of the Persian Gulf, to provide cover for a withdrawal of the Egyptian garrisons in the East of the Sudan. This force was annihilated by the Mahdists at the First Battle of El Teb, a few miles inland from a port called Trinkitat. The Mahdists moved on to besiege the other garrison towns in the area held by the Egyptians.  Baker survived the loss of his force.

In January 1884, at the urging of the British Government, the Khedive appointed General Charles Gordon to oversee the evacuation of the Egyptian forces from the Sudan. General Gordon had acted as Governor of the Sudan in the 1870s with considerable effect. Gordon travelled from London to Khartoum, the capital of the Sudan, arriving on 18^th February 1884.

In the meanwhile, a British army, commanded by Major General Graham, was dispatched from Egypt by ship down the Persian Gulf to land at Suakin and relieve the Egyptian garrison at Tokar, 50 miles to the South of Suakin.

General Graham’s force began to arrive at Suakin on 20^th February 1884, the first regiment being the 10^th Hussars. Other Royal Navy ships arrived with the remaining regiments. Once assembled, the force moved down the coast by ship to the lagoon of Trinkitat, for the march to the relief of Tokar.

On 22^nd February 1884, General Graham received information from a group of Egyptian soldiers that the governor of Tokar had surrendered to the Mahdi’s forces, his troops joining the rebels to avoid being massacred.

The British force moved inland, between two patches of salt marsh, to occupy a position called Fort Baker, the scene of Baker Pasha’s disaster the previous month: Colonel Baker was accompanying the British force.

On 29^th February 1884, the British infantry brigade formed a square and began the advance to the hamlet of El Teb, some 2 ½ miles inland along the track to Tokar, where Osman Digna’s Mahdists lay dug into entrenched positions.

The front of the square was formed by the Gordon Highlanders and the rear by the Black Watch, both in company columns of fours at company intervals. The right flank was formed by the 2^nd Royal Irish Fusiliers and 3^rd King’s Royal Rifle Corps, the left flank by the 1^st York and Lancaster Regiment and the detachment of Royal Marine Light Infantry, all in open column of companies. The angles of the square were filled by guns manned by Royal Artillery and Royal Navy personnel.

Colonel Buller, who won his Victoria Cross on Mount Hlobane in the Zulu War (see the Battle of Khambula), commanded the infantry brigade. The only baggage animals taken with the force carried spare ammunition. The cavalry, 10^th and 19^th Hussars and Mounted Infantry commanded by Colonel Stewart, followed the infantry square at a distance.

At 11.20am, the Mahdists opened rifle and artillery fire, using the small arms and Krupp guns captured from the Egyptian forces they had annihilated in the course of the revolt.

The British square halted and the infantry were ordered to lie down, while the guns and machine guns fired on the Mahdists. The effect of this bombardment was to silence the Krupps. The square stood up and continued its advance under rifle fire. The British began to take casualties.

When the British square was within two hundred yards of the earthworks, the Mahdist tribesmen abandoned their firearms and charged with spears and swords. Large numbers of the tribesmen were shot down by the rifle fire of the British infantry and by the Gatling and Gardiner guns of the Naval Brigade. None broke into the British square.

Following this assault, the Mahdist tribesmen fell back and the square reformed and resumed its advance.

At this point, Colonel Stewart’s Cavalry Brigade advanced past the right flank of the square and charged the massed Mahdist tribesmen, leading to a confused struggle in the broken thorn bush covered country. The cavalry suffered heavy casualties in this scrimmage.

As the British infantry reached the Mahdist earthworks, the battalions formed lines and stormed the tribesmen’s positions at the point of the bayonet.

At around 1pm, General Graham’s troops took the hamlet of El Teb and the Mahdists began to stream away into the surrounding countryside.

Casualties at the Battle of El Teb: The British casualties were 5 officers and 24 non-commissioned ranks killed and 17 officers and 142 non-commissioned ranks wounded. The Mahdists suffered around 2,500 killed and an unknown number of wounded.

Follow-up to the Battle of El Teb: Following the battle, General Graham continued his advance on Tokar. He fought one further major engagement, the Battle of Tamai, before being ordered back to Egypt, leaving General Charles Gordon to manage the crisis in Sudan with Egyptian resources.

Anecdotes and traditions from the Battle of El Teb:

• The battles between the British and the Sudanese Jihadist tribesmen were of considerable ferocity. The Mahdi’s dictat was that all non-Muslims in the Sudan faced death, although the Muslim Egyptian and Turkish personnel in the Sudan fared little better at his hands. No British wounded in the battle survived unless immediately recovered. All the cavalrymen who fell from their horses during the charge were killed by the tribesmen, unless promptly rescued. Equally the British troops took few prisoners.
• The battle was fought over the same area in which Baker Pasha’s Egyptian force had been annihilated the previous month. After the battle, the Black Watch were given the task of gathering the corpses of the European officers killed in the earlier battle and burying them.
  

  Captain A.K. Wilson winning the Victoria Cross at the Battle of El Teb on 29th February 1884 in the Sudanese War: picture by Harry Payne

• Two Victoria Crosses were won at El Teb: One by Captain Arthur Wilson, Royal Navy, for holding off a Mahdist attack while his ratings brought their Gardiner gun into action; the other by Sergeant Marshall of the 19^th Hussars for rescuing his wounded commanding officer, Colonel Barrow, whose horse had been killed during the final cavalry charge.
  

  Sergeant Marshall winning the Victoria Cross at the Battle of El Teb on 29th February 1884 in the Sudanese War by rescuing his commanding officer, Lt Col Barrow of the 19th Hussars: picture by Harry Payne

• The Mahdist artillery comprised Krupp guns captured with their Egyptian gun crews. If Egyptian gunners miss aimed or miss fired their gun they were flogged or killed by the Mahdists.
• It is said that Osman Digna and his commanders concealed from the rank and file of the Mahdist army that they were fighting British troops, maintaining that the enemy were Egyptians and Turks.
• Colonel Baker, Baker Pasha, had been a highly regarded commanding officer of the 10^th Prince of Wales’ Hussars until convicted of an indecent assault and forced to leave the army in disgrace and take service with the Khedive of Egypt.
• Colonel Redvers Buller VC, commanding the infantry brigade, was wounded at El Teb. He went on to command the Natal Field Force in the Great Boer War, with a singular lack of success. None of the panache that inspired his campaigns as a junior officer survived his promotion to a senior commander.
• Colonel Fred Burnaby acted as intelligence officer for General Graham and was wounded in the arm at El Teb.

Campaign Medals for the Battle of El Teb:
For the Sudan campaign the British troops received the Egypt medal that had been issued for the Tel-El-Kebir campaign in 1882, but without the date. Where troops already had the Egypt 1882 medal they received an additional clasp ‘El Teb’ for that medal. In the same way, the Khedive Star was issued to those ranks that did not already have it.

References for the Battle of El Teb:
War on the Nile by Michael Barthorp.

British Battles by Grant.

History of British Cavalry Volume 3: 1872-1898 by the Marquess of Anglesey

The previous battle of the War in Egypt and the Sudan is the Battle of Tel-el-Kebir

The next battle of the War in Egypt and the Sudan is the Battle of Tamai

To the War in Egypt and the Sudan index

The battle fought on 27^th July 1880, where a force of British and Indian troops was overwhelmed by Afghan soldiers and tribesmen, a notorious Victorian military disaster

The previous battle in the Second Afghan War is the Battle of Ahmed Khel

The next battle in the Second Afghan War is the Battle of Kandahar

To the Second Afghan War index

Battle: Maiwand

War: Second Afghan War

Date of the Battle of Maiwand: 27^th July 1880.

Place of the Battle of Maiwand: West of Kandahar in Southern Afghanistan.

Combatants at the Battle of Maiwand: British troops and Indian troops of the Bombay Army against Afghan regular troops and tribesmen.

Generals at the Battle of Maiwand: Brigadier General Burrows against Ayub Khan.

Size of the armies at the Battle of Maiwand: 2,500 British and Indian troops with 6 RHA guns and 6 smooth bore guns against 3,000 Afghan cavalry and 9,000 infantry with 6 batteries of artillery (36 guns).

Uniforms, arms and equipment at the Battle of Maiwand:
The British and Indian forces were made up, predominantly, of native Indian regiments from the armies of the three British presidencies, Bengal, Bombay and Madras, with smaller regional forces, such as the Hyderabad contingent, and the newest, the powerful Punjab Frontier Force.

The Mutiny of 1857 had brought great change to the Indian Army. Prior to the Mutiny, the old regiments of the presidencies were recruited from the higher caste Brahmins, Hindus and Muslims of the provinces of central and eastern India, principally Oudh. Sixty of the ninety infantry regiments of the Bengal Army mutinied in 1857 and many more were disbanded, leaving few to survive in their pre-1857 form. A similar proportion of Bengal Cavalry regiments disappeared.

The British Army overcame the mutineers with the assistance of the few loyal regiments of the Bengal Army and the regiments of the Bombay and Madras Presidencies, which, on the whole, did not mutiny. But principally, the British turned to the Gurkhas, Sikhs, Muslims of the Punjab and Baluchistan and the Pathans of the North-West Frontier for the new regiments with which Delhi was recaptured and the Mutiny suppressed.

After the Mutiny, the British developed the concept of ‘the Martial Races of India’. Certain Indian races were more suitable to serve as soldiers, went the argument, and those were, coincidentally, the races that had saved India for Britain. The Indian regiments that invaded Afghanistan in 1878, although mostly from the Bengal Army, were predominantly recruited from the martial races; Jats, Sikhs, Muslim and Hindu Punjabis, Pathans, Baluchis and Gurkhas.

Prior to the Mutiny, each Presidency army had a full quota of field and horse artillery batteries. The only Indian artillery units allowed to exist after the Mutiny were the mountain batteries. All the horse, field and siege batteries were, from 1859, found by the British Royal Artillery.

In 1878, the regiments were beginning to adopt khaki for field operations. The technique for dying uniforms varied widely, producing a range of shades of khaki, from bottle green to a light brown drab.

As regulation uniforms were unsatisfactory for field conditions in Afghanistan, the officers in most regiments improvised more serviceable forms of clothing.

Every Indian regiment was commanded by British officers, in a proportion of some 7 officers to 650 soldiers, in the infantry. This was an insufficient number for units in which all tactical decisions of significance were taken by the British and was particularly inadequate for less experienced units.

The British infantry carried the single shot, breech loading, .45 Martini-Henry rifle. The Indian regiments still used the Snider; also a breech loading single shot rifle, but of older pattern and a conversion of the obsolete muzzle loading Enfield weapon.

The cavalry was armed with sword, lance and carbine, Martini-Henry for the British troopers, Snider for the Indian sowars.

The British artillery, using a variety of guns, many smooth bored muzzle loaders, was not as effective as it could have been, if the authorities had equipped it with the breech loading steel guns being produced for European armies. Artillery support was frequently ineffective and on occasions the Afghan artillery proved to be better equipped than the British.

The army in India possessed no higher formations above the regiment in times of peace, other than the staffs of static garrisons. There was no operational training for staff officers. On the outbreak of war, brigade and divisional staffs had to be formed and learn by experience.

The British Army had, in 1870, replaced long service with short service for its soldiers. The system was not yet universally applied, so that some regiments in Afghanistan were short service and others still manned by long service soldiers. The Indian regiments were all manned by long service soldiers. The universal view seems to have been that the short service regiments were weaker both in fighting effectiveness and disease resistance than the long service.

Winner of the Battle of Maiwand: Overwhelmingly, the Afghans.

British and Indian Regiments at the Battle of Maiwand: 
E/B Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, now Maiwand Battery, 29^th Commando Regiment, Royal Artillery.
3^rd Queen’s Own (Bombay Cavalry)
3^rd Scinde Horse (Bombay Army)
HM 66^th Regiment (less 2 companies), from 1882 Royal Berkshire Regiment and now the Rifles.
1^st Grenadiers (Bombay Army)
30^th Bombay Native Infantry (Jacob’s Rifles)
2^nd Company Bombay Sappers and Miners (half company)

Account of the Battle of Maiwand: 
When in March 1879 Lieutenant General Sir Donald Stewart marched north to Kabul with his division of Bengal Army and British regiments, Kandahar was left to the Wali, its Afghan ruler, and a replacement garrison of Bombay and British troops under Major General Primrose. The Bengal regiments in the north of Afghanistan were to withdraw to India during 1880, leaving only Kandahar Province occupied by British and Indian troops.

In early 1880, the word reached Kandahar that Ayub Khan, the younger brother of the deposed Ameer of Afghanistan Yakoub Khan, was about to march with his army from Herat to Ghuznee, passing to the north of Kandahar.

The Wali of Kandahar urged the British to intercept Ayub at Girishk, on the Helmond River, to prevent him from raising the whole countryside by his armed passage.

The Indian Government directed General Primrose to send a brigade to Girishk and to bring regiments up from the reserve division as replacements.

Primrose appointed Brigadier General Burrows commander of the field brigade, with Brigadier General Nuttall commanding the cavalry.

The two cavalry regiments, 3^rd Bombay Light Cavalry and 3^rd Scinde Horse marched out of Kandahar on 4^th July 1880, followed by the infantry and guns the next day.

Burrows force joined the Wali’s troops at Girishk, only for the Wali’s men to mutiny, many joining Ayub Khan’s army.  The British seized their six antiquated smooth bore guns and formed a makeshift battery, manned by soldiers from the 66^th Regiment with Royal Horse Artillery officers under Captain Slade.

Late on 26^th July 1880, Burrows received intelligence that Ayub’s force was moving through the Malmund Pass and would reach the village of Maiwand the next day, poised to march on Ghuznee. If Burrows had moved on hearing the news, he might have reached Maiwand before Ayub. Instead the brigade marched in the early hours of the next day, after a particularly trying time assembling its baggage.

As the British/Indian brigade approached Maiwand, Ayub’s army could be seen marching across its front, in the swirling dust storms that swept the semi-desert area. Burrows formed the view that he could reach Maiwand before the Afghans and urged his troops forward.

Burrows force passed the village of Mundabad and found it had reached a substantial ravine twenty-five feet deep, running along its front. Instead of taking up defensive positions along the ravine and in the village, Burrows ordered his force across the ravine into the open plain beyond.

Ayub’s army comprised regular Afghan regiments from Kabul and Herat, the Wali’s force which had deserted to him and Afghan tribesmen, making the force up to around 12,000 men, including 3,000 cavalry. Burrows, by contrast, had available for his line around 1,500 infantry and 350 cavalry, after telling off the necessary baggage guards.

The British guns crossed the ravine and continued forward to a position where the Afghans were in range and opened fire.

The guns advanced considerably further than Burrows intended, the rest of his force hurrying up in support; the infantry in a line, with the 66^th on the right, Jacob’s Rifles in the centre and the 1st Grenadiers on the left.

The first phase of the battle comprised an artillery duel; the Afghans out-shooting the British, having a greater number of more modern and heavier guns, including six state-of-the-art Armstrong guns. The 1^st Grenadiers and the cavalry suffered significant casualties, while the 66^th and Jacob’s Rifles were able to find cover from the bombardment.

Following the artillery exchange, the Afghan infantry massed in front of the British/Indian line for an assault. In a pre-emptive move, Burrows ordered the 1st Grenadiers to attack, but then cancelled the order even though the advance was making progress, fearing that the Grenadiers were suffering excessive casualties from the Afghan gunfire.

The advance across the open plain exposed the British/Indian left flank; the threat from the enveloping Afghan cavalry causing Burrows to move two companies of Jacob’s Rifles to this flank and bolstering them with two of the smooth bore guns on their left, between Jacob’s Rifles and the troops of the baggage guard.

The British commanders had not realized that a hidden second ravine ran beside the force’s other flank, joining the main ravine in their right rear. The Afghans used this ravine during the battle to infiltrate down the British/Indian right flank, forcing the 66^th Foot to wheel to face the Afghans, until the regiment faced at right angles to its neighbours, Jacob’s Rifles and the 1st Bombay Grenadiers.

Burrows’ force was now seriously strung out, in a horse shoe formation, exposed by the abortive advance of the infantry line, with the Afghan cavalry massing on the left flank and Afghan tribesmen, infantry and guns infiltrating down the right flank, by way of the subsidiary ravine.

In the early afternoon, the two smoothbore guns ran out of ammunition and withdrew, a move which severely unsettled the two companies of Jacobs Rifles on the left flank, already suffering from the artillery fire and the heat.

With the departure of the smooth bores, the Afghan cavalry were enabled to infiltrate behind the British/Indian left flank. Efforts were made to counter this move with volley firing from the two companies of Jacob’s Rifles, but the fire was largely ineffective, the companies inexperienced and commanded by a newly joined officer, almost unknown to his soldiers and who did not speak their language.

On the British/Indian right flank, the Afghans continued to pass down the subsidiary ravine. A move was made by troops of the Scinde Horse to attack these Afghans but the cavalry was recalled.

Ayub brought two of his guns down the subsidiary ravine and commenced firing at short range, probably as short as three hundred metres, into the 1st Grenadiers.

In the early afternoon, the guns ceased firing and a mass of Afghan tribesman charged the British/Indian infantry line. The two companies of Jacob’s Rifles on the left fled, leaving the flank of the 1st Grenadiers wholly exposed.

The Afghans cut down numbers of the Grenadiers, the Indian soldiers apparently too exhausted and demoralized to resist.

The RHA guns positioned in the centre of the line fired a last salvo and withdrew in haste, the Afghans reaching within yards of the retreating guns and overwhelming the left section. Seeing the guns go, the remainder of Jacob’s Rifles dissolved into the left wing of the 66^th, throwing the right of the line into confusion.

Burrows sent Nuttall an order to charge the Afghans with his cavalry, in an attempt to restore the situation. Only 150 cavalry sowars could be assembled and these men charged half-heartedly at the Afghans surrounding the Grenadiers and withdrew immediately after the contact. Burrows rode about the field attempting to bring about a further cavalry attack, but without success.

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Battle of Kandahar, also known as the Battle of Baba Wali, fought on 1^st September 1880 and the last battle of the Second Afghan War; General Roberts’ crowning success after his march from Kabul

The previous battle of the Second Afghan War is the Battle of Maiwand

The next battle in the British Battles sequence is the Battle of Isandlwana

To the Second Afghan War index

Battle: Battle of Kandahar or the Battle of Baba Wali.

War: Second Afghan War

Date of the Battle of Kandahar: 1^st September 1880.

Place of the Battle of Kandahar: Southern Afghanistan.

Combatants at the Battle of Kandahar: Troops of the British, Bengal and Bombay Armies against Afghan regular troops and tribesmen.

Generals at the Battle of Kandahar: Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Roberts VC KCB against Ayub Khan.

Size of the armies at the Battle of Kandahar: General Roberts force from Kabul comprised 2,562 British and 7,151 Indian troops. Some 2,000 troops also took part in the final battle from the British and Indian troops of the Kandahar garrison. The Afghan army comprised 3,000 cavalry and 12,000 infantry and tribesmen with 6 batteries of artillery (36 guns) and the two RHA guns captured at the Battle of Maiwand.

Uniforms, arms and equipment at the Battle of Kandahar:
The British and Indian forces were made up, predominantly, of native Indian regiments from the armies of the three British presidencies, Bengal, Bombay and Madras, with smaller regional forces, such as the Hyderabad contingent, and the newest, the powerful Punjab Frontier Force.

The Mutiny of 1857 brought great change to the Indian Army. Prior to the Mutiny, the old regiments of the presidencies were recruited from the higher caste Brahmins, Hindus and Muslims of the provinces of central and eastern India, principally Oudh. Sixty of the ninety infantry regiments of the Bengal Army mutinied in 1857 and many more were disbanded, leaving few to survive in their pre-1857 form. A similar proportion of Bengal Cavalry regiments disappeared.

The British Army overcame the mutineers with the assistance of the few loyal regiments of the Bengal Army and the regiments of the Bombay and Madras Presidencies, which on the whole did not mutiny. But principally, the British turned to the Gurkhas, Sikhs, Muslims of the Punjab and Baluchistan and the Pathans of the North-West Frontier for the new regiments with which Delhi was recaptured and the Mutiny suppressed.

After the Mutiny, the British developed the concept of ‘the Martial Races of India’. Certain Indian races were more suitable to serve as soldiers, went the argument, and those were, coincidentally, the races that had saved India for Britain. The Indian regiments that invaded Afghanistan in 1878, although mostly from the Bengal Army, were predominantly recruited from the martial races; Jats, Sikhs, Muslim and Hindu Punjabis, Pathans, Baluchis and Gurkhas.

Prior to the Mutiny, each Presidency army had a full quota of field and horse artillery batteries. The only Indian artillery units allowed to exist after the Mutiny were the mountain batteries. All the horse, field and siege batteries were, from 1859, found by the British Royal Artillery.

In 1878, the regiments were beginning to adopt khaki for field operations. The technique for dying uniforms varied widely, producing a range of shades of khaki, from bottle green to a light brown drab.

As regulation uniforms were unsatisfactory for field conditions in Afghanistan, the officers in most regiments improvised more serviceable forms of clothing.

Every Indian regiment was commanded by British officers, in a proportion of some 7 officers to 650 soldiers, in the infantry. This was an insufficient number for units in which all tactical decisions of significance were taken by the British and was particularly inadequate for less experienced units.

The British infantry carried the single shot, breech loading, .45 Martini-Henry rifle. The Indian regiments still used the Snider; also a breech loading single shot rifle, but of older pattern and a conversion of the obsolete muzzle loading Enfield weapon.

The cavalry was armed with sword, lance and carbine, Martini-Henry for the British troopers, Snider for the Indian sowars.

The British artillery, using a variety of guns, many smooth bored muzzle loaders, was not as effective as it could have been, if the authorities had equipped it with the breech loading steel guns being produced for European armies. Artillery support was frequently ineffective and on occasions the Afghan artillery proved to be better equipped than the British.

The army in India possessed no higher formations above the regiment in times of peace, other than the staffs of static garrisons. There was no operational training for staff officers. On the outbreak of war, brigade and divisional staffs had to be formed and learn by experience.

The British Army, in 1870, replaced long service with short service for its soldiers. The system was not yet universally applied, so that some regiments in Afghanistan were short service and others still manned by long service soldiers. The Indian regiments were all manned by long service soldiers. The universal view seems to have been that the short service regiments were weaker both in fighting effectiveness and disease resistance than the long service.

Winner of the Battle of Kandahar: The British and Indian Army.

British Regiments at the Battle of Kandahar: 
Regiments from Kabul:
9^th Lancers, from 1966 9^th/12^th Royal Lancers *
3^rd Bengal Cavalry *
23^rd Bengal Cavalry *
1^st Central India Horse *
2^nd Central India Horse *
three batteries of Mountain Artillery.
2^nd Battalion 60^th Rifles, now the Rifles. *
72^nd Highlanders, later Seaforth Highlanders, now the Royal Regiment of Scotland. *
92^nd Highlanders, later Gordon Highlanders, now the Royal Regiment of Scotland. *
15^th Bengal Native Infantry (Ludhiana Sikhs) *
23^rd Bengal Native Infantry (Punjab Pioneers) *
24^th Bengal Native Infantry (Punjabis) *
25^th Bengal Native Infantry (Punjabis) *
2^nd Prince of Wales’s Own Gurkhas *

4^th Gurkhas *
5^th Gurkhas *
2^nd Sikh Infantry *
3^rd Sikh Infantry *

Kandahar Regiments:
E/B Battery Royal Horse Artillery
3^rd Queen’s Own Cavalry (Bombay Army) *
3^rd Scinde Horse (Bombay Army) *
HM 7^th Royal Fusiliers, now the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. *
HM 66^th Regiment (remainder of), from 1882 the Royal Berkshire Regiment and now the Rifles. *
1^st Grenadiers (Bombay Army) *
4^th Bombay Native Infantry *
19^th Bombay Native Infantry *
28^th Bombay Native Infantry (Jacob’s Rifles) *
29^th Balluch Battalion *
* These regiments have Kandahar as a battle honour.

The Order of Battle of the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force:
Commander in Chief: Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Roberts VC. KCB.
Cavalry Brigade: commanded by Brigadier General Hugh Gough VC CB.
9^th Lancers
3^rd Bengal Cavalry
23^rd Bengal Cavalry
Central India Horse

Artillery Brigade: commanded by Colonel Alured Johnson
three batteries of Mountain Artillery.

Infantry Division: commanded by Major General Sir John Ross KCB
First Brigade: commanded by Brigadier General H. Macpherson VC CB
92^nd (Gordon) Highlanders
23^rd Bengal Native Infantry (Punjab Pioneers)
24^th Bengal Native Infantry (Punjabis)
2^nd Prince of Wales’s Own Gurkhas

Second Brigade: commanded by Brigadier General TD Baker CB
72^nd (Duke of Albany’s) Highlanders
2^nd Sikh Infantry
3^rd Sikh Infantry
5^th Gurkhas

Third Brigade: commanded by Brigadier General CM MacGregor CB
2^nd Battalion 60^th Rifles
15^th Bengal Native Infantry (Ludhiana Sikhs)
25^th Bengal Native Infantry (Punjabis)
4^th Gurkhas

Account of the Battle of Kandahar:
The disastrous defeat at the Battle of Maiwand, forty miles west of Kandahar, on 27^th July 1880, threw British plans into disarray, after two years of uninterrupted success in the Second Afghan War. The remaining Bombay brigade found itself besieged in Kandahar by Ayub Khan’s victorious army, the nearest support hundreds of miles away in Kabul and in Quetta, forces commanded by General Roberts and Brigadier General Phayre respectively.

Roberts moved first, his troops being relatively concentrated around the Afghan capital, while Phayre’s Bombay troops were scattered along the lengthy lines of communication connecting Kandahar with India, from Quetta to the Indus River.

On 8^th August 1880, Roberts marched out of the Sherpur Cantonment in Kabul with his Kabul-Kandahar Field Force; his renowned march to Kandahar had begun.

The Central Indian Horse and a battery of artillery, coming up from Gandamak, caught up the next day as Robert’s army moved across high ground to join the main Kandahar road near Ghuznee, before marching south down that road. The pace was forced as hard as possible; only mountain artillery accompanying the infantry and cavalry; with supplies carried by camel. The days were hot and the nights cold; the troops marching out in the early morning to avoid the full heat of the sun, halting a few minutes every hour, with camp pitched at around midday. With this routine, Roberts’ troops managed to cover up to twenty miles a day.

On 23^rd August 1880, the force reached Kelat-i-Ghilzai, one hundred and forty miles beyond Ghuznee. The pace of the march was taking its toll, with soldiers falling sick at the rate of five hundred a day.

Messages from Kandahar informed Roberts that there was no pressing urgency, as the garrison was well able to hold out for some time yet and so, with eighty-eight miles to go, Roberts’ permitted his force to rest at Kelat-i-Ghilzai. When he moved on, Roberts took the British garrison with him, it no longer being part of the British plan to hold the town.

On 27^th August 1880, word reached Roberts that Ayub Khan had abandoned his siege of Kandahar and withdrawn westwards. Roberts sent Brigadier General Gough’s cavalry brigade to search him out.

Roberts halted at Robat on 28^th August 1880, to allow his force to concentrate. Officers came out from Kandahar to give him the latest intelligence and consult with him.

On 31st August 1880, the Kabul Field Force reached Kandahar and entered the city. Roberts’ 10,000 troops had marched three hundred miles in three weeks.

Roberts resolved to move against Ayub Khan the same day. Ayub’s camp lay to the west of Kandahar, between the Baba Wali range of hills, which rise to 5,000 feet and the Argandab River, the hills breached by the Baba Wali Kotal, a defile, and the Murcha Pass. The main assault would be made by the Kabul Field Force, with Bombay troops providing a diversion. Nuttall’s brigade of Bombay cavalry, survivors from the battle at Maiwand, was to picket the Murcha, while Bombay infantry and the 7^th Royal Fusiliers threatened the Baba Wali Kotal. In the main attack, Robert’s Bengal force would move around the southern end of the hills and advance north up the river to Ayub’s camp, taking the villages on the way.

Roberts had 11,000 men and 32 guns in the field, against Ayub Khan’s 15,000 Afghan regular troops and tribesmen and 32 guns.

The battle began the next morning at around 9.30am with artillery bombardments of the Baba Wali Kotal and the foremost villages held by the Afghans.

Following the bombardment, the 92^nd Highlanders and the 2^nd Gurkhas, supported by the 23^rd and 24^th BNI attacked the village of Gundimullah Sahibdad. After two hours of close combat the village was carried and the British and Indian troops moved on to the next fortified village, Pir Paimal.

To the south, the 72^nd (Albany) Highlanders and the 2^nd Sikhs took Gundigan, the colonel of the 72nd being killed in the assault.

At around midday, both infantry brigades began the assault on Pir Paimal, the last stronghold shielding Ayub’s camp, the Third Brigade coming up in support.

As Roberts planned, the Afghans, their retreat threatened by the advance on Pir Paimal, began to melt away. The final Afghan fortifications, outside the camp, were heavily defended by guns, leading the British and Indian troops to expect a severe test. The regiments stormed forward, led by Major George White of the 92^nd and Lieutenant Colonel Money of the 3rd Sikhs, to find the line abandoned. The Afghans had gone.

As the infantry advanced, Gough’s cavalry brigade picked its way through the maze of walled gardens and fields, only to be ordered back, to cross the Argandab River and cut off the Afghan retreat. By the time the cavalry had retraced their path and crossed the river, the horses were exhausted and the Afghans had largely gone, retreating west towards Herat.

The last battle of the Second Afghan War had been fought.

Casualties at the Battle of Kandahar: 
Roberts’ force captured all Ayub Khan’s guns, including the two guns captured from the Royal Horse Artillery at the Battle of Maiwand. British and Indian casualties were 248 killed and wounded. Afghan casualties were estimated at around 2,500 killed, wounded and captured.

The commanding officer of the 72nd Highlanders, Lieutenant Colonel Brownlow, was killed.

Follow-up to the Battle of Kandahar:
The British and Indian regiments finally withdrew from Afghanistan in April 1881. By the Treaty of Gandamak, signed the previous year, a substantial swathe of Afghan territory became part of India, including much mountainous tribal territory. The result was sixty-five years of almost incessant warfare between those tribes and the British and Indian Armies.

The Second Afghan War imposed an enormous financial strain on the Government of India, leading to the disbanding of several Indian Army regiments, as an economy measure.

• Anecdotes and traditions from the Battle of Kandahar: 
  • Roberts’ march to Kandahar captured the imagination of the Victorian British Empire and was considered a triumph of determination and organisation. General Roberts was later elevated to the peerage as a baron, earl and then a viscount.
  • General Roberts, an artillery officer known to his soldiers affectionately as ‘Bobs’, suffered the loss of an eye in childhood. An Old Etonian, Roberts won the Victoria Cross in the Indian Mutiny and went on to command the Indian Army and then the British and Empire troops in the Boer War. He suffered personal tragedy in the death of his son, Freddie dying in the attempt to rescue the guns at the Battle of Colenso in the Boer War, winning a posthumous Victoria Cross.
  

  Lieutenant Menzies of the 92nd Highlanders defended by Drummer Roddick during the Battle of Kandahar on 1st September 1880 in the Second Afghan War: picture by Skeoch Cumming

  • During the assault on Gundimullah, Lieutenant Menzies of the 92^nd was attacked by several Ghazis, or fanatical Afghan tribesmen. Knocked to the ground, Menzies was rescued first by a drummer from his own regiment and then by a Gurkha.

  

  Second Afghan War Medal with clasps for Kandahar, Kabul and Charasia and the Kabul and Kandahar Star: Battle of Kandahar on 1st September 1880 in the Second Afghan War

• Major George White earned the Victoria Cross leading the attack on the Afghan fortification. He was followed by Sepoy Inderbir Lama of the 2^nd Gurkhas, who marked an Afghan gun as taken for his regiment by hanging his cap over the muzzle. White commanded the British force shut up in Ladysmith during the Boer War.
  • During the confusion of the final attack on the Afghan camp, Lieutenant Hector Maclaine, Royal Horse Artillery, a prisoner from the retreat after the Battle of Maiwand, was murdered by his Afghan guards, with a sepoy prisoner.
  • During the Second Afghan War, Colour Sergeant Hector MacDonald of the 92^nd was commissioned in the field for bravery and initiative. MacDonald achieved promotion to brigadier and distinguished himself in the Egyptian campaign.
  • A week after the battle, Brigadier General Daubeny and a force marched to Maiwand, to bury the British and Indian dead and examine the scene of the heavy defeat of the previous month.
  

  British Officer wearing the Second Afghan War Medal and the Kabul and Kandahar Star: Battle of Kandahar on 1st September 1880 in the Second Afghan War

  • British officers irreverently referred to Roberts’ march to Kandahar, apparently competing with Phayre to relieve the city, as ‘the Race for the Peerage’.

• A memorial to Lieutenant Colonel Brownlow and the casualties of the 72nd Highlanders in the Second Afghan War stands on the Edinburgh Castle Esplanade.

References for the Battle of Kandahar:

The Afghan Wars by Archibald Forbes

The Road to Kabul; the Second Afghan War 1878 to 1881 by Brian Robson.

Recent British Battles by Grant.

The previous battle of the Second Afghan War is the Battle of Maiwand

The next battle in the British Battles sequence is the Battle of Isandlwana

To the Second Afghan War index

The final battle of the Sikh Wars, fought on 21^st February 1849, in which Gough’s Anglo-Indian Army of the Punjab methodically destroyed the last Sikh army

The previous battle in the Second Sikh War is the Battle of Chillianwallah

The next battle in the British Battles sequence is the Battle of the Alma

To the Second Sikh War Index

Battle: Goojerat

War: Second Sikh War.

Date of the Battle of Goojerat: 21^st February 1849.

Place of the Battle of Goojerat: In the Punjab in the North-West of India.

Combatants at the Battle of Goojerat: British troops and Indian troops of the Bengal and Bombay Presidencies against Sikhs of the Khalsa, the army of the Punjab, with their Afghan allies.

Commanders at the Battle of Goojerat: Major General Sir Hugh Gough against the Sikh general, Shere Singh.

Size of the armies at the Battle of Goojerat: 24,000 British, Bengal Army and Bombay Army troops with 96 guns, against 60,000 Sikhs with 59 guns.

Uniforms, arms and equipment at the Battle of Goojerat (this section is the same in each of the battles of the Sikh Wars):
The two wars fought between 1845 and 1849 between the British and the Sikhs led to the annexation of the Punjab by the British East India Company, and one of the most successful military co-operations between two races, stretching into a century of strife on the North West Frontier of British India, the Indian Mutiny, Egypt and finally the First and Second World Wars.

The British contingent comprised four light cavalry regiments (3^rd, 9^th, 14^th and 16^th Light Dragoons- the 9^th and 16^th being lancers) and twelve regiments of foot (9^th, 10^th, 24^th, 29^th, 31^st, 32^nd, 50^th, 53^rd, 60^th, 61^st, 62^nd and 80^th regiments).

The bulk of General Gough’s ‘Army of the Sutlej’ in the First Sikh War and ‘Army of the Punjab’ in the Second Sikh War comprised regiments from the Bengal Presidency’s army: 9 regular cavalry regiments (the Governor-General’s Bodyguard and 1^st, 3^rd, 4^th, 5^th, 6^th, 7^th, 8^th and 11^th Bengal Light Cavalry), 13 regiments of irregular cavalry (2^nd, 3^rd, 4^th, 7^th to 9^th and 11^th to the 17^th Bengal Irregular Cavalry), 48 regiments of foot (1^st to 4^th, 7^th, 8^th, 12^th to 16^th, 18^th, 20^th, 22^nd, 24^th to 27^th, 29^th to 33^rd, 36^th, 37^th, 41^st to 54^th, 56^th, 59^th, 63^rd and 68^th to 73^rd Bengal Native Infantry), horse artillery, field artillery, heavy artillery and sappers and miners.

The Bombay presidency contributed a force that marched in from Scinde, in the west, and gave considerable assistance at the Siege of Multan; the 19^th Bombay Native Infantry gaining the title of the Multan Regiment for its services in the siege, a label still held by its Indian Army successor.

A Bombay brigade under Brigadier Dundas joined General Gough’s army for the final battle of the Second Sikh War at Goojerat, where the two regiments of Scinde Horse, Bombay Irregular Cavalry, particularly distinguished themselves. The brigade comprised: 2 regiments of Scinde Horse, 3^rd and 19^th Bombay Native Infantry and Bombay horse artillery and field artillery.

Each of the three presidencies, in addition to their native regiments, possessed European infantry, of which the 1^st Bengal (European) Infantry, 2^nd Bengal (European) Light Infantry and 1^st Bombay (European) Fusiliers took part in the Sikh Wars.

Other corps fought under the British flag, such as the Shekawati cavalry and infantry and the first two Gurkha regiments: the Nasiri Battalion (later 1^st Gurkhas) and the Sirmoor Battalion (later 2^nd Gurkhas).

General Gough commanded the British/Indian army at six of the seven major battles (not the Battle of Aliwal). An Irishman, Gough was immensely popular with his soldiers, for whose welfare he was constantly solicitous. The troops admired Gough’s bravery, in action wearing a conspicuous white coat, which he called his ‘Battle Coat’, so that he might draw fire away from his soldiers.

Gough’s tactics were heavily criticised, even in the Indian press in letters written by his own officers. At the Battles of Moodkee, Sobraon and Chillianwallah, Gough launched headlong attacks, considered to be ill-thought out by many of his contemporaries. Casualties were high and excited concern in Britain and India. By contrast, Gough’s final battle, Goojerat, which decisively won the war, cost few of his soldiers their lives and was considered a model of care and planning.

Every battle saw vigorous cavalry actions, with HM 3^rd King’s Own Light Dragoons and HM 16^th Queen’s Lancers particularly distinguishing themselves. The British light cavalry wore embroidered dark blue jackets and dark blue overall trousers, except the 16^th who bore the sobriquet ‘the Scarlet Lancers’ for their red jackets. The headgear of the two regiments of light dragoons was a shako with a white cover; the headgear of the lancers the traditional Polish tschapka.

HM regiments of foot wore red coats and blue trousers with shakos and white covers.
The Bengal and Bombay light cavalry regiments wore pale blue uniforms. The infantry of the presidency armies wore red coats and peak less black shakos.

The weapons for the cavalry were the lance for the lancer regiments and sword and carbine for all; the infantry was armed with the Brown Bess musket and bayonet.

Commands in the field were given by the cavalry trumpet and the infantry drum and bugle.
In the initial battles, the Sikh artillery outgunned Gough’s batteries. Even in these battles and in the later ones, the Bengal and Bombay horse and field artillery were handled with great resource and were a major cause of Gough’s success.

Many of the more senior British officers had cut their military teeth in the Peninsular War, and at the Battle of Waterloo: Gough, Hardinge, Havelock of the 14^th Light Dragoons, Cureton, Dick, Thackwell and others. Many of the younger men would go on to fight in the Crimea and the Indian Mutiny.

The Sikhs of the Punjab looked to the sequence of Gurus for their spiritual inspiration, and had established their independence, fiercely resisting the Moghul Kings in Delhi and the Muslims of Afghanistan. The Sikhs were required by their religion to wear the ‘five Ks’, not to cut their hair or beard and to wear the highly characteristic turban, a length of cloth in which the hair is wrapped around the head.

The Maharajah of the Punjab, Ranjit Singh, whose death in 1839 ended the Sikh embargo on war with the British, established and built up the powerful Sikh Army, the ‘Khalsa’, over the twenty years of his reign. The core of the ‘Khalsa’ was its body of infantry regiments, equipped and trained as European troops, wearing red jackets and blue trousers. The Sikh artillery was held in high esteem by both sides. The weakness in the Sikh army was its horse. The regular cavalry regiments never reached a standard comparable to the Sikh foot, while the main element of the mounted arm comprised clouds of irregular and ill-disciplined ‘Gorcharras’.

The traditional weapon of the Sikh warrior is the ‘Kirpan’, a curved sword kept razor sharp and one of the ‘five Ks’ a baptised Sikh must wear. In battle, at the first opportunity, many of the Sikh foot abandoned their muskets and, joining their mounted comrades, engaged in hand to hand combat with sword and shield. Horrific cutting wounds, severing limbs and heads, were a feature of the Sikh Wars, in which neither side gave quarter to the enemy.

It had taken the towering personality of Ranjit Singh to control the turbulent ‘Khalsa’, he had established. Ranjit Singh’s descendants found the task beyond them and did much to provoke the outbreak of the First Sikh War, in the hope that the Khalsa would be cut down to size by the armies of the British East India Company. The commanders of the Sikh armies in the field rarely took the initiative in battle, preferring to occupy a fortified position and wait for the British and Bengalis to attack. In the opening stages of the war there was correspondence between Lal Singh and the British officer, Major Nicholson, suggesting that the Sikhs were being betrayed by their commander.

Pay in the Khalsa was good, twice the rate for sepoys in the Bengal Army, but it was haphazard, particularly after the death of Ranjit Singh. Khalsa administration was conducted by clerks writing in the Persian language. In one notorious mutiny over pay, Sikh soldiers ran riot looking for anyone who could, or looked as if they could, speak Persian, and putting them to the sword.

The seven battles of the war and the siege of the city of Multan were hard fought. Several of the battle fields were wide flat spaces broken by jungly scrub, from which the movement of large bodies of troops in scorching heat raised choking clouds of dust. As the fighting began, the dust clouds intermingled with dense volumes of musket and cannon smoke. With the thunder of gunfire and horses’ hooves, the battle yells and cries of the injured, the battles of the Sikh Wars were indeed infernos.

Winner of the Battle of Goojerat: This convincing victory by Gough’s army ended the Sikh Wars and led to the annexation of the Punjab into British India.

British and Indian Regiments at the Battle of Goojerat:
British Regiments:
HM 3^rd King’s Own Light Dragoons, now the Queen’s Royal Hussars. *
HM 9^th Queen’s Royal Light Dragoons (Lancers), now the 9^th/12^th Royal Lancers. *
HM 14^th the King’s Light Dragoons, now the King’s Royal Hussars. *
HM 16^th Queen’s Light Dragoons (Lancers), now the Queen’s Royal Lancers. *
HM 10^th Foot, later the Royal Lincolnshire Regiment and now the Royal Anglian Regiment. *
HM 24^th Foot, later the South Wales Borderers and now the Royal Welsh Regiment. *
HM 29^th Foot, later the Worcestershire Regiment and now the Worcestershire and Sherwood Foresters Regiment. *
HM 32^nd Foot, later the Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry and now the Rifles. *
HM 1^st Battalion, 60th Rifles, later Royal Green Jackets and now the Rifles. *
HM 61^st Foot, later the Wiltshire Regiment and now the Royal Gloucestershire, Berkshire and Wiltshire Regiment. *

Bengal Army regiments:
Cavalry:
1^st Bengal Light Cavalry. *
5^th Bengal Light Cavalry. *
6^th Bengal Light Cavalry. *
8^th Bengal Light Cavalry. *
3^rd Bengal Irregular Cavalry. *
9^th Bengal Irregular Cavalry. *
11^th Bengal Irregular Cavalry. *
14^th Bengal Irregular Cavalry. *

Infantry:
2^nd Bengal (European) Fusiliers. *
8^th Bengal Native Infantry. *
15^th Bengal Native Infantry. *
20^th Bengal Native Infantry. *
25^th Bengal Native Infantry. *
30^th Bengal Native Infantry. *
31^st Bengal Native Infantry. *
36^th Bengal Native Infantry. *
45^th Bengal Native Infantry. *
46^th Bengal Native Infantry. *
51^st Bengal Native Infantry. *
52^nd Bengal Native Infantry. *
56^th Bengal Native Infantry. *
69^th Bengal Native Infantry. *
70^th Bengal Native Infantry. *
72^nd Bengal Native Infantry. *

Horse Artillery and Field Artillery.

Bombay Army regiments:
Cavalry:
1^st Scinde Irregular Horse. *
2^nd Scinde Irregular Horse. *

Infantry:
1^st Bombay (European) Fusiliers.*
3^rd Bombay Native Infantry.*
19^th Bombay Native Infantry.*

Field Artillery.

Punjab Regiment:
Corps of Guides.*

Cavalry:
1^st Scinde Irregular Horse in 1861 became the 5^th Bombay Cavalry, from 1903 35^th Scinde Horse, from 1922 the 14^th Prince of Wales’s Own Scinde Horse and from 1950 the 14^th Scinde Horse of the Indian Army.*
2^nd Scinde Irregular Horse in 1861 became the 6^th Bombay Cavalry, from 1903 36^th Jacob’s Horse, from 1922 the 14^th Prince of Wales’s Own Scinde Horse and from 1950 the 14^th Scinde Horse of the Indian Army.*
The Corps of Guides in 1874 became the Queen’s Own Corps of Guides, in 1922 10^th Queen Victoria’s Own Corps of Guides Cavalry (FF), in 1927 The Guides Cavalry (10^th) (Queen Victoria’s Own FF) and in 1947 the Guides Cavalry of the Pakistan Army.*

All the Bengal cavalry regiments that fought at Goojerat ceased to exist in 1857.

Infantry:
2^nd Bengal (European) Light Infantry, in 1861 became 102nd Light Infantry and from 1880 the Royal Munster Fusiliers. Disbanded in 1922.*
31^st Bengal Native Infantry in1861 became the 2^nd Bengal Light Infantry, in 1903 2^nd (Queen’s Own) Rajput Light Infantry, in 1922 1^st (Queen Victoria’s Own) Light Infantry Battalion 7^th Rajput Regiment and in 1950 became 4^th Battalion the Brigade of the Guards of the Indian Army.*
70^th Bengal Native Infantry in 1861 became the 11^th Bengal Native Infantry and from 1903 11^th Rajputs, from 1922 5^th Battalion 7^th Rajput Regiment; from 1947 5^th Battalion, the Rajput Regiment of the Indian Army.*
1^st Bombay (European) Fusiliers in 1862 became HM 103^rd (Royal Bombay Fusiliers) and from 1880 2^nd Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers. Disbanded in 1922.*
3^rd Bombay Native Infantry in 1903 became the 103^rd Mahratta Light Infantry and from 1922 1^st Battalion 5^th Mahratta Light Infantry; from 1947 1^st Battalion, the Mahratta Light Infantry of the Indian Army.*
19^th Bombay Native Infantry in 1903 became the 119^th Infantry (The Mooltan Regiment) and from 1922 2^nd Battalion (Mooltan Battalion) 9^th Jat Regiment; from 1947 2^nd Battalion (Mooltan Battalion), the Jat Regiment of the Indian Army.*

The remaining Bengal infantry regiments that fought at Goojerat ceased to exist in 1857.

Order of Battle of the Army of the Punjab at the Battle of Goojerat:
General Sir Hugh Gough, Commander-in-Chief:
The Cavalry Division: Major General Sir Joseph Thackwell.
1^st Brigade: Brigadier Lockwood; HM 14^th Light Dragoons, 1^st Bengal Light Cavalry, elements of 11^th and 18^th Bengal Irregular Cavalry.
2^nd Brigade: Brigadier Hearsey; 3^rd and 9^th Bengal Irregular Cavalry.
3^rd Brigade: Brigadier White; HM 3^rd Light Dragoons, HM 9^th Lancers, 8^th Bengal Light Cavalry, Scinde Irregular Horse and 2 troops of horse artillery.
The Guides Cavalry.

1^st Infantry Division: General Whish.
Lieutenant Colonel Hervey’s Brigade: HM 10th Foot, 8^th and 52^nd Bengal Native Infantry, 1 company of Pioneers and 1 troop of horse artillery.
Brigadier Markham’s Brigade: HM 32^nd Foot, 51^st and 72^nd Bengal Native Infantry, 2 troops of horse artillery and a light field battery.
Brigadier Hoggan’s Reserve Brigade: 5^th and 6^th Bengal Light Cavalry, 45^th and 69^th Bengal Native Infantry and 1 Bombay light field battery.

2nd Infantry Division: General Gilbert.
Brigadier Penny’s Brigade: 2^nd Bengal (Europeans) Fusiliers, 31^st and 70^th Bengal Native Infantry.
Brigadier Mountain’s Brigade: HM 29^th Foot, 30^th and 56^th Bengal Native Infantry.

3rd Infantry Division: Major General Sir Colin Campbell.
Brigadier Carnegy’s Brigade: HM 24^th Foot and 25^th Bengal Native Infantry.
Brigadier McLeod’s Brigade: HM 61^st Foot, 36^th and 46^th Bengal Native Infantry and 2 light field batteries.
Brigadier Dundas’ Brigade (Bombay Army): HM 60^th Rifles, 1^st Bombay (European) Fusiliers, 3^rd and 19^th Bombay Native Infantry and 1 Bombay light field battery. Also, the Scinde Camel Baggage Corps.

Heavy Artillery:
Ten 18 pounders
Eight 8 inch howitzers.

Account of the Battle of Goojerat:
Following the carnage of the Battle of Chillianwallah, General Gough’s Army of the Punjab camped around the village of Chillianwallah, while for three days, rain poured down.

Shere Singh’s Sikh Army lay at the village of Rassool, between Chillianwallah and the River Jhelum.

The weather cleared, but Gough resolved not to attack the Sikhs until General Whish had joined him with his division, following Whish’s capture of the City of Multan. Shere Singh tried to lure Gough into a premature battle, but to no avail.

The army of Chattar Singh joined the Sikhs at Rassool, bringing a force of 1,500 Afghan cavalry commanded by the son of Dost Mohammed, the Amir of Afghanistan who had so humiliatingly defeated the British in the First Afghan War.

On 25^th January 1849, shortage of supplies forced Shere Singh to leave Rassool and march east, to the more fertile country around Goojerat, on the Chenab River.

Gough dispatched Lieutenant Hodson with a force of cavalry to Wazirabad, on the far side of the Chenab, to watch for a Sikh incursion across the river.

On 15^th February 1849, Gough broke camp and moved towards the Chenab, to meet Whish’s division and put himself in a position to attack the Sikhs.

On Gough’s direction, Whish sent a small force to reinforce Hodson in Wazirabad.

On 16^th, 17^th and 18^th February 1849, Gough approached the Sikh army in Goojerat.  On the last day of the march Whish’s division joined the army.

On 19^th and 20^th February 1849, Dundas’s Bombay brigade and Markham’s Bengal brigade marched in, giving Gough his decisive force for the final battle with the Sikhs; 24,000 troops and 96 guns.

Gough found the Sikh army, numbering 60,000 men, drawn up to the south of Goojerat. The mass of the regular Sikh infantry, with 59 guns, was in line in the two-mile gap between the dry River Dwara on the right and the flowing Katela River on the left. On each flank, the Sikh cavalry continued the line beyond the two river beds, with the Afghan cavalry on the right. The Sikhs had fortified several villages lying in advance of their line.

Behind the Sikh line, the distant Himalayan Mountains gave a dramatic snow tipped backdrop to the forthcoming battle.

Gough planned to launch his main attack along the side of the Dwara nullah, while the 1^st and 2^nd cavalry brigades pinned the Sikh left flank and centre. His infantry brigades would be formed for the attack: from the right, Hervey’s, Penny’s and Mountain’s brigades, with Markham’s brigade in support. To the left of Hervey’s would be the heavy guns on the bank of the Dawa: on the left bank of the dry nullah; Carnegy’s, McLeod’s and Dundas’s brigades, with Hoggan’s in support. White’s cavalry brigade would cover the left flank.

The British, Bengal and Bombay troops fell in for the battle soon after dawn on 21^st February 1849. Gough rode down the line, wearing his white ‘Fighting Coat’, and was cheered vigorously by his men.

On the signal, the Army of the Punjab advanced two miles towards the Sikh positions, halting as the Sikh guns opened fire.

Gough ordered his gun batteries forward, with a covering of skirmishers, and a heavy duel opened between the opposing artilleries, the Bengal and Bombay artillery outnumbering the Sikh guns nearly two to one. The decisive point came when the two Bengal horse artillery reserve batteries took several Sikh guns in enfilade and destroyed them. After two and half hours of bombardment the Sikh fire began to fade.

With the slackening gunfire, the Sikh cavalry on Gough’s right moved forward towards Hearsay’s cavalry division, leading to extensive manoeuvring between the opposing forces.

The main British infantry attack began as Penny’s and Mountain’s brigades, supported by the heavy guns, moved forward towards the centre of the Sikh line and were received with a heavy fire from the surviving guns.

The village of Bara Kalra (Great Kalra) lay in advance of the right of the Sikh centre. A party of Gough’s light troops moved forward to take the apparently empty village, to be met by a storm of shots from the loop holed houses.

Gilbert, the divisional commander, dispatched the 2^nd Bengal (European) Fusiliers to attack the Sikh garrison, the regiment pushing through the village in the face of a stubborn resistance. The Sikhs counter-attacked, pushing the 2^nd Fusiliers back through Bara Kalra, until they were halted by blasts of grape shot at close range from Fordyce’s troop of Bengal Horse Artillery, which finally cleared the Sikhs from the village.

At the same time, Hervey’s brigade attacked the twin village of Chota Kalra (Little Kalra), HM 10^th Foot and 8^th BNI leading the advance.

Again, the resistance was fierce and the fire extremely heavy. Sikh cavalry threatened the right flank of the brigade, forcing the third regiment, 52^nd BNI, to form to the right. Markham’s brigade came up, and, with the supporting fire of Mackenzie’s and Anderson’s batteries of Bengal Horse Artillery, Hervey’s battalions took Chota Kalra.

On the left bank of the Dawa Nullah, the artillery cleared the row of villages of their Sikh garrisons and Campbells’ three brigades advanced unopposed, enabling the guns to move forward and take the main Sikh line in enfilade across the Dawa, causing numerous casualties and contributing to the general retreat of the Sikh army.

On Gough’s left, the Sikh cavalry moved forward and round his flank, but were halted by the fire of Duncan’s and Huish’s batteries of Bengal Horse Artillery. This was followed by a charge delivered by the Scinde Horse and a squadron of HM 9^th Lancers, which drove the Sikh cavalry back.

All along the line, the Sikh formations were collapsing and taking to flight, in striking contrast to their measured withdrawal in all the previous battles of the wars, other than Aliwal.

Thackwell’s cavalry pursued the Sikhs beyond Goojerat for twelve miles towards the River Jhelum, halting only when his artillery horses were exhausted and could go no further. Hearsey, with the right flank cavalry brigade, joined the rest of the Cavalry Division beyond Goojerat and continued the chase until nightfall.

Pickets were placed on the Chenab River fords, permitting the Sikh soldiers to cross and return to their farms provided they surrendered their weapons.

Casualties at the Battle of Goojerat: British and Indian casualties were 96 killed and 750 wounded. The units that suffered most heavily were the 2^nd Bengal (European) Fusiliers and the 31^st BNI of Penny’s brigade during the attacks on Bara Kalra.

Sikh casualties have been estimated at 2,000 killed, wounded and captured. They lost 56 guns.

Follow-up to the Battle of Goojerat:

General Gilbert, with a force of infantry, cavalry and guns took up the pursuit the next day, marching fifty miles to the north in three days, halting for three days, and then resuming the advance.

On 14^th March 1849, Gilbert reached Rawalpindi and received the surrender of Shere Singh and Lal Singh.

On 19^th March 1849, Gilbert crossed the Indus River at Attock in pursuit of Dost Mohammed’s Afghan troops, and, on 21^st March 1849, Gilbert’s troops marched into Peshawar. The war was over. The Punjab became part of British India and Sikh soldiers began to join the East India Company’s army.

Anecdotes and traditions from the Battle of Goojerat:

• During the Battle of Goojerat, a party of Sikh horse circled round behind the Anglo-Indian lines and attempted to kill or capture General Gough. They were driven off by the general’s escort of 5^th Bengal Light Cavalry.
• The Scinde Irregular Horse excited great admiration from onlookers who saw their charge on the left wing, delivered at great speed and in the closest of order. The regiment captured two Sikh standards. During the pursuit after the battle, the Scinde Irregular Horse pursued the Afghan troops to the Khyber Pass.
• Aspects of the Scinde horsemen’s equipment were much admired and emulated by Indian and British cavalry regiments, such as the shoulder chains, designed to deflect sword cuts, which became and are still characteristic features of cavalry full dress.
• At the Battle of Goojerat, General Gough placed all his irregular cavalry regiments in the battle line, leaving two regular Bengal Light Cavalry regiments, the 5^th and 6^th, to guard the camp.
• The 56^th BNI lost its colours during the battle. One was recaptured and returned to the regiment by Sepoy Raganuth Dube of the 70^th BNI, now the 5^th Battalion of the Rajput Regiment of the Indian Army.
• Following the two Sikh Wars, Major General Sir Hugh Gough became a peer as Viscount Gough.

Medals and decorations:

British and Indian soldiers who took part in the Second Sikh War received the silver medal entitled ‘Punjab Campaign, 1848-9’.
Clasps were issued for the battles (or in the case of Mooltan the siege) which were described as: ‘Mooltan’, ‘Chillianwallah’, and ‘Goojerat’.
Description of the medal:
Obverse. -Crowned head of Queen Victoria. Legend: ‘Victoria Regina.’
Reverse. -The Sikh army laying down its arms before Sir W.R. Gilbert and his troops near Rawal Pindi. Inscription ‘To the Army of the Punjab.’ In exergue ‘MDCCCXLIX.’
Mounting. -Silver scroll bar and swivel.
Ribbon. -Dark blue with two thin yellow stripes, 1 ¼ inch wide.

References for the Battle of Goojerat:

History of the British Army by Fortescue.

History of British Cavalry by the Marquis of Anglesey.

The previous battle in the Second Sikh War is the Battle of Chillianwallah

The next battle in the British Battles sequence is the Battle of the Alma

To the Second Sikh War Index

The British capture of the Afghan city of Ghuznee on 23^rd July 1839: a successful beginning to a disastrous war

The previous battle in the British Battles sequence is the Battle of Waterloo

The next battle in the First Afghan War is the Battle of Kabul and the Retreat to Gandamak

To the First Afghan War index

Battle: Ghuznee

War: First Afghan War

Date of the Battle of Ghuznee: 23^rd July 1839

Place of the Battle of Ghuznee: Central Afghanistan

Combatants at the Battle of Ghuznee: British and Indian troops of the Bengal and Bombay Armies, allied to the army of Shah Shuja, against the Afghan army of Dost Mohammed.

Commanders at the Battle of Ghuznee: General Sir John Keane, Commander in Chief of the Bombay Army against Hyder Khan, a son of the Amir Dost Mohammed.

Size of the armies at the Battle of Ghuznee: 9,500 British and Indian troops of the Bengal Army, 5,000 troops of the Bombay Army and 6,000 men led by Shah Shujah, against the Afghan garrison of 3,500 men.

Uniforms, arms and equipment at the Battle of Ghuznee:
The British infantry, wearing cut away red coats, white trousers and shako hats, were armed with the old Brown Bess musket and bayonet. The Indian infantry were similarly armed and uniformed.

The 4th Hussars wore the standard hussar uniform of pelisse, dolman and shako rather than a busby, and were armed with swords and carbines.

The 16th Lancers wore scarlet tunics and the Polish tzapka hat and carried carbines, swords and lances.

The Afghan soldiers were dressed as they saw fit, and carried an assortment of weapons, including muskets and swords.

The Ghilzai tribesmen carried swords and jezails, long barrelled muskets.

Winner: The British and Indian Army.

British and Indian Regiments at the Battle of Ghuznee: 
British:
4^th Hussars, now the Queen’s Royal Hussars. *
16^th Lancers now the Queen’s Royal Lancers. *
2^nd Queen’s Foot now the Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment. *
13^th Foot later the Light Infantry and now the Rifles. *
17^th Foot now the Royal Anglian Regiment. *

Indian:
2^nd Bengal Light Cavalry
3^rd Bengal Light Cavalry
3^rd Skinner’s Horse *
31^st Lancers *
34^th Poona Horse *
3^rd Sappers and Miners *

Shah Shujah’s Regiment
1^st Bengal Fusiliers (European Regiment) later the Munster Fusiliers. *
2^nd Bengal Native Infantry
16^th Bengal Native Infantry
19^th Bombay Infantry later the 119th Multan Regiment. *
27^th Bengal Native Infantry
31^st Bengal Native Infantry
42^nd Bengal Native Infantry
43^rd Bengal Native Infantry
48^th Bengal Native Infantry
* These regiments have Ghuznee as a battle honour. The Bengal native regiments were all swept away in the Indian Mutiny of 1857.

The First Afghan War:
The British colonies in India in the early 19^th Century were ruled by the Honourable East India Company, a powerful trading corporation based in London, answerable to its shareholders and to the British Parliament.

In the first half of the 19^th Century, France as the British bogeyman gave way to Russia, leading finally to the Crimean War in 1854. In 1839 the obsession in British India was that the Russians, extending the Tsar’s empire east into Asia, would invade India through Afghanistan.

This widely held obsession led Lord Auckland, the British governor general in India, to enter the First Afghan War, one of Britain’s most ill-advised and disastrous wars.

Until the First Afghan War, the Sirkar (the Indian colloquial name for the East India Company) had an overwhelming reputation for efficiency and good luck. The British were considered to be unconquerable and omnipotent. The Afghan War severely undermined this view. The retreat from Kabul in January 1842 and the annihilation of Elphinstone’s Kabul garrison dealt a mortal blow to British prestige in the East only rivalled by the fall of Singapore 100 years later.

The causes of the disaster are easily stated: the difficulties of campaigning in Afghanistan’s inhospitable mountainous terrain, with its extremes of weather, the turbulent politics of the country and its armed and refractory population, and, finally, the failure of the British authorities to appoint senior officers capable of conducting the campaign competently and decisively.

The substantially Hindu East India Company army crossed the Indus with trepidation, fearing to lose caste by leaving Hindustan, and appalled by the country they were entering. The troops died of heat, disease and lack of supplies on the desolate route to Kandahar, subject, in the mountain passes, to repeated attack by the Afghan tribes. Once in Kabul, the army was reduced to a perilously small force and left in the command of incompetents. As the Bengal Army soldier, Sita Ram, in his memoirs complained: ‘If only the army had been commanded by the memsahibs, all might have been well.’

The disaster of the First Afghan War was a substantial contributing factor to the outbreak of the Great Mutiny in the Bengal Army in 1857, and, more immediately, led to wars in Sind, Gwalior and against the Sikhs in the Punjab.

The successful defence of Jellalabad and the progress of the Army of Retribution in 1842 could do only a little to retrieve the East India Company’s lost reputation.

Account of the Battle of Ghuznee:

By the 1830s, the British Indian Empire stretched to the border of the Sikh Kingdom of the Punjab, in the North West. The British increasingly considered their responsibilities extended over the whole of the Indian sub-continent, even though many of the Indian states retained their independence. There was little to fear from these kingdoms. What did cause alarm was the threat from the Russian Empire.

Tsarist expansion, down the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea, south towards Persia and Western Afghanistan, and to the north of the Himalayas, created a concern for the British that became an obsession; the perceived British/Russian rivalry known during the 19^th Century as ‘The Great Game’.

In 1838, a joint Persian/Russian force laid siege to Herat, the important north-western Afghan city. The British Viceroy in India, Lord Auckland, and his advisers planned an invasion of Afghanistan to combat the siege of Herat, and to place an Ameer favourable to Britain on the throne in Kabul, the Afghan capital, in place of the existing incumbent, Dost Mohammed. The candidate to be made Ameer was Shah Shujah, then languishing in the Sikh capital Lahore on an East India Company pension.

A force of two divisions from the Bengal Army, under the commander in chief, Sir Harry Fane, assembled in Ferozepore on the border of the Punjab, under the name ‘the Army of the Indus’.

The quickest route to Kabul was to march across the Punjab and enter Afghanistan by way of Peshawar and the Khyber Pass, but Ranjit Singh, the Sikh ruler of the Punjab, would never consent to such a large British force crossing the Punjab. The invasion route had to be through the southern passes, with the approach to Kabul via Kandahar and Ghuznee; a journey three times the distance of the direct route.

A second force of a single division from the Bombay Army, under its commander in chief, Sir John Keane, would join the Bengal force, landing by sea at the mouth of the Indus.

Before the march could begin, news reached India that the Persians and Russians had abandoned the siege of Herat. The view of many British officials was that the reason for the invasion of Afghanistan had gone. Lord Auckland resolved to continue with his plan, although the size of the force was scaled down, with the second Bengal division remaining as a reserve at Ferozepore.

The nominated commander in chief of the army, Sir Harry Fane, refused to take further part in the venture, leaving the command to Sir John Keane.

The Army of the Indus began the campaign in December 1838, marching down the left bank of the Indus, to cross at Roree for the journey to Quetta, where the rendezvous with the force from the Bombay Army would take place. The Indus was crossed by a long bridge of boats, built by the Bengal Army Sappers and Miners. A diversion to quell the Ameers of Scinde briefly delayed the march.

The Bombay and Bengal forces met at Quetta and prepared for the invasion of Afghanistan. Supplies were low and the troops near to starvation. The Army hurried, as best it could, up the Bolan and Kojuk passes and marched the one hundred and forty-seven miles to Kandahar, arriving on 4^th May 1839. The local leaders showed their opinion of their new Ameer, arriving with his British sponsors, by escaping to the west.

Sir John Keane continued his advance towards Kabul on 27^th June 1839, after a foray to Girishk on the Helmond River, in pursuit of the fleeing Khans of Kandahar, and the storming of the fortress of Khelat. A severe shortage of draft horses forced Keane to leave his siege train in Kandahar.

On 21^st July 1839, the army arrived before Ghuznee, an important town on the road to Kabul. Reconnaissance showed Ghuznee to be occupied in force and strongly fortified, with a seventy foot wall and a flooded moat. The lack of a siege train was now severely felt. The town had to be taken, before the final advance to Kabul, and the only way was by storm, promising heavy losses.

The Army’s chief engineer, Colonel Thompson, reconnoitred the town and interviewed captured Afghans. This intelligence revealed that the garrison had sealed all the gates by piling stones and debris behind them; that is except the Kabul Gate to the north. Thompson observed this gate and saw an Afghan courier admitted to the town. The gate appeared to be clear and inadequately defended. This was the only possible point of assault. The Army marched around Ghuznee, and camped on the north side to prepare for the attack.

On 22^nd July 1839, thousands of Ghilzai tribesmen attacked Shah Shujah’s contingent, and had to be repelled. The preparations for storming the Kabul Gate were then made. Artillery was positioned to cover the approach, and the light companies of the three British regiments (HM 2^nd, 13^th and 17^th Foot) and the one Bengal European regiment were formed into a storming party, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Dennie of HM 13^th Foot. The rest of the three British regiments formed the main attacking column commanded by Brigadier Sale. High winds prevented the garrison from realising they were about to be attacked.

At 3am on 23^rd July 1839 a party of engineers commanded by Captain Peat of the Bombay Sappers and Miners moved towards the gate. Lieutenant Durand commanded the explosion party.

The engineers were one hundred and fifty yards from the gate, when they were challenged and fire given from the town wall, blue flares being thrown down from the battlements to illuminate the scene. The British artillery opened a bombardment of the walls, and musket and gun fire erupted around the town.

Peat’s party rushed forward to the wall, and Durand’s men placed powder bags against the gate and unrolled a length of quick match which they lit. The explosion blew in the gate.

The signal to attack was to be given by Peat’s bugler, but he was killed. Durand hurried back and brought forward the storming party. Dennie’s four light companies rushed through the shattered gate and met the Afghan defenders in a savage hand to hand fight in the semi-dark of the gate tunnel.

An Afghan counterattack cut Dennie’s party off from the supporting column. Sale was severely wounded by an Afghan swordsman as his men joined the attack. Finally, the British column cut its way through the gate into the streets beyond. The citadel was found to be undefended and the town was in British hands by dawn.

Casualties at the Battle of Ghuznee: British casualties were 200 killed and wounded. The Afghans lost 500 killed and 1,600 prisoners. The number of wounded is not known.

Follow-up to the Battle of Ghuznee:

Keane left a garrison in Ghuznee, and the Army marched on towards Kabul on 30^th July 1839. When Dost Mohammed heard of the fall of Ghuznee, he sent to the British asking what terms he was offered. The answer was ‘honourable asylum in India’. This was not acceptable, but his army would not fight. Dost Mohammed fled his capital, leaving it to the invading British and their puppet ruler, Shah Shujah.

Anecdotes and traditions from the Battle of Ghuznee:

• General McMunn in his book ‘Afghanistan from Darius to Amanullah’ states that the Army of the Indus was taken by surprise when it moved from India proper into the area north-west of the Indus, where the usual network of Indian merchants and suppliers did not reach, with the consequence that there were no supplies to be bought. This is the same problem that British generals encountered in America (see Braddock on the Monongahela).
• The medal to mark the capture of Ghuznee was issued on the orders of Shah Shujah, once he was established as the Ameer of Afghanistan, and issued to the soldiers of General Keane’s army.

References for the Battle of Ghuznee:

The Afghan Wars by Archibald Forbes
Afghanistan from Darius to Amanullah by General McMunn
History of the British Army by Fortescue.

The previous battle in the British Battles sequence is the Battle of Waterloo

The next battle in the First Afghan War is the Battle of Kabul and the Retreat to Gandamak

To the First Afghan War index

The recapture of Delhi from the Mutineers during the Indian Mutiny of 1857/8

The previous battle of the British Battles series is the Siege of Sevastopol

The next battle in the British Battles series is the Battle of Magdala

To the Indian Mutiny index

War: Indian Mutiny.

Date of the Siege of Delhi: 8^th June 1857 to 20^th September 1857

Place of the Siege of Delhi: Delhi, in northern India.

Combatants at the Siege of Delhi: British, Indian and Nepalese troops against the Hindu and Muslim Mutineers and the troops of a number of native rulers. Several other native rulers supported the British and provided them with troops.

Commanders at the Siege of Delhi: A number of British officers commanded the British Delhi Field Force before Delhi, each one dying or becoming incapacitated by disease or wounds and giving way to his successor.

The Commander-in-Chief in India on the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny General George Anson was at the hill station of Simla.

On 26^th May 1857, during the march on Delhi, Anson contracted cholera and died.

Anson was succeeded by General Sir Henry Barnard, a veteran of the Crimean War.

On 5^th July 1857, Barnard also died from cholera and was succeeded by General Reed, who, due to his ill-health, handed the command of the Delhi Field Force to Brigadier-General Archdale Wilson.

Wilson commanded the Delhi Field Force for the rest of the campaign.

The Mutineers looked to the titular Mogul Emperor, Bahadur Shah, resident in Delhi, as their figurehead.

Bahadur Shah appointed various leaders of the Mutiny to high command during the Siege of Delhi, as set out in the text.

Mutineers’ leadership:

The Mutineers were defeated in their defence of Delhi by the British, in spite of fighting tenaciously and with skill and being equipped with the same weapons as their opponents with an apparently limitless supply of ammunition.

The reason for their failure would seem to lie in the lack of effective leadership.

The mutinies in the various Indian regiments were largely instigated and led by sepoys or low-ranking NCOs.

While Indian officers joined the mutinies in most regiments, they were often not the prime movers, leaving their regiments to be led by inexperienced and ill-educated soldiers.

Surendra Nath Sen in his book ‘Eighteen Fifty-Seven’ deals with the workings of the garrison of Delhi.

The residual Moghul Emperor, Bahadur Shah, living in the old fort in Delhi with his family, including his three sons, Mirza Moghul, Mirza Khizr Sultan and Mirza Abu Brka, was elderly and had no experience of rule when the Mutineers arrived in Delhi and made him their titular leader.

Bahadur Shah’s adviser, Hakim Ahsanullah, was convinced that the British would win and was unhappy at the position to which the mutinous sepoys elevated Bahadur Shah.

Sen says the mutineers did not trust Bahadur Shah and he did not trust the mutineers.

Nevertheless, the mutineers looked to Bahadur Shah to pay them and supply them with food.

Bahadur Shah attempted to form a council to administer and rule the city, but many of his appointees refused to act and the council was ineffectual.

The city was subject to significant disorder during the course of the siege.

Bahadur Shah’s oldest son, Mirza Moghul, was initially appointed commander of the Mutineers in the city, but he had no military experience and the Mutineers were not inclined to follow his orders.

An artillery subadar from the mutinous garrison of Bareilly, Bakht Khan, of noble birth, on his arrival in Delhi in early July 1857 was interviewed by Bahadur Shah and as a distant relative of the royal family and a soldier of forty years’ experience with service in the First Afghan War, was appointed commander-in-chief of the Mutineer army in place of Mirza Moghul.

Bakht Khan was unable to exercise proper control.

There was intense dislike and rivalry between the various mutinous regiments that came to Delhi and Sen reports ‘suicidal rivalry between Bakht Khan and Muhammad Ghaus Khan, the commander of the Nimach rebels’ and that Bakht Khan’s orders ceased to be obeyed.

Religious issues surfaced between Hindu and Muslim Mutineers, although these were not as intense as they might have been or that the British hoped for.

In contrast, the Delhi Field Force was officered at the middle level by a number of ruthlessly determined and resourceful officers who led disciplined and hard-fighting regiments, that were in several cases devoted to their British commanders.

Size of the armies at the Siege of Delhi: The size of the Delhi Field Force varied during the course of the siege, as casualties were suffered and reinforcements marched in. The numbers of troops at different stages of the siege are given in the narrative section.

The numbers of Mutineers in Delhi are very much a matter of conjecture and were probably not known to anyone. As native regiments mutinied across Northern India many of them were drawn to Delhi and marched into the city during the siege, increasing the size of the Delhi garrison.

The Mutineers suffered losses from battle casualties, disease and desertion.

At times complete Mutineer regiments left Delhi to return to their homes.

Estimates of the size of the Mutineer garrison in Delhi made by British sources varied from 40,000 to 70,000.

Uniforms, arms and equipment at the Siege of Delhi:

There were cavalry, infantry and artillery on both sides.

The cavalry was armed with lance, sword and muzzle-loading carbines.

The infantry of both sides was armed with the Brown Bess musket, with an effective accurate range of around 100 yards or the more modern Enfield rifled musket, a muzzle loading weapon with an effective accurate range of 300 yards. Both weapons carried a bayonet for close quarter fighting.

It is far from clear the extent to which conversion from the smooth bore musket to the Enfield rifled musket had progressed in either the British or the Indian regiments, both mutinous and loyal, when the Indian Mutiny broke out in early 1857.

However, the immediate trigger for the mutinies in several of the Bengal Native regiments in 1857 was the issue of the Enfield rifled musket and the requirement for the sepoys to bite open the new cartridges, indicating that the issue of the new weapon was under way in the Bengal Native Army in 1856-7.

Probably the Mutinous Indian regiments largely did not use the Enfield in the fighting during the Indian Mutiny, in view of their religious objections to the biting of the cartridges greased with animal fat.

Although the British troops in the Crimean War, 1853-6, were widely re-equipped with rifled muskets, either the Enfield or the French Minié, it would seem that this was not the case for the whole British Army, particularly where regiments were serving overseas; these regiments continuing to carry their Brown Bess smooth-bore muskets well past the general issue of Enfields in 1853.

British regiments are reported as being re-equipped with the Enfield rifled musket on arrival at Calcutta from Britain in 1857-8, in place of the Brown Bess.

Reports of battles in the Indian Mutiny describe British infantry as having an advantage over their Indian adversaries through being armed with the Enfield rifle, suggesting that the Mutineer infantry was armed almost entirely with the old smooth bore short range muskets.

It would seem however that not all British or loyal native Indian regiments were equipped with the Enfield even when in the front line.

Reports of the Relief of Lucknow describe certain British regiments as being given specific duties because they were armed with the more accurate and longer-ranged Enfield, suggesting that other British regiments retained the old Brown Bess smooth bored musket.

Large numbers of field guns were deployed by both sides in the Indian Mutiny with a wide range of sizes up to 24 pounder siege guns and some howitzers.

Guns were still almost entirely muzzle-loaded, firing either solid ball, grape-shot, case-shot or exploding shells.

Guns were horse-drawn or in the case of the larger guns drawn by slow-moving oxen. Many of the largest guns were drawn by elephant.

During the course of the siege, the Delhi Field Force was particularly reliant on the Bengal Horse Artillery armed with small calibre muzzle-loading guns.

A novel feature of the Indian Mutiny was the use of the Telegraph.

Lord Dalhousie, the Governor-General of India, caused the Telegraph to be introduced into India in the mid-1850s.

On the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny a Telegraph line was in operation between Calcutta, Delhi and the North-West of India.

News of the Mutiny in Delhi was transmitted to the British at both ends of the Telegraph line on the day of the outbreak enabling counter-measures to be put in place without delay.

Winner of the Siege of Delhi: The British recaptured Delhi in September 1857 after several months of heavy fighting.

Events leading to the Siege of Delhi:

On 29^th March 1857, at Barrackpore, a garrison town immediately north of Calcutta, the British administrative capital of India, in the eastern state of Bengal, a sepoy of the 34^th Native Infantry Regiment of the East India Company’s Bengal army turned his musket on the adjutant of his regiment, a British officer named Lieutenant Baugh.

This is the incident that is said to have started the Indian Mutiny.

The issues leading to the Mutiny were complex.

The British directly ruled the Bombay Presidency on the west coast of India, the Madras Presidency on the east coast, Bengal in the north-east of India, the Central Provinces and the area around Delhi in the north.

Native principalities of India covered as much land as the British areas, subject to varying degrees of British influence and control.

The British sovereign entity in India was the East India Company, a commercial organisation administered from London, not the British Crown.

Over the years the British Government increased its control over the East India Company and exercised a significant influence in the appointment of the Governor and other officials.

Senior military officers were seconded from the British army and a significant part of the garrison in India comprised regiments of the British army.

There was increasing interference by the British in Indian land administration and practices and the growth of evangelical religion in Britain led to an influx into India of Christian missionaries, leading to a fear that the British intended to replace the indigenous religions of Hinduism and Islam with Christianity.

The British continued to widen the area of India that they controlled.

It is considered that a major cause for the Mutiny was the final annexation of Oudh by the British.

The principality of Oudh covered much of northern Central India with its capital in the ancient city of Lucknow.

The British East India Company increased its control of Oudh incrementally, effectively deposing the rulers, the last of whom was removed to Calcutta under effective house arrest and replaced by a British Chief Commissioner, Sir Henry Lawrence.

The East India Company annexed Oudh in 1856, ending the fiction that it was still an independent state.

Many of the Bengal Army sepoys were from Oudh and bitterly resented the annexation of their homeland by the British.

Native Indian regiments in the service of the British East India Company, particularly in the Bengal army, tended to recruit high caste Hindu sepoys. For these sepoys the integrity of their Hindu faith was paramount.

One issue for the native sepoys was a change in the terms of service enabling regiments to be shipped overseas to fight wars in Persia and Burma: travel by sea causing a Hindu sepoy to lose his caste.

Another was the arming of the sepoys with the new 1853 Enfield rifled musket. In order to load this weapon a soldier was required to bite off the end of the cartridge before pouring the gun powder charge into the barrel of the firearm.

Cartridges for the Enfield were greased with fat, rumoured to be either cow or pig fat, taking of which into the mouth being major breaches of the Hindu and Muslim religions.

These two issues arose against a background of deteriorating morale and discipline in the Indian regiments over a period of years.

In addition, the British reputation for invincibility took a severe knock from the incompetence and defeats of the war in Afghanistan (First Afghan War 1839 to 1842).

The East India Company’s army comprised some 250,000 sepoys and around 5,000 British troops.

The two British Army cavalry regiments and twenty British infantry regiments posted to India to support the East India Company government were spread across the country with the strongest contingent in the Punjab and others in Persia and Burma.

The British Governor of India, Lord Dalhousie, repeatedly requested reinforcement by more British regiments, but this was not forthcoming from the British Government against a background of demand for troops created by the losses in the Crimean War.

Following the incident in Barrackpore, several Indian soldiers were tried for mutiny and some executed. The 19^th Sepoy Infantry was disbanded.

At Ambala, near Delhi, the sepoy troops, in view of the rumours over the new rifles and cartridges, burnt down several buildings, including the British officers’ bungalows.

Word of the mutiny in these regiments spread quickly through the garrisons of northern India and several regiments, where they were not disbanded by British troops, mutinied.

In Delhi, Bahadur Shah, the titular head of the old Mogul dynasty held his court under sufferance from the British.

Bahadur Shah became the rallying point for many of the Mutineers, who marched to Delhi.

Several of the Indian native rulers took the opportunity to revolt against the British.

Significant among these Indian rulers were Nana Sahib and the Rani of Jhansi, causing a block of territory 100 miles on each side of the River Ganges from Allahabad to Delhi to be in revolt against the British.

The 34^th Bengal Native Infantry was disbanded after a significant delay, while further acts of mutiny took place in the Calcutta area.

On 10^th May 1857, at Meerut, the 3^rd Bengal Light Cavalry and the 11^th and 20^th Native Infantry Regiments mutinied and attempted to massacre their officers at church parade.

The massacre was largely prevented but, due to the failure of senior British officers to act decisively, the Mutineers were enabled to march away, heading for Delhi.

Mounted Mutineers reached Delhi on 11^th May 1857 and entered the city without being halted by the troops of the Indian garrison, the 38^th, 54^th and 74^th regiments of Native Infantry.

The few British officials and officers in the garrison went on the alert.

The Mutineers released the prisoners from the gaol, entered the palace of the aged Moghul ruler, Bahadur Shah and called on him to lead them in the fight against the British.

The British men, women and children found in the palace were killed.

Parties of Mutineers searched out the European and Eurasian residents of the European Quarter of Delhi and killed them.

Lieutenant Willoughby, in charge of the Delhi magazine, where a substantial quantity of ammunition was stored, prepared the magazine for defence with his staff of 8 British soldiers.

From the cantonment to the north of Delhi, Brigadier-General Graves sent the 54^th and other native infantry regiments to restore order in the city.

These troops joined the Mutineers at the city gate and fired on their British officers. the British survivors escaped into the countryside and made their way to various places thought to be safe havens, leaving Bahadur Shah as the restored ruler in the old Mogul Capital City of Delhi with a rapidly growing army of Mutineers.

One of the last acts of the British in Delhi was to blow up the Armoury in what is described as a ‘terrific explosion’, killing three of the seven British soldiers defending the Armoury; the others, including Lieutenant Willoughby who fired the charge, escaping into the countryside. Around 100 mutineers were also killed in the explosion.

Willoughby with some of his soldiers was murdered by the inhabitants in the village where they took refuge.

In Calcutta, due to the lack of reliable information, it was difficult For Lord Canning and the East India Company administration to assess the full implications of what was occurring.

On 12^th May 1857, the news of what had taken place at Meerut and Delhi reached the British commander-in-chief, General George Anson at Simla in the north-west of India.

Such troops as were available were assembled for an attack to recover Delhi.

HM 75^th Foot and the East India Company 1^st Bengal (European) Fusilier and the 2^nd Bengal (European) Fusilier regiments were ordered to march to Ambala, to the north of Delhi.

The Sirmoor Gurkha battalion moved to Meerut and a siege train with the Nasiri Gurkha battalion marched to Phillaur.

The garrison in Ambala comprised HM 9^th Lancers, two batteries of horse artillery and three untrustworthy native regiments.

The primary target for General Anson was to recover Delhi from the Mutineers, an aim urged on him by John Lawrence the British Chief Commissioner in the Punjab.

Due to Dalhousie’s repeated reductions in military spending over the previous years, there was no transport for the various regiments’ baggage and they arrived in Ambala without tents, supplies or medical provision or sufficient ammunition for a prolonged military operation, imposing a significant delay on any advance to Delhi.

At Ferozepore three native regiments mutinied and although dispersed and partially disarmed many Mutineers made their way to join the Mutineers in Delhi.

A native regiment mutinied at Agra and escaped to Delhi, with further mutinies at Shahjahanpur, Bareilly, Budaon, Moadabad and Farakhabad.

On 4^th June 1857 two native regiments mutinied at Jhansi and massacred the English population, with the connivance of the Rani of Jhansi.

On 6^th June 1857 the garrison of a native regiment and an artillery battery in Allahabad mutinied.

The British Advance on Delhi:

John Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner in the Punjab repeatedly urged General Anson to advance on Delhi.

Anson’s inclination was to wait until he had organised a siege train from the guns held at Agra and ensured that his army was better equipped.

Canning, the Governor-General in Calcutta, equally required Anson to re-capture Delhi, a course of action Anson now felt bound to adopt, although against his better judgement.

Anson ordered the troops at Meerut and the siege train at Ludhiana to join him at Baghpat on the road to Delhi.

Anson himself marched out of Ambala on 25^th May 1857 with HM 9^th Lancers, two troops of Bengal Horse Artillery, HM 75^th Foot, 1^st Bengal (European) Fusiliers, 4 companies of the 2^nd Bengal (European) Fusiliers and the 60^th Native Infantry.

The 60^th Native Infantry was suspect and was sent away soon afterwards, shortly before it mutinied.

On 26^th May 1857, Anson’s column reached Karnal, where Anson died of cholera and was succeeded in command by General Sir Henry Barnard, a British army officer who had been chief-of-staff of the British army in the Crimea.

On 27^th May 1857, Brigadier General Archdale Wilson marched out of Meerut with two squadrons of the Carabiniers (6^th Dragoon Guards), a wing of the 60^th Rifles, Tombs Bengal Horse Artillery troop, Scott’s field battery and some native sappers and irregular cavalry.

The Battle at Ghazi-ud-din Nagar:

On 30^th May 1857, Wilson’s column reached Ghazi-ud-din Nagar, approaching the suspension bridge across the River Hindan, now dry.

A large force of Mutineers with guns was in a defensive position behind and in the dry river bed.

The odds against Wilson were said to have been 7 to 1.

At 4pm, Wilson’s column attacked the Mutineers’ positions along the river and drove them back, capturing five of the Mutineers’ guns.

The next day the Mutineers returned. After an artillery engagement lasting two hours the Mutineers fell back before an advance by the 60^th Rifles.

On 1^st June 1857, the Sirmoor Gurkha Battalion joined Wilson’s column and on 7^th June 1857 Wilson reached Alipur and joined Barnard’s force.

The advance down the Grand Trunk Road to Delhi by the whole force began at midnight.

Lieutenant William Hodson, an officer of irregular horse, conducting a reconnaissance along the road to Delhi, found a powerful force of Mutineers in position halfway to Delhi, at the village of Badli-ki-Serai.

Battle of Badli-ki-Serai 8^th June 1857:

The Mutineers, outnumbering the British force by 4 or 5 to 1, occupied a strong position across the Grand Trunk Road.

On the right of the Mutineers’ position was a serai or way-side inn and a walled village with two substantial stone gates.

In front of the village was an expanse of impassable swampy ground.

On the left of their position the Mutineers had constructed a sand-bagged battery with four heavy guns and an 8-inch mortar.

On either side of the road was a network of ditches through swampy ground.

At a mile distance to the west ran the Western Jumna Canal.

Barnard launched his attack on the Mutineers’ positions at daybreak on 8^th June 1857.

Brigadier Hope-Grant with ten horse artillery guns, the Carabiniers (6^th Dragoon Guards), three squadrons of 9^th Lancers and fifty of Hodson’s Jhind Horse, commanded by Lieutenant William Hodson advanced around the Mutineers’ left flank.

This move was followed by an advance of the main body of the British force up the road towards the Mutineers’ position.

Once the lights from the Mutineers’ camp could be seen, Brigadier Showers with his First Brigade of the 75^th Foot and the 1^st Bengal (European) Fusiliers moved off to the right of the Mutineers’ position, while Colonel Graves led the 2^nd Brigade of 1^st Battalion 60^th Rifles, 2^nd Bengal (European) Fusiliers and the Sirmoor Gurkha battalion to the Mutineers’ left.

The British heavy guns remained on the road with a battery of field artillery on each flank.

Before the British guns could come into action they were subjected to a heavy fire by the Mutineers’ artillery, in place across the road.

The British guns were of a smaller calibre and unable to respond adequately to this bombardment, which inflicted many casualties on the British force and caused the native drivers to abandon the column with their bullocks, leaving the guns immobile, until they were rounded up and forced to return.

Barnard ordered Showers to charge the Mutineers’ guns, an assault carried out with considerable success by the 75^th Foot, supported by the 1^st Bengal Fusiliers, carrying the gun battery at the point of the bayonet, before crossing the road, bursting through the stone gatehouse and charging into Badli-ki-Serai, where a desperate fight took place leading to the destruction of the Mutineers holding the village.

Graves’ brigade appeared on the extreme right of the Mutineers’ position, after marching around the swampy ground, while the British cavalry and horse artillery advanced around the Mutineers’ left flank.

The Mutineers abandoned their positions in the village and Serai and retreated precipitately to Delhi, leaving their guns on the field to be taken by the British.

Under a hot sun, Barnard marched on to Delhi, reaching the parade ground of the abandoned British cantonments to the north-west of Delhi and to the north of the northern end of Delhi Ridge.

The Mutineers opened fire from the ridge, causing Barnard to divide his force in two and conduct sweeps from the northern and southern ends of the ridge, clearing it of the Mutineers.

The days casualties saw the Mutineers lose around a thousand men with the British column suffering 182 casualties, 60 of whom were taken by the 75^th Foot.

The British captured thirteen of the Mutineers’ guns, two being 24 pounders.

Barnard’s column, now referred to as the ‘Delhi Field Force’ took up positions on Delhi Ridge and the Siege of Delhi was under way.

In reality, for some time it was the Delhi Field Force that was besieged rather than the city.

The Siege of Delhi:

Delhi Ridge, on which the British force was now positioned, lay along the northern side of Delhi, slanting from the west to the north-east of the city. 

Delhi Ridge is around two miles in length, two hundred yards wide at the northern end to eight hundred yards wide at its southern end.

Delhi Ridge is around sixty feet in elevation, its northern end resting on the Jumna River, flowing down the eastern side of the city and unfordable from the rainy season, when the snow begins to melt in the Himalayan Mountains.

Immediately adjacent to the southern end of Delhi Ridge lay the Grand Trunk Road, the route from Delhi to the north-west of India and the Punjab, the main sources of supply and troop reinforcement for the Delhi Field Force.

The northern end of Delhi Ridge lay beyond the range of the many guns positioned by the Mutineers along the ramparts of the city.

For these various reasons the Delhi Field Force positioned its main camp to the rear of the northern end of Delhi Ridge in the old wrecked army cantonment and took up positions along the Ridge.

Behind the southern end of the Ridge lay the extensive suburb of Sabzi Mandi, its buildings a succession of houses and walled gardens, providing extensive cover for the Mutineers’ raids onto the south-western end of the Ridge during the course of the siege.

Approximately halfway along the Ridge stood a large house, the country residence of a Mahrattha chief, Hindu Rao’s House. The British occupied this building as their main piquet.

Two hundred yards along the Ridge, to the left of Hindu Rao’s House, a battery of heavy guns was positioned, with five hundred yards further along, in an old mosque, an infantry piquet with two guns and half a mile yet further, in the Flagstaff Tower, another infantry piquet with two guns.

On the right of the British position was an infantry piquet with three heavy guns fronted by a cavalry piquet with two horse artillery guns, overlooking the Grand Trunk Road.

The length of the British line was 2,600 yards, or around one yard per man of the British force, with odds against them of between twenty and forty to one.

General Barnard received pressing instructions from both Lord Canning, the Governor-General in Calcutta and Sir John Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, to storm and take Delhi and, in addition, to despatch troops to relieve Lucknow and Cawnpore.

These were tall orders as Barnard barely had enough troops and guns to keep the Mutineers from overwhelming his defensive position on Delhi Ridge.

In addition to the casualties inflicted on his troops during the fighting on Delhi Ridge, the heat and demands on an undermanned force caused a great many additional casualties from exhaustion and disease, particularly cholera.

Mutineers’ attacks on 8^th 9^th 10^th and 12^th June 1857:

 On 8^th June 1857, the day the British occupied Delhi Ridge, the Mutineers sallied out of the city and attacked the British garrison in Hindu Rao’s House, but were driven off by the Sirmoor Gurkha battalion, two companies of the 60^th Rifles and two of Scott’s guns.

On 9^th June 1857, the Corps of Guides marched into the British camp after a march from the Punjab of six hundred miles, achieved in twenty-two days.

The Guides, after being inspected by General Barnard, helped repel an assault by the Mutineers on the Hindu Rao House that same afternoon.

The Guides pursued the Mutineers back to the walls of Delhi, where one of their officers, Lieutenant Quintin Battye, was mortally wounded.

The Mutineers began a cannonade using the heavy guns positioned on the north wall of the Delhi fortifications.

The British guns put in place on the Ridge were found to be inadequate to counter the bombardment by the heavier guns of the Mutineers.

The Mutineers launched further attacks on the Hindu Rao position on 9^th and 10^th June 1857, all of which were repelled by Major Reid and his Sirmoor Battalion of Gurkhas, with support from the 60^th Rifles and the Guides.

On 12^th June 1857, a body of Mutineers crept up on the Flagstaff Tower by way of a network of ravines at the base of the Ridge and launched an attack. The piquet, comprising two Horse Artillery guns and two companies of the 75^th Foot, was about to be relieved by companies from the 2^nd Bengal Fusiliers.

A thick fog descended on the Ridge, concealing the Mutineers as they rushed the Flagstaff Tower.

The Mutineers’ attack was repelled with difficulty, after two companies of the 60^th Rifles came up to support the troops of the piquet.

Captain Knox of the 75^th Foot was killed among the several British casualties in the fight.

Hard on the heels of this assault, the Mutineers launched a further attack on the Hindu Rao house, this time from the Sabzi Mandi suburb in the rear of the Ridge.

The Mutineers were only with difficulty repelled, causing the British to strengthen the defences on the north side of the Ridge facing Sabzi Mandi and on the south side with an additional advanced piquet in a building known as Metcalfe’s House, twelve hundred yards in advance of the Flagstaff Tower.

The small number of British troops in the Delhi Field Force meant that in each of these attacks virtually the whole British manpower was deployed, leaving little opportunity for rest and recovery.

In addition, the heat and the glaring sun were a substantial burden, with growing incidents of disease among the troops.

The aborted assault on the Delhi defences of 13^th June 1857:

In accordance with the directions he was receiving from Lord Canning in Calcutta and Sir John Lawrence in the Punjab, General Barnard prepared an assault on Delhi.

Three junior British engineer officers were assigned to plan the assault in the utmost secrecy, under the directions of the commanding general.

The whole force was to be deployed in three columns.

One column was to enter Delhi by the Kashmir Gate, the main entrance in the north wall of the city.

The second column was to enter by the Lahore Gate, situated in the western side of the city.

The third column was to make an assault over the city wall.

The three columns would move off from the British camp so as to arrive at the walls at daybreak.

No notice of the intended attack was given to the soldiers of the Delhi Field Force, even to the commanding engineer, whose officers were planning the operation.

At 1am on 13^th June 1857, the day of the attack, the whole Delhi Field Force was suddenly paraded and ammunition given out.

At this point, the various senior officers commanding the columns were given their instructions.

It was then found that the 75^th Foot, after pursuing the Mutineers from the attack on the Flagstaff Tower into the grounds of Metcalfe House had not been recalled and were still there, about a mile in front of the Tower.

By the time the 75^th Foot returned to camp and been issued with ammunition it was dawn and too late to attempt the attack on the city. The operation was cancelled.

The general view seems to have been that the cancellation was a fortunate outcome as the attack had little chance of success and would have led to substantial British casualties.

Not until the Delhi Field Force received further reinforcements from the Punjab could an attack on Delhi succeed.

The Mutineers’ attacks of 15^th 17^th and 18^th June 1857:

On 15^th June 1857, a strong force of Mutineers attacked the Metcalfe House piquet but was driven back with considerable loss.

On 17^th June 1857, the Mutineers launched attacks on Delhi Ridge from every direction.

It appeared that the assaults were to mask the building of a battery by the Mutineers at an Idgah, a large walled rectangular open-air place of muslim worship, on a hill a quarter of a mile in front of the southern limit of the Delhi Ridge, from where enfilading fire could be directed against the positions of the Delhi Field Force along the Ridge.

Barnard directed that the battery be attacked by two columns, one led by Major Tombs of the Bengal Horse Artillery with 400 men of the 60^th Rifles and the 1^st Bengal Fusiliers, 30 Guides Cavalry, his own battery and a party of Sappers and Miners.

the other column, led by Major, Reid comprising four companies of the 60^th Rifles and some Gurkhas was to attack through Kishenganj on the left flank of the battery at the Idgah.

The two British columns converged on the Idgah, driving the Mutineers before them, blew open the gates and destroyed the battery, inflicting heavy casualties on the Mutineers.

On 18^th June 1857, the Mutineers issued in great strength from Delhi and attacked all along the line of the British positions.

One force of Mutineers infiltrated through the suburbs on the British right and appeared in their rear.

The only troops available to repel this attack were some cavalry and light guns of Tombs Horse Artillery battery. The Mutineers were repelled with difficulty, following a further attack by a party of the 60^th Rifles.

Mutineers’ attack of 23^rd June 1857:

It seems to have been reported in the British camp that the Mutineers believed that the British Raj was destined only to last for 100 years and that period was to be computed from the date of Clive’s great victory at the Battle of Plassey on 23^rd June 1757.

An attack on the Delhi Field Force on the anniversary of Plassey was consequently destined to succeed and would lead to the eviction of the British from India.

Further supporting this belief was the knowledge that it was a propitious date for both Hindus and Muslims.

Surendra Nath Sen queries whether this was in fact the Mutineer’s reasoning, pointing out that natives of India did not use the western calendar.

At 5am on 23^rd June 1857, the Mutineers began a determined attack on the Delhi Ridge with some six thousand men.

The Mutineers’ heavy guns on the Delhi walls bombarded Hindu Rao’s House and the Ridge, while other guns in the western suburbs fired into the right flank of the British positions on the Delhi Ridge.

 A series of determined attacks were then launched against the right flank and rear of the British line.

A small force of eight hundred British and Sikh troops arrived from the north-west of India and was thrown into the fighting, in spite of being exhausted from their hurried march in the heat.

After twelve hours fighting, the Mutineers were finally repelled, leaving the British, Gurkhas and Sikhs exhausted in the terrific heat, but elated by their success.

Virtually every soldier in the Delhi Field Force was drawn into the battle.

The Mutineers casualties are said to have been around 1,000 killed and wounded, while the Delhi Field Force loss was 160.

Casualty figures for the Mutineers during the Siege of Delhi are highly problematic.

The Mutineers kept no record of their casualties and some British authorities consider that figures given in British accounts after the various engagements exaggerated the number of Mutineer casualties by a significant margin.

The decision was then taken for the Delhi Field Force to occupy the Sabzi Mandi suburb.

A piquet of 180 men was established in Sabzi Mandi, occupying a serai on one side of the Grand Trunk Road and a Hindu temple on the other side, connected by a line of breastworks to the Hindu Rao piquets.

Mutineers’ attack of 27^th June 1857:

On 27^th June 1857, the Mutineers attacked the Metcalfe House in front of Delhi Ridge, the new Sabzi Mandi piquets and the batteries on Delhi Ridge.

The attack was repelled with British casualties of 62.

Mutineers’ attack of 30^th June 1857:

On 30^th June 1857, an attack was made on the Hindu Rao House.

Two British officers of the 4^th Sikhs, Yorke and Packe, were wounded. The circumstances and nature of their wounds showed that they had been shot by their own men.

All the Hindustanis in the 4^th Sikhs were disarmed and expelled from the British camp.

In that week the Monsoon burst, with rains flooding the area and causing severe outbreaks of disease.

At the beginning of July 1857, reinforcements arrived of guns, infantry and cavalry, bringing the strength of the Delhi Field Force  to nearly 6,000 men.

Additional Mutineers arrived in Delhi from a number of towns across northern India, far outnumbering the modest addition to the British force.

The Mutineers from Rohikund could be seen marching over the Jumna River into Delhi by the Bridge of Boats, with their bands playing and colours flying.

Proposed assault on Delhi:

Due to the fears that there might be a rising against the British in the Punjab, the capture Delhi was being urgently pressed.

General Barnard reluctantly agreed to the assault and Lieutenant Alex Taylor, the acting commanding engineer, was given the task of planning the operation.

In the event, a conspiracy was discovered among the native troops and the assault abandoned.

On the day of the intended assault, Lieutenant-Colonel Baird-Smith of the Bengal Engineers joined the Delhi Field Force as its new chief engineer.

Mutineers’ attack of 3^rd July 1857:

On 3^rd July 1857, a force of Mutineers, around 5,500 strong, with several guns, occupied the suburbs to the right of the British position.

The Delhi Field Force turned out in strength in expectation of an attack on the British line.

Instead, once darkness fell, the Mutineer force marched off to the north towards Alipur, some twenty miles away.

Alipur was garrisoned by a squadron of the 5^th Punjab Cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant Younghusband, with a few guns.

The Mutineers reached Alipur around midnight and instead of attacking immediately, opened a gun barrage, enabling the Punjabi sowars to mount and escape to Rhai, ten miles to the north.

Hearing the gunfire, a relief column under Major Coke was sent from the British camp.

Coke’s column intercepted the Mutineer force as it returned to Delhi with loot from Alipur and attacked them.

The Mutineers got away with their guns but abandoned a great deal of loot and ammunition.

Death of General Barnard on 5^th July 1857:

On 5^th July 1857, General Barnard succumbed to cholera and died within a few hours, much lamented by the Delhi Field Force.

Barnard was replaced as commander of the force by General Reed.

Mutineers’ attack of 9^th July 1857:

On 9^th July 1857, the Mound Piquet, a position behind the British right flank overlooking the Grand Trunk Road, was held by two guns of Tomb’s troop of Indian horse artillery and a troop of Carabiniers/6^th Dragoon Guards commanded by 2^nd Lieutenant Hills and Lieutenant Stillman.

A piquet of the 9^th Irregular Cavalry commanded by an Indian officer was further forward observing the Grand Trunk Road.

A sowar from the piquet informed the two British officers that a party of Mutineer cavalry was approaching. The sowar was sent on to warn the British camp. The main piquet mounted up and the gunners prepared their guns.

The British troops were surprised by the arrival of the Mutineer cavalry, the gunners still loading.

Hills ordered his guns to fire when ready and himself charged the head of the Mutineer column, cutting down the two leading Mutineers, before being ridden down.

Hills was further attacked by a group of Mutineers and only rescued by the arrival of Tombs who cut down his assailants.

The Mutineer cavalry attempted to persuade the native gunners of Tombs’ troop to join them. The gunners answered by firing at them, before escaping across the canal.

Hills and Tombs were awarded the Victoria Cross for their conduct in this action.

Mutineer infantry and guns were now in the suburbs beneath the Ridge, from where they were evicted by a column of 800 infantry and six guns commanded by General Chamberlain.

British casualties were 1 officer and 40 men killed, 8 officers and 163 men wounded with 11 men missing and likely to have been killed by the Mutineers, as neither side took prisoners.

It was clear that the piquet of 9^th Irregular Cavalry had acted in concert with the Mutineers, as insufficient warning was given of the approach of the Mutineer cavalry. The sowars and NCOs of the piquet were not seen again and were assumed to have ridden off with the escaping Mutineers.

General Reed took the opportunity to disarm and discharge all the remaining Hindustanis in the force, to the relief of the remaining troops, both European and Native.

There was now a short lull indicating that the Mutineers had suffered significant casualties on 9^th July 1857.

The established pattern was that the Mutineers would await the arrival of reinforcements before launching another attack, using the newly joined regiments.

Mutineers’ attack of 14^th July 1857:

On 14^th July 1857, the Mutineers emerged from Delhi in substantial numbers and attacked the Hindu Rao House and the Sabzi Mandi piquets.

A column, commanded by Brigadier Showers, was formed of what Roberts calls ‘the usual strength’, 800 infantry with six horse artillery guns and cavalry from the Guides and Hodson’s Horse. Brigadier-General Chamberlain accompanied the column.

Chamberlain leapt his horse into the first substantial compound held by the Mutineers, receiving a ball in the shoulder.

The troops followed Chamberlain and drove the Mutineers from the compound.

The Mutineers were driven with considerable difficulty out of a number of building and compounds, finally reaching the Lahore Gate, where the pursuing column met a heavy gun and musketry fire from the walls of the city.

The column was forced to withdraw to the lines on the Ridge, now pursued by the Mutineers, who continued to attack until the lines were reached.

The losses of the Delhi Field Force were 15 killed, 16 officers and 177 men wounded with 2 missing.

Mutineer losses were estimated at 1,000 killed.

Roberts describes how the Mutineers spent hours carrying their dead back to Delhi in carts after this engagement.

Termination of General Reed’s command:

On 17^th July 1857, the health of Major-General Reed had deteriorated to such an extent that he was forced to give up command of the Delhi Field Force, being replaced by Brigadier Archdale Wilson.

Roberts describes how Wilson’s introduction of a more systematic organisation for the relief of piquets provided a considerable relief to the troops and improved their overall morale and health.

Mutineers’ attack of 18^th July 1857:

On 18^th July 1857, the Mutineers mounted a general attack on the batteries along the Delhi Ridge and the Sabzi Mandi piquets.

By this time considerable work had been carried out by the Delhi Field Force in clearing way the old serais and walled gardens of the Sabzi Mandi, depriving the Mutineers of the cover they had used to such effect on several occasions and giving the Sabzi Mandi piquets clear fields of fire.

In the afternoon a column set out to drive the Mutineers away, consisting of four horse artillery guns, 750 infantry and the Guides Cavalry, commanded by Colonel Jones of the 60^th Rifles.

Jones forced the Mutineers back, but did not make the mistake of approaching the city walls, remaining in a position before Sabzi Mandi.

Of the Delhi Field Force, 1 officer and 12 men were killed, 3 officers and 66 men wounded with 2 men missing.

Mutineers’ attack of 23rd July 1857:

The Mutineers did not make a further attack on the positions of the Delhi Field Force for some five days and then the assault was on its left flank, at the far end of the Delhi Ridge from the suburbs.

On 23^rd July 1857 the Mutineers emerged from the Kashmir Gate and occupied Ludlow Castle.

From there the Mutineers’ artillery opened a barrage on Metcalfe House and the Stable Piquet and the Mosque Piquet on the Ridge.

A counter-barrage by the British guns was unable to silence the Mutineers’ guns and a column was sent to push the Mutineers out of Ludlow Castle, in case they intended to set up a permanent battery.

The column comprised six horse artillery guns, 400 British infantry, 360 men of the 1^st Punjab Infantry and a troop of Guides Cavalry. They were joined by 250 men from the Metcalfe House piquet.

The column approached Ludlow Castle, initially apparently unnoticed, but was then subjected to a heavy fire of grapeshot.

The column swept the Mutineers out of the position and pursued them to the walls of the city, where as so often happened in these pursuits, the pursuers were subjected to a damaging fire from the city walls, forcing a precipitous retreat, during which Brigadier Showers was wounded.

Mutineers’ attack of 23^rd July 1857:

On 23^rd July 1857 a strong force of Mutineers marched to Alipur with the purpose of establishing a bridge over the cut to intercept the Delhi Field Force’s communications with Meerut and the Punjab.

A column followed from the Dehi Field Force and waited to repel the crossing over the bridge.

In the event, monsoon raid caused heavy flooding and the half-finished bridge was washed away.

The Mutineers marched back to Delhi and, being joined by a strong force from the city, began a night-long attack on the right flank of the Delhi Field Force at Sabzi-Manji.

Mutineers’ attack of 1^st August 1857:

This period was a Mohammedan festival at which it was the custom for the King of Delhi to pray at the Idgah.

The festival was replaced by a particularly determined attack by both Hindu and Muslim Mutineers.

After lengthy prayers by each denomination during the morning of 1^st August 1857, the Mutineers, shouting religious battle cries, marched out of every city gate and attacked the British positions on the Ridge.

The attacks were repeatedly made and thrown back throughout the night and the next day, until the Mutineers finally gave up and returned to the city.

British casualties were 1 officer and 9 men killed with 36 men wounded, the troops being well protected by the breastworks along the Ridge.

The Mutineers’ casualties were reported to have been heavy.

News was reaching Delhi of the approach of Nicholson’s ‘Movable Column’ from the Punjab, as a reinforcement for the Delhi Field Force.

Many of the Mutineers despaired of winning the fight against the British at Delhi and left the city for their homes.

There was increasing disorder in the city, with the absence of any strong leadership either military or civil, the only authority being the elderly king.

The Mutineers still outnumbered the Delhi Field Force by eight or nine to one.

During this period, information was arriving at the Delhi Field Force from the Punjab and elsewhere across India, usually written in Greek characters on scraps of paper sewn into a native’s shoe or clothing.

The Delhi Field Force learned that Lucknow held out against the Mutineers and that British troops were being sent to India.

In particular the British governor at the South African Cape was ordering all the troop ships stopping in Capetown on their way to China to take their regiments to Calcutta.

Mutineers’ attack of 11^th August 1857:

On 11^th August 1857, the Mutineers made a further attempt to overwhelm the Metcalfe House piquet.

Guns were brought out of the Kashmir gate and positioned at Ludlow Castle and the Kudsiabagh.

The Mutineers began a bombardment, with heavy musketry, from the jungle at the foot of Delhi Ridge.

While casualties to the Delhi Field Force were not high it was considered dangerous to leave the Mutineers unchallenged so far forward.

Brigadier Showers led a force to drive the Mutineers back into the city, comprising British, Sikh and Gurkha infantry, a troop of Horse Artillery, a squadron of the 9^th Lancers and the Guides cavalry.

Showers’ orders were to ‘move up silently and take the guns at Ludlow Castle’.

Showers’ column approached the Mutineers’ position at dawn on 12^th August 1857.

A Mutineer sentry called ‘Ho come dar?’ and was promptly shot down.

After an exchange of musketry, the Mutineers were overwhelmed. 250 Mutineers were killed and four of their guns captured.

Casualties in Showers’ column were 1 officer and 19 men killed, 7 officers and 85 men wounded, with 5 men missing.

Showers himself was wounded with Major Coke, the commandant of the 1^st Punjab Infantry (Coke’s Rifles).

The captured Mutineer guns were pushed back to the British lines by cheering soldiers.

The next day the Punjab Movable Column, commanded by Brigadier-General John Nicholson, marched into the Delhi Field Force camp.

Nicholson was a legendary character among the Punjabi and Sikh troops referred to as ‘Nickal Seyn’.

His force comprised the British 52^nd Light Infantry, a wing of the 1^st Baluch regiment and the 2^nd Punjab Infantry, with 200 Multani Cavalry and 500 Military Police.

The strength of the Delhi Field Force was now 8,000 troops of all arms.

Hodson at Rohtak:

On 14^th August 1857, the day of Nicholson’s column’s arrival, a body of Mutineer cavalry was seen to leave Delhi on the Grand Trunk Road heading north-west.

The Delhi Field Force was now strong enough for a pursuit to be mounted and Captain William Hodson followed the Mutineers with a body of Guides Cavalry and his own Hodson’s Horse.

Hodson’s column came up with a group of irregular horse who had failed to return to duty, although not obviously active Mutineers. They were wiped out.

Hodson continued to the town of Rohtak. The town and its neighbouring fort were occupied by the Mutineers.

After venturing into Rohtak, Hodson withdrew and made as if to return to Delhi Ridge.

The Mutineer cavalry pursued Hodson’s column, which suddenly turned and launched a charge, entirely overwhelming the pursuing Mutineers.

On his return to camp Hodson was highly commended for his success.

Battle of Najafgarh:

A British siege-train with powerful guns was on its way from Ferozepore and other parties of troops were known to be marching to join the Delhi Field Force.

On 24^th August 1857, a formidable contingent of Mutineers marched west from Delhi, intent on intercepting the siege train.

On 25^th August 1857, Nicholson left camp with sixteen horse artillery guns, 1,600 infantry and 450 cavalry with orders to overtake the Mutineers and bring them to action.

Nicholson caught up with the Mutineers at 4pm outside the town of Najafgarh, after marching for twenty miles in pouring rain along roads turned to quagmires. Two swamps had to be crossed.

The Mutineers were occupying a position a mile and three-quarters long in front of a wide and deep drainage ditch.

A Serai or large country inn stood in front of this position, held by four guns.

On each flank the Mutineers occupied a village, strongly held.

A branch of the drainage ditch ran along the Mutineers’ right flank.

A bridge in the rear of the Mutineers’ position carried the road in from Delhi.

Nicholson approached by a side road that came in on the right of the Mutineers’ position.

The branch of the drainage ditch ran between Nicholson’s advance and the Mutineers’ position, crossed by a ford.

The heavy rain had made the drainage ditch a dangerous obstacle, chest-high even at the ford.

Nicholson’s men crossed the ditch with some difficulty, subjected to a heavy fire from the Serai.

Nicholson carried out a short reconnaissance of the Mutineers’ position before launching his attack on the Serai.

Nicholson addressed the soldiers of HM 61^st Regiment and the 1^st Bengal (European) Fusiliers, urging them to hold their fire until the last moment in the charge.

Under cover of a barrage from the horse artillery guns, the British infantry took the Serai and swept up the Mutineers’ line behind the Serai, driving them over the bridge towards Delhi.

The battle was over by the evening, leaving thirteen guns to be captured by the British, with a large quantity of ammunition, camels, horses and other supplies.

The Mutineers gave their casualties as 800 men killed and wounded.

British losses were 2 officers and 23 men killed, with 3 officers and 68 men wounded. 2 of the wounded British officers died.

The Mutineers left in Delhi assumed that the preponderance of the Delhi Field Force must have marched to Najafgarh. The city Mutineers launched an attack on the Ridge the next day, 26^th August 1857, but were beaten off, with small loss.

The storming of Delhi by the Delhi Field Force:

By 6^th September 1857, the Siege Train reached the camp of the Delhi Field Force on Delhi Ridge.

A contingent sent by the Maharajah of Kashmir of 2,200 men and four guns joined the force.

The Raja of Jhind arrived in the camp with several hundred of his troops, to take part in the capture of Delhi.

No further assistance could be expected.

It was felt by the Delhi Field Force that the attack on the city must now be made, while the army was at its strongest and before it was again whittled away by the casualties caused in holding the positions on Delhi Ridge and by disease.

By that date 2,977 men were in the hospital.

In the course of three weeks, HM 52^nd Light infantry had dwindled from 600 healthy men to 242 men fit for duty due in part to battle casualties, but primarily to disease.

Brigadier-General Archdale Wilson, the Commander of the Delhi Field Force was not confident that he could take the City of Delhi, held by the Mutineers with an army numbering in excess of 40,000 men and equipped with many more guns than he commanded, but the pressure on Wilson to mount the assault was now irresistible.

Lawrence in the Punjab and Canning, the British Governor-General in Calcutta, had been clamouring for some time for Wilson to assault Delhi.

It was becoming increasingly clear that the prospects for the British of winning the war against the Mutineers and the various rebelling princes depended on the re-capture of Delhi.

Wilson was under daily pressure from his own senior subordinates to mount the assault.

Nicholson was threatening to remove Wilson as the commander of the Delhi Field Force by force if he prevaricated any longer.

Wilson turned to his senior military engineer Lieutenant-Colonel Baird-Smith for his advice.

Baird-Smith, supported by all the influential subordinate officers in the Force, strongly advised Wilson to storm the city without delay.

At a Council of War held on 6^th September 1857, Wilson announced that an attack on Delhi would be made.

Preparations were already under way; a trench had been dug with a battery of two 9-pounders and two 24-pounders at the right of the British line, to prevent the Mutineers from intervening in the preparation of batteries further along the British line with sorties from the Lahore and Kabul gates.

This field work had the unlooked-for effect of causing the Mutineers to believe that the assault on Delhi was to be launched from that end of the British line, the right, when the reverse was the case.

Wilson issued an order on 7^th September 1857, directing that preparations for the assault on Delhi be commenced immediately.

‘Ground was broken’ that evening, commencing the building of the gun batteries that would lay the ground for the assault.

Battery No. 1 was begun 700 yards from the Mori Bastion at the north-west corner of the city walls. The right half of the battery, with five 18-pounders and one 8-inch mortar, was to silence the Mutineers’ guns in the Mori Bastion, while the left end of Battery No. 1, with four 24-pounders was to engage the Kashmir Bastion.

Battery No. 1, commanded by Major James Brind of the Bengal Artillery, was completed and opened fire at sunrise the next day, having endured several hours of heavy bombardment by the Mutineers’ guns during the early hours of daylight.

By the afternoon, the Mori Bastion was a heap of rubble from the British bombardment, with its guns silenced.

No 2 Battery was constructed at Ludlow Castle, 500 yards from the Kashmir Gate, one of the key points for the planned assault on Delhi.

While the battery was built in two parts, with seven heavy howitzers and two 18-pounders on the right and nine 24-pounders on the left, the whole battery on the morning of 11^th September 1857 opened fire on the Kashmir gate.

Nos 3 and 4 Batteries were situated in the Kudsiabagh and fired on the Kashmir bastion.

Baird-Smith’s plan selected the left flank as the point of attack, the River Jumna acting as a barrier to prevent a flanking counter-attack by the Mutineers.

Throughout the barrage on the city walls, the Mutineers’ guns on the walls returned a heavy fire and attempted unsuccessfully to silence the batteries of the Delhi Field Force.

By the evening of the 13^th September 1857, the guns in the British batteries had completed their task of breaching key sections of the city’s northern defences.

Nicholson, with the engineer Taylor and four junior engineer officers, inspected the defences and reported at midnight that the breaches were practicable for the assault. Colonel Baird-Smith passed this report to General Wilson, who issued orders for the storming of the Delhi walls to take place at daybreak the following morning.

There were to be four attacking columns. No 1 column, commanded by Brigadier-General Nicholson, comprising HM 75^th Foot, 1^st Bengal Fusiliers and 2^nd Punjab Infantry, was to storm the breach in the Kashmir Bastion.

No 2 column, commanded by Brigadier Jones, comprising HM 8^th Foot, 2^nd Bengal Fusiliers and 4^th Sikhs, was to storm the breach in the Water bastion.

No 3 column, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, comprising HM 52^nd Light Infantry, the Kumaon Gurkha battalion and 1^st Punjab Infantry, was to storm the Kashmir Gate, once it was blown.

No 4 column, commanded by Major Reid, comprised the Sirmoor Gurkha Battalion, the Guides Infantry and detachments from the piquets. With the Kashmir Contingent, this column was to attack the suburbs of Kisenganj and Paharibur and storm the Kabul gate.

A reserve column was formed under Brigadier-General Longfield, comprising HM 61^st Foot, 4^th Punjab Infantry and a wing of the Baluch Battalion with some of the Jhind contingent. This column would provide support where needed.

200 men of the 60^th Rifles would cover Nicholson’s advance and then join the reserve.

The strength of the attacking force was 5,000 men and took up a significant part of the Delhi Field Force.

The Attack on Delhi on 14^th September 1857:

It took time for many of the men allocated to the attacking columns to find their way back from duty on the piquet lines.

In addition, it was necessary to mount a brief additional bombardment to remove repairs to the defences installed over night by the Mutineers.

The British breaching batteries suddenly ceased firing and the column commanders gave the signal for the attack.

The 60^th Rifles gave a loud cheer echoed by the other troops.

As the front of each column rose to its feet and rushed forward, they were met by a storm of gunfire and musketry from the Mutineers on the walls of Delhi.

Most of the men carrying the storming ladders were shot down, but were quickly replaced and the ladders planted against the walls.

The Kashmir bastion was soon taken by No 1 column, as was the Water bastion by No 2 column.

No 3 column advanced towards the Kashmir gate and halted while the two engineer officers went forward with the explosive charges to blow the gate, reaching the gatehouse by crossing a plank over the ditch, all that remained of the bridge.

Under a heavy fire, Lieutenant Home and his men attached the explosive charges to the gate.

Lieutenant Salkeld came up with his firing party. Salkeld was shot in the leg and handed the slow-match to Corporal Burgess.

Burgess lit the fuse and fell mortally wounded.

The explosion blew the gate in and Bugler Hawthorne sounded the regimental call of the 52^nd.

Colonel Campbell did not hear the call or the explosion, so great was the noise of the assault, but was already bringing his column forward.

The troops crossed the ditch by the single plank and rushed through the gate.

Inside was an 18-pounder gun with its Mutineer crew scorched and killed by the explosion.

No 3 column poured through the Kashmir gate to meet up with the No 1 and No 2 columns which had surged through their respective breaches and joined up in the area between the Kashmir gate and the Church.

To the west of the city, the No 4 column advanced from Sabzi Mandi towards Kisenganj and Paharipur.

It would seem that the Mutineers were expecting the weight of the British attack to be made here with an attack on the Kabul gate at the north-western point of the Delhi city walls.

The Mutineers were in great strength here and moved forward to line the bank of the Jumna canal.

The commander of No 4 column, Major Reid, was wounded early in the fighting and there was confusion as to who was now in command.

The column was pushed back and it seemed for a time that the Mutineers might break through to the British camp.

Seeing how the battle was developing, Brigadier Hope-Grant brought up the British cavalry brigade.

The horse artillery opened a destructive fire on the Mutineers and the appearance of the cavalry held the Mutineers back, enabling the Kashmir contingent to withdrew from the Idgah and the rest of No 4 column to retire to the Hindu Rao House.

The three storming columns were reforming inside the walls and the guns in the captured Water and Kashmir bastions were being turned on the Mutineers inside the city.

The orders were for Nicholson’s 1^st column to attack along the inside of the city wall towards the Ajmir gate in the south-west of the city.

Jones’ 2^nd column was to take the Kabul gate at the head of the Grand Trunk Road in the north-west corner of the city.

Campbell’s 3^rd column was to head for the Jama Masjid, the large mosque in the centre of Delhi.

The 1^st and 2^nd columns became intermingled and advanced along the wall past the Kabul gate, capturing all the guns positioned on the rampart.

Nicholson became separated from his men and joined Campbell’s push towards the Jama Masjid, until they were halted by the Mutineers’ resistance at the Burn bastion, just short of the Lahore gate.

The Mutineers brought up a gun and subjected Campbell’s men to such a heavy fire that they were forced to withdraw to the Kabul gate.

Nicholson here re-joined his men and ordered a further attack on the Burn bastion.

The column made its attack down the lane that ran parallel to the wall.

In this lane Major Jacob, commanding the 1^st Bengal Fusiliers, was mortally wounded. He ordered his men to leave him and press the attack. Nicholson rushed to the front of the column, where he too was mortally wounded.

The column fell back again to the Kabul gate where the 1^st and 2^nd columns spent the night.

Campbell’s 3^rd column was guided by Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, who from his pre-Mutiny office of Magistrate and Collector of Delhi knew the city well.

Metcalfe led the column by roads that avoided the worst of the Mutineers’ fire to the Jama Masjid.

The column had no guns or explosives to blow in the gate and after half an hour fell back to the Church in the north-east corner of Delhi, where the 3^rd column was joined by the 4^th Punjab Infantry from the Reserve column.

General Wilson having watched the successful entry of his troops into Delhi, rode into the city to the Church.

Information reached him that the cavalry had suffered heavy losses and that Hope-Grant and Tombs were both dead.

Captain Frederick Roberts was sent to discover the truth and returned with the news that both these officers were unwounded and that the Mutineers had been repelled in their attack on the right wing of the Delhi Field Force.

Wilson was ill and greatly depressed by the heavy casualties and the apparent failure of the various columns to gain their objectives.

He was inclined to call off the attack and withdraw his forces to the Ridge.

Before giving the order Wilson referred to Baird-Smith for his opinion.

Baird-Smith’s reply was an uncompromising ‘We must hold on’. Similar urgings came from Neville Chamberlain commanding the Hindu Rao House piquet and from the mortally wounded Nicholson.

Wilson resolved to continue the attack on the city.

At the end of 14^th September 1857, the Delhi Field Force had a tenuous hold on a small section of the city walls.

Three of the four column commanders had been wounded and 66 officers and 1,104 soldiers had been killed or wounded.

The night was spent resting the troops and re-organising the columns.

The Mutineers failed to take advantage of the exhausted condition and disorder in the British ranks, other than a movement early in the evening which caused the band of the 4^th Punjab Infantry to strike up with the song ‘Cheer, Boys, Cheer!’

Cheering broke out in the ranks of the Punjabis and spread to neighbouring regiments.

Any intended move by the Mutineers was abandoned.

Attack on the city on 15^th September 1857:

One of the hazards in the attack was the amount of alcohol found.

It was believed that quantities of drink had been left in the streets by the Mutineers to hamper the attacking columns. On the previous day many British soldiers had become intoxicated.

A determined effort was now made to destroy all the alcohol found in the city.

Guns were brought up and a bombardment attempted of the Mutineers’ positions across the city. This was found to be of little impact.

On 16^th September 1857 Wilson, completely exhausted, handed over command of the attack on the city to Brigadier-General Sir Neville Chamberlain.

The Mutineers withdrew from their positions in the suburbs into the city.

Here the troops of the Delhi Field Force steadily pushed them back.

The magazine, near to the church in the north-east corner of the city, was taken by the British.

On 17^th September 1857, the Bank, a building south of the church, was taken by the British.

After several days of sapping through the walls of houses to enable the advance to be made without the troops being exposed in the streets, on 20^th September 1857, the British advance was resumed.

The Burn bastion was taken, followed by the capture of the Lahore gate.

The 1^st and 2^nd columns pushed into the centre of Delhi, towards the Jama Masjid Mosque.

Here they found that Campbell’s 3^rd column had made its way through the streets from the north-east of the city to the Jama Masjid, which had been taken by 4^th Punjab Infantry.

The columns pushed on to the Moghul Red Fort, the palace occupied by the Ex-Emperor Bahadur Shah and the headquarters of the Mutineers’ resistance.

The 60^th Rifles was given the honour of storming the Red Fort, as a mark of respect for the prominent part the regiment had played in the Siege.

Lieutenant Home, one of the team that blew the Kashmir gate, blew in the outer gate of the fort.

A second gate was forced and the 60^th Rifles and the 4^th Punjab Infantry rushed into the fort.

Delhi had been re-taken by the British.

Casualties at the Siege of Delhi:

Casualties are set out in the text of the siege as they occurred and where known.

Overall the British Delhi Field Force suffered 3,854 officers and men killed and wounded.

In the final 6 days of the storming of Delhi, the Delhi Field Force suffered 1,347 officers and men killed and wounded.

Follow-up to the Siege of Delhi:

The Delhi Field Force, after capturing Delhi, pillaged the city and committed extensive atrocities on the civil population, which fled into the surrounding countryside and lived in poverty until it was deemed safe to return.

In due course the British administration imposed fines on every household in Delhi, regardless of whether it had supported the Mutineers.

Bahadur Shah initially fled to the Qutb, a complex south of Delhi.

With the imminent collapse of the defence of Delhi, Bakht Khan advised Bahadur Shah to follow the main body of the Mutineers to Oudh.

The King’s courtier Mirza Ilahi Baksh advised Bahadur Shah to negotiate his surrender to the British to secure the future of the Queen, her son and her father.

Ilahi Baksh urged Bahadur Shah to move to Humayun’s Tomb, the imposing resting place of the Moghul Emperors south of Delhi.

Ilahi Baksh was providing information to Hodson and informed Hodson of the King’s whereabouts.

Hodson was authorised by General Wilson to negotiate the King’s surrender against a guarantee of his life.

On 21^st September 1857, Hodson went to Humayun’s Tomb and took Bahadur Shah, his youngest son and his father-in-law into custody.

On 22^nd September 1857, Hodson returned to Humayun’s Tomb and demanded the surrender of the three princes, Mirza Moghul, Mirza Khizr Sultan and Mirza Abu Bakr.

Hodson specifically refused to extend the amnesty to guarantee the lives of the three princes.

On the way back to Delhi, Hodson himself shot the three princes dead.

Bahadur Shah was, after a considerable delay, subjected to a form of trial and banished to Rangoon where he died on 7^th November 1862.

British and Indian regiments in the Delhi Field Force awarded the Battle Honour ‘Delhi 1857’:

Her Majesty’s Regiments

6^th Dragoon Guards, Carabiniers

9^th Lancers

8^th King’s Regiment of Foot

52^nd Light Infantry

60^th Rifles

61^st Regiment of Foot

75^th Regiment of Foot

East India Company Regiments

1^st Bengal (European) Fusiliers

2^nd Bengal (European) Fusiliers

1^st Regiment Hodson’s Horse

2^nd Regiment Hodson’s Horse

1^st Punjab Irregular Cavalry

2^nd Punjab Irregular Cavalry

5^th Punjab Irregular Cavalry

Corps of Guides

Corps of Bengal Sappers and Miners

Punjab Pioneers

4^th Sikh Infantry

1^st Punjab Infantry

2^nd Punjab Infantry

4^th Punjab Infantry

1^st Baloch Battalion

Sirmoor Battalion (Gurkhas)

Kumaon Battalion (Gurkhas)

Anecdotes and traditions from the Siege of Delhi:

• 35 Victoria Crosses were awarded for valorous conduct by British soldiers during the operations around Delhi. Native soldiers were not at that time eligible for the award nor could it be awarded posthumously.
• In the early days of the Siege, the British became so short of ammunition for the guns that General Barnard offered a reward for every 24-pounder round shot recovered from the battlefield.
• During the desperate fighting on the Delhi Ridge in the first half of June 1857, Major Tombs of the Bengal Horse Artillery was wounded in the shoulder and had five horses killed under him.
• Field-Marshal Roberts, in his book ‘Forty-one years in India’ comments wryly on how well served the Mutineers’ guns were by their British-trained gunners.
• Lieutenant Quintin Battye is reported by Lord Roberts to have intoned the Latin motto ‘dulce et decorum est pro patria more’ on his deathbed. Battye was a member of a renowned British family with strong links to India. Battye’s brother Major Wigram Battye died leading the Guides Cavalry at the Battle of Futtehabad on 2^nd April 1879 in the Second Afghan War. A memorial to the two brothers is in St Paul’s Cathedral.
• In the attack on the Hindu Rao House on 10^th June 1857, the Mutineers crept up to the Ridge and called out to the Gurkhas that they wanted them to join the Mutiny. The Gurkhas replied that they were coming, before discharging a volley at close range hitting some thirty Mutineers.
• The British Crown took over the rule of India from the East India Company after the Indian Mutiny.
• The European regiments in the East India Company service were incorporated into the British army. The 1^st and 2^nd Bengal Fusiliers became the 101^st and 104^th HM regiments from 1862.
• After the Indian Mutiny, the Sirmoor Battalion of Gurkhas became the 2^nd Gurkha Regiment in the Bengal Army. In 1901 the Regiment became King Edward VII’s Own Gurkha Rifle. In 1947 the Regiment transferred from the Indian Army to the British Army, subsequently becoming part of the Royal Gurkha Rifles. The Sirmoor Battalion was awarded a silver Queen’s Truncheon for its conduct during the Siege of Delhi, which the regiment carried in place of colours.
• Due to the close association of the Sirmoor Battalion and HM 60^th Rifles during the Siege of Delhi, at the request of the 60^th, the Sirmoor Battalion, or 2^nd Gurkha Regiment, became a Rifle Regiment. A change adopted by all ten Gurkha regiments in the Indian Army.
• The 9^th Queen’s Royal Lancers became known as the ‘Delhi Spearmen’ for their conduct in the Indian Mutiny.

References for the Siege of Delhi:

The Indian Mutiny by Julian Spilsbury

For Valour: The Complete History of the Victoria Cross Volume 2 the Indian Mutiny (1857-1859) by Michael Charles Robson

History of the British Army Volume XIII by Fortescue

Forty-one years in India by Field-Marshal Lord Roberts

Eighteen Fifty-Seven by Surendra Nath Sen

British Battles by Grant.

The previous battle of the British Battles series is the Siege of Sevastopol

The next battle in the British Battles series is the Battle of Magdala

To the Indian Mutiny index

The extensive operation in the Tirah to the south of the Khyber Pass that followed the attacks by the Afridi tribes in the Khyber Pass and the attacks by the Orakzais on the Samana Range forts, part of the risings that engulfed the North-West Frontier of British India in 1897

The previous battle of the North-West Frontier of India is the Mohmand Field Force 1897

The next entry in the British Battles sequence is British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in the First World War

To the North-West Frontier of India index

War: North-West Frontier of India.

Dates of the Tirah operation: October 1897 to May 1898

Place of the Tirah: The mountainous area immediately to the south of the Kabul River (all now in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan).

Combatants in the Tirah: British and Indian troops against the Afridi and Orakzai Pathan tribes on the Afghanistan border with British India.

Commanders in the Tirah: The British Tirah Field Force was commanded by Lieutenant General Sir William Lockhart.

British and Indian Army Regiments in the Tirah: 

Order of Battle of the Tirah Field Force:

General Officer Commanding: Lieutenant-General Sir William Lockhart

First Division: commanded by Major-General W. Penn Symons

First Brigade:  commanded by Colonel Hamilton replaced on wounding by Brigadier-General Hart VC

2^nd Derbyshire Regiment, 1^st Devonshire Regiment, 30^th Punjabis and 2^nd/1^st Gurkhas

Second Brigade: commanded by Brigadier-General Gaselee

2^nd Yorkshire Regiment, 1^st Queen’s Surreys, 3^rd Sikhs and 2^nd/4^th Gurkhas

Divisional Troops:

18^th Bengal Lancers, No1 Mountain Battery RGA, No1 Kohat, No 2 Derajat Mountain Batteries, 28^th Bombay Infantry, Sappers and Field Hospital

Second Division: commanded by Major-General Yeatman-Biggs

Third Brigade: commanded by Brigadier-General Kempster

1^st Gordon Highlanders, 1^st Dorsetshire Regiment, 15^th Sikhs and 1^st/2^nd Gurkhas

Fourth Brigade: commanded by Brigadier-General Westmacott

2^nd King’s Own Scottish Borderers, 1^st Northamptonshire, 36^th Sikhs and 1^st/3^rd Gurkhas

Divisional Troops:

18^th Bengal Lancers, Nos’s 8^th and 9^th Mountain Batteries RGA, No 5 Bombay Mountain Battery, Machine Gun Det 16^th Lancers,21^st Madras Infantry Pioneers, Sappers and Field Hospital

Line of Communication Troops:

22^nd Punjab Infantry, 2^nd/2^nd Gurkha Rifles, 39^th Gharwal Rifles, 2^nd Punjab Infantry PFF, 2^nd Bengal Cavalry, Jeypore Transport Corps and Gwalior Transport Corps

Peshawar Column: commanded by Brigadier General Hammond

2^nd Royal Iniskilling Fusiliers, 2^nd Oxfordshire Light Infantry, 9^th Gurkha Rifles, 45^th Sikhs, 57^th Battery Royal Garrison Artillery, No 3 Mountain Battery RA, 9^th Bengal Lancers and No 5 Co Bengal Sappers and Miners

Kurram Moveable Column: commanded by Colonel Hill

12^th Bengal Infantry, Nabha Imperial Service Infantry, 3^rd Battery Royal Garrison Artillery, 6^th Bengal Cavalry and Central India Horse

Rawalpindi Reserve Brigade: commanded by Brigadier General Macgregor

2^nd King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, 1^st Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry, 27^th Bombay Light Infantry, 2^nd Hyderabad Infantry and Jodhpur Imperial Service Lancers

Strengths:

1,010 British officers, 10,882 British troops, 22,614 Indian troops and 19,934 non-combatants.

There were probably around 40,000 Orakzai and Afridi tribesmen available to fight against the British incursion. The numbers at each of the engagements were significantly lower than this overall figure.

By the end of the 19^th Century tribesmen on the North-West Frontier of India were widely equipped with breech loading rifles, some with the recently introduced Lee Metford.

Ammunition was either looted from the British, purchased in illicit deals or manufactured in workshops across the region.

Winner of the Tirah: The various clans of the two main tribes finally submitted to payment of the indemnities imposed by the British authorities after one of the hardest fought campaigns of the North-West frontier.

Uniforms, arms and equipment in the Tirah:
The British military forces in India fell into these categories:

• Regiments of the British Army in garrison in India.  Following the Indian Mutiny of 1857, India became a Crown Colony.  The ratio of British to Indian troops was increased from 1:10 to 1:3 by stationing more British regiments in India.  Brigade formations were a mixture of British and Indian regiments.  The artillery was put under the control of the Royal Artillery, other than some Indian Army mountain gun batteries.
• The Indian Army comprised the three armies of the Presidencies of Bombay, Madras and Bengal.  The Bengal Army, the largest, supplied many of the units for service on the North-West Frontier.  The senior regimental officers were British.  Soldiers were recruited from across the Indian sub-continent, with regiments recruiting nationalities, such as Sikhs, Punjabi Muslims, Pathans and Gurkhas.  The Indian Mutiny caused the British authorities to view the populations of the East and South of India as unreliable for military service.
• The Punjab Frontier Force:  Known as ‘Piffers’, these were regiments formed specifically for service on the North-West Frontier and were controlled by the Punjab State Government. 
• Imperial Service Troops of the various Indian states, nominally independent but under the protection and de facto control of the Government of India.  The most important of these states for operations on the North-West Frontier was Kashmir.

A British infantry battalion comprised 10 companies with around 700 men and some 30 officers. A battalion had a maxim machine gun detachment of 2 guns and around 20 men.

Indian infantry battalions had much the same establishment, without the Maxim gun detachment. Senior officers were British, holding the Queen’s Commission. Junior officers were Indian.

In 1897, Indian infantry regiments carried the single shot, drop action Martini-Henry breech loading rifle.  British regiments were issued with the new Lee Metford bolt action magazine rifle from 1894.

By 1897, both Indian and British Royal Garrison Artillery Mountain Batteries used the RML (Rifled Muzzle Loading) 2.5 inch gun, the successor to the small, basic and unreliable RML 7 pounder gun, which had gone out of service in the British batteries in the early 1880s and, finally, in the Indian batteries in around 1895.  The 2.5 inch had the nickname of ‘the Screw Gun’ as the barrel came in two sections that were screwed together for firing.  The gun was dismantled for transport and carried by mules (see Kipling’s poem ‘the Screw Guns’). 

British and Indian troops in 1897 wore khaki field dress when campaigning, with a leather harness to carry equipment and ammunition.  British troops wore a pith helmet.  Indian troops were largely turbaned.  Gurkha troops wore a pill box hat.  Scottish Highland regiments wore the kilt.  Scottish Lowland Regiments, such as the Highland Light Infantry and the King’s Own Scottish Borderers, wore tartan trews.

The Indian cavalry regiments were armed with lance, sabre and carbine.

The standard tactic used by the British and Indian armies on the North-West Frontier of India, as with other so-called ‘semi-civilised enemies’, was to deliver a frontal attack, discharging controlled volleys of rifle fire and charging home with the bayonet.  When stationary under fire, cover was taken behind sangars or low, stone-built walls. 

Supporting fire was provided by artillery, where available.  Cavalry conducted scouting duties and, in suitable circumstances, delivered mounted charges, which were particularly effective against loose formations of tribesmen caught in flat open country.  The Indian cavalry regiments were adept at mixing mounted action with dismounted, in which carbine fire was used against tribesmen, particularly during a withdrawal.

When a military column moved through hostile country, great care had to be taken to ensure that flanking high ground was occupied in strength, until the column was clear of the area. 

Withdrawal was when troops became most vulnerable.  Experienced units made sure that withdrawal was made by alternate leaps, so that there was always a force providing covering fire for the troops moving back.  Pathan tribes were quick to follow up British withdrawals and any error was immediately exploited.  Many of the problems in battle for the British arose from inexperienced regiments failing to comply with the exacting requirements of frontier warfare.

A feature of warfare on the North-West Frontier of India was the ability of tribesmen to assemble in large numbers with little warning and to move at disconcerting speed across mountainous terrain, even at night.

Colonel HD Hutchinson in his book ‘The Campaign in the Tirah, 1897/98’ published in 1898 stated ‘it must be remembered that never before on our North-West Frontier have we had to deal with an enemy armed with long-ranging breech-loaders, as these Afridis are. It may be argued where they got them from, but the fact remains that they possess them. The majority have Martini-Henry rifles, with which they shoot very straight up to 1200 and 1500 yards. But in addition they have a few Lee-Metfords, fifty or sixty probably, taken or stolen from us at various times, notably on 9^th and 16^th November, and their supply of ammunition is apparently unlimited. Consequently the work thrown on flanking parties now is extremely heavy. In the days when the enemy had nothing better than the jezail and a few Enfields and Sniders, it was practically enough to keep them a good half-mile clear of the line of march. Now, the flankers must go much farther afield than that, and points have to be occupied and held fully a mile away on either hand before the road can be considered safe.’

Background to the Tirah:
In 1897, the North-West Frontier of India erupted in warfare, the tribes along the border attacking British garrisons and Indian villages.  The reaction to this uprising was a series of incursions by the British into tribal territory in 1897 and 1898.

The Government of India identified several factors leading to the uprisings.  The Amir of Afghanistan in the late 1880s penned a book urging Muslims in the border regions to wage ‘jihad’ against the British.  The Amir claimed to the British that the book was to preserve his own precarious position amongst fanatical Afghans. 

Numbers of Muslim mullahs in the independent tribal regions along the border of India preached ‘jihad’ against the British and invoked the Amir’s book. 

The Government of India concluded that the immediate trigger for the uprisings was the victory of the Turks over the Greeks in the eastern Mediterranean, a potent symbol of Muslim success over the Christian infidel.

Of considerable importance was the concern of the Pathan border tribes at the threat to their independence from the increasingly intrusive British presence in the area and the marking of a border between British India and Afghanistan by the Durand Commission accompanied by a strong Indian Army escort. This operation had finally to be abandoned in the face of the increasing hostility from the border tribes.

The British found tribal dissatisfaction hard to reconcile with the growing prosperity of the area from the increase in trade with British India during the 1890s.

The incidents on the North-West Frontier leading to the general outbreak of war along the Frontier were, on 10^th June 1897, an attack at Maizar in the Tochi on a political officer with his military escort by tribesmen of the Madda Khel.

This incident was followed by the massed attack on the garrisons in Malakand and Chakdara on 26^th July 1897, leading to the mounting of the British advances north of the Khyber River.

On 7^th August 1897 the Hadda Mulla with some 5,000 mainly Mohmand tribesmen mounted an attack on Shabkadar Fort and burnt the frontier village of Shankargarh.

With these uprisings, the Government of India watched with some trepidation to see what the powerful Khyber tribes of Orakzai and Afridis would do.

Two reserve brigades were assembled at Rawalpindi, in addition to the Malakand Field Force, moving up to relieve the Malakand and Chakdara and to take punitive action against the tribes in the Swat Valley.

A movable column, the Mohmand Field Force, advanced to relieve Shabkadar Fort and to drive the Hadda Mulla and his supporters back into the mountains.

Various of the border forts were re-inforced.

The Orakzai attack on the Samana Forts:

In the southern Tirah, following the First Miranzai Expedition in 1891, the decision was taken to establish a row of posts and forts on the crest of the Samana Range along the southern side of the Khanki Valley to act as a restraint on the Orakzai tribes in the area.

The western fort was Gullistan, the eastern was Fort Lockhart with a subsidiary post on the mountain crest called Saragarhi, providing a heliograph signalling link between the two main forts. A mule road was built linking the posts with each other and with the main government position at Hangu in the Miranzai valley.

On 26^th August 1897 Afridi tribesmen advanced down the Ublan Pass appearing to be intending an attack on police posts in the main Miranzai Valley in the vicinity of Kohat.

On 27^th August 1897 Major General Yeatman-Biggs led a column into the Ublan Pass and reinforcements were brought up from Kohat.

At the same time the Orakzai became active on the Samana Ridge, surrounding the post at Lakka held by local levies.

Between 26^th and 29^th August 1897 tribesmen captured and destroyed police posts at Lakka, Saifaldarra and Shinawari.

On 1^st September 1897 the focus of attention shifted to Sadda and Parachinar, 70 and 90 miles up the main valley road to the west where attacks were threatened and the British military presence was weak.

With the absence of the preponderance of the force based in Kohat and Hangu on the operation to deal with this threat, the Orakzai launched attacks along the Samana Ridge against the British posts.

At the end of August 1897, the position on the Samana Ridge was that a number of small posts were occupied by tribal police and local levies on behalf of the British authorities: Saraghari, Crag Piquet, Sangar Piquet, Sartop and Dhar.

The two larger forts of Gullistan and Fort Lockhart were garrisoned each by two companies of the 36^th Sikhs; Gullistan commanded by Major de Voeux, who had with him his wife, children, including a baby daughter and a nanny and Fort Lockhart commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Haughton, the commandant of the 36^th Sikhs.

On 3^rd September 1897 a heliograph message was received in Fort Lockhart from Gullistan that the tribesmen were advancing on the fort in strength from Samana Sukh.

Colonel Haughton took a force of 50 men from the Fort Lockhart garrison and advanced along the ridge towards Gullistan.

15 of these men were left in the Saraghari post while the rest of the force continued, now under heavy fire from the tribesmen, up to the fort.

The attackers’ standards were within 150 yards of the south wall.

A thorn hedge positioned to keep attackers back from the post was repeatedly set on fire by the tribesmen and extinguished by volunteers sallying from the fort under a continuous heavy rifle-fire.

As at 8pm the tribesmen were clearly gathering for an assault, two Sikh sepoys rushed out of the fort and set fire to a bonfire positioned to illuminate any such attack.

The rifle-fire on the fort was maintained until midnight, but the garrison in return inflicted heavy losses on the tribesmen who withdrew, pulling back from the fort completely during the day.

Colonel Haughton returned with his party to Fort Lockhart.

On the evening of 4^th September 1897, the tribesmen renewed their attack on Gullistan but were again driven off.

The tribesmen’s losses had been significant and they withdrew from the Samana Ridge for a time, although continuing with their raids into British territory.

Until now the assault on the Samana posts was the work of the Orakzais whose territory lay around the Samana Ridge.

Information now came in to Major General Yeatman-Biggs at Hangu that the Afridis intended to join the Orakzais in a combined attack on the Samana posts.

On 7^th September 1897 General Yeatman-Biggs with a strong force marched out of Hangu to re-supply the Samana posts.

On 10^th September 1897 the defences of Fort Gullistan were improved by the Bombay Sappers and Miners of the column.

On the same day the main Afridi lashkar joined the Orakzais, the rest arriving on 11^th September 1897. 10,000 tribesmen with 22 standards were seen to be moving down the Khanki Valley.

It seemed likely that an attack on Hangu or Shahu Khel in the main Miranzai valley was about to be launched by the tribesmen.

Half the lashkar turned back up the Khanki valley.

Engagements took place between the tribesmen and the rear-guard of the relief column as it withdrew to the Miranzai valley, comprising two companies of 2^nd Gurkhas, with a column of 51 laden baggage camels.  Deserted by their drivers, the camels had to be abandoned and were mostly captured by the tribesmen.

The troops suffered 6 killed and an officer and 8 men wounded. The tribesmen acknowledged the loss of 100 dead and wounded.

With some difficulty and harassed by the pursuing tribesmen, General Yeatman-Biggs’ column withdrew to Hangu.

The whole lashkar now turned on the Samana forts.

The first post attacked, during the night of 11^th September 1897, was Sangar, held by 44 soldiers of the 36^th Sikhs. This post was situated on high ground with little cover for the attackers and they were driven off by the garrison, with the loss of a standard.

In the morning the tribesmen moved on to attack the post of Saraghari.

Saraghari was not strongly constructed, nor well situated for defence against such an overwhelming number of attackers, there being cover for the attackers to approach close to the post.

The garrisons in Gullistan and Fort Lockhart could see Saraghari and were able to follow each stage of the assault, although unable to assist due to their small numbers; Fort Gullistan being itself under heavy attack.

The first attack on Saraghari was driven off with 60 tribal casualties, but two tribesmen remained in a dead angle against a corner of the wall, where they could not be seen by the garrison.

These two tribesmen pulled down the wall creating a hole.

The activities of the two tribesmen, unseen by the Sikhs in Saraghari, were visible to the troops in Fort Lockhart and Gullistan.

Attempts were made to signal a warning from Fort Gullistan but was apparently not seen.

At around noon a party was sent out from Fort Lockhart in an attempt to divert the tribesmen from their attack on Saraghari. This was without effect.

At around 3pm the signaller in Saraghari heliographed to Fort Lockhart that ammunition was running low in the post.

Colonel Haughton with Lieutenant Munn and 93 soldiers from the Fort Lockhart garrison attempted to fight through to Saraghari.

Haughton was three quarters of the way to Saraghari when the tribesmen finally overwhelmed the post’s garrison.

At around 3.40pm the tribesmen rushed the hole made in the corner of the post’s wall by the two unseen tribesmen, forced the main door and climbed in over the walls.

The garrison was wiped out. The last man held out in the guardroom, where he is said to have killed around 20 tribesmen, who admitted to a total of 180 killed in the attack on the post.

The tribesmen stripped and mutilated the bodies of the Sikhs and destroyed the post before turning their whole strength on Fort Gullistan.

Gullistan was built in the same style as the post at Saraghari with the same areas of dead ground at the corners.

Major de Voeux caused further barricades to be built inside the corners, in case the walls were broken down at these points.

A heavy fire was maintained against the fort for the whole night and dawn revealed the tribesmen entrenched in newly built sangars within 20 yards of the fort’s walls.

Major De Voeux decided that it was essential to carry out a sortie to undermine the morale of the besieging tribesmen and encourage his own men.

A tribal standard was planted in a sangar within 20 yards of the south-west end of the hornwork. Major De Voeux decided that this standard was to be captured.

Colour Havildar Kala Singh and his section of 16 men volunteered for the raid.

While the garrison maintained a heavy fire on the tribesmen, Kala Singh’s party left the hornwork by the southern gate and crept around the wall to the point opposite the sangars and charged.

There were now three standards displayed from the sangars and so heavy was the tribesmen’s fire, that Kala Singh’s party was forced into cover.

A further party of 11 men led by Havildar Sundar Singh leapt the hornwork wall and the combined party of Sikh soldiers captured the sangars and the three standards.

The party returned to the fort with the standards, to find that two wounded Sikhs had been left in the sangars.

Three Sikh soldiers went back to the sangars and brought the wounded men back.

Of the combined party, 13 had been wounded, 2 mortally.

The effect of the capture of the standards was to raise the morale of the garrison and discourage the attacking tribesmen, of whom the Mamuzai, whose standards had been taken, had lost heavily.

The attack on Gullistan continued during the rest of the day and the following night, but it was not pressed to a storming as at Saranghari.

The next day at around noon the relieving column commanded by Major General Yeatman-Biggs could be seen and the Gullistan garrison opened a heavy fire on the tribesmen, no longer needing to husband their ammunition. The tribesmen dispersed to their homes.

It was considered that the lack of enthusiasm shown by the Orakzais during the subsequent operations was heavily influenced by their failure at Gullistan.

Account of the Tirah:

During early 1897 It became apparent to the Government of India that outbreaks of violence by the Pathan tribes along the frontier were likely. Of particular concern were the Afridis and Orakzais living to the south of the Kabul River.

Two brigades were concentrated at Rawalpindi and another at Peshawar.

The Khyber Pass itself was garrisoned and policed by levies from the local tribes considered reliable from the British perspective.

In mid-August information became available to the British that an Afridi lashkar was proposing to attack the garrison at Jamrud and that the Orakzais was intending to follow the Afridi lead by attacking the Samana forts.

The British garrisons at Kohat and Peshawar were reinforced.

Further information followed that a force of some 10,000 Afridis was moving into the Khyber Pass with the intention of attacking the posts held by tribal levies in the service of the British.

At the end of August 1897, the Afridis took the Khyber posts of Fort Maude, Ali Masjid and Landi Kotal.

It was considered in British official circles that the hostile operations by the Orakzais and Afridis constituted such a fundamental threat to British rule of the area that a substantial invasion of the Tirah must take place and continue until the tribes were humbled and forced to accept humiliating terms dictated to them in the heart of their country.

On 3^rd September 1897 orders were given for the assembly of a British force for the invasion of the Tirah, a force that would be the largest so far deployed on the North-West Frontier of India.

It was considered that punitive action must be taken without delay even though the best time to invade tribal territory was in the spring while the crops were still growing and could be destroyed, thereby ensuring the maximum impact, not in the autumn when harvesting was already complete and the troops faced the hardship of winter in the mountains.

The date of 12^th October 1897 was fixed for the commencement of operations, it being hoped that the end of the operations north of the Kabul River would free up troops and transport animals for use in the Tirah.

In the event these operations were not complete in time and only one brigade with its transport became available instead of the two brigades expected.

The routes into the Tirah were by way of the courses of the Bara, Mastura and Khanki Rivers. All were difficult and in places impassable even to mules.

It was expected the tribesmen would make their stands in either the Sampagha or Arhanga Passes.

It was decided that the British operations be based on the frontier town of Kohat rather than Peshawar, further north, Kohat being further to the west, only 30 miles from the advanced base at Shinawari and with a better road.

The British force assembled for the operation into the Tirah comprised 44,000 combat troops under Lieutenant-General Sir William Lockhart, The British Commander-in-Chief in the Punjab.

Lockhart was peremptorily recalled from furlough in England.

Lockhart’s force was formed into a main column of two divisions, each of two infantry brigades and two subsidiary columns. A reserve brigade was to be held in Rawalpindi.

The main column, commanded by Lockhart, would conduct the invasion of the Tirah from Kohat, via the Sampagha and Arhanga Passes.

The two subsidiary columns would operate from Peshawar and the neighbouring area.

General Lockhart arrived in theatre on 4^th October 1897, taking over command from Major General Yeatman-Biggs.

The one major aspect of the expedition that remained to be completed was the collection of a sufficient transport.

Up to Shinawari the road was practicable for carts, but from that point into the Tirah only pack animals could be used, mules, ponies and donkeys. Even camels were too slow and cumbersome.

From the beginning of October 1897, while preparations for the advance into the Tirah were being completed a number of minor engagements took place with cavalry reconnaissance parties being ambushed by parties of tribesmen.

First Action at Dargai:

By 16^th October 1897, the road from Shinawari over the Chagru Kotal towards Kharappa was sufficiently improved to take transport to the top of the Kotal (pass), making it necessary to dislodge the tribesmen from the village of Dargai and the ridges in the area, to enable the work to continue.

On 18^th October 1897 Major General Sir Power Palmer, in command at Shinawari, marched his troops out to deliver the attack in two columns.

The first column, commanded by Brigadier General F.J. Kempster, comprised 1^st Gordon Highlanders, 1^st Dorsets, 1^st/2^nd Gurkhas, 15^th Sikhs, No 4 Madras Sappers and Miners, No 8 Mountain Battery Royal Garrison Artillery Machine Gun Detachment of the 16^th Lancers and Scouts from 5^th Gurkhas.

The second column, commanded by Brigadier General R. Westmacott, comprised 2^nd KOSB, 1^st/3^rd Gurkhas, No 5 Mountain Battery and a rocket troop Royal Artillery.

General Palmer accompanied the first column. General Lockhart watched the advance from the Samana Sukh, a neighbouring area of high ground.

The main column left the main camp at Shinawari at 4.30am. Its approach march was along a spur running north-west from Shinawari into ground that would bring the column behind the right of the tribal position around the village of Dargai.

The second column was tasked to march directly to the summit of the Chagru Kotal or pass and from there to launch its attack on Dargai. The second column left the Shinawari camp at 5am, reaching Chagru Kotal at 8.30am where it was joined by additional troops, 1^st Northamptons and No 9 Mountain Battery RA, marching up from Fort Lockhart to the south-east.

Few tribesmen could be seen in the Dargai position and it was decided to launch an attack by the second column without waiting for the support of the first column.

At 9am the 3^rd Gurkhas began the advance supported by the KOSB, with the Northamptons in reserve.

The mountain batteries remained on the Chagru Kotal, firing in support of the advance.

Increasing numbers of tribesmen began to appear and opened fire on the second column troops as they reached the feature called Mama Khan.

The troops advanced towards Dargai from Mama Khan, moving below the ridge for 900 yards, thereby avoiding the tribesmen’s fire. At the end of this advance, the troops were forced to move to the top of the ridge and into the tribesmen’s line of sight and fire.

A path climbed up the near sheer cliff to the plateau on which lay the village of Dargai.

The supporting troops opened a heavy fire on the tribesmen at the top of the cliff and in the surrounding positions while the 3^rd Gurkhas advanced by alternate rushes into the dead ground at the base of the cliff.

From there, closely supported by the KOSB, the 3^rd Gurkhas climbed the path and stormed the Dargai position.

The tribesmen, now aware of the approach of the main column around their right flank, put up little resistance in Dargai, before making off towards the Khanki valley.

The second column occupied the Dargai position and the peak behind the village, Narik Sukh.

The tribesmen left 20 dead in the field but removed their wounded and probably some dead.

British casualties were 2 killed and 13 wounded.

While the second column was in action against the Dargai position the main column was advancing up the river valley to the left of Dargai.

After some five miles of marching the track deteriorated to such an extent that it was no longer feasible to continue with the mules carrying the supplies and in particular the guns of No 8 Mountain Battery.

All the mules were returned to the Shinawari Camp escorted by the Dorsets and 2 companies of Sikhs.

The main column continued its advance along the track, led by 1^st/2^nd Gurkhas and the 5^th Gurkha scouts. The column turned east and began its encircling movement round behind the Dargai position.

At around 11am communication was established by heliograph with the second column.

At around midday the advanced guard reached the peak of Khand Talao, 2 ½ miles west of Dargai and there the column halted to permit the troops to close up.

From the peak the 1^st/2^nd Gurkhas opened fire on the tribesmen falling back from the Dargai position.

At 2.30pm the main column was sufficiently closed up to continues its advance, but by now considerable bodies of tribesmen had gathered along the heights to the north of the main column’s line of advance and harassed the rear-guard.

Some 4,000 Afridis could be seen advancing on Dargai from the Khanki Valley.

By 3.10pm the main column was arriving at Dargai and joining the second column as the second column began its withdrawal.

No 5 Mountain Battery gave covering fire from Chagru Kotal, while No 9 Mountain Battery moved to the top of the Samana Sukh, escorted by the Northamptons, to continue the covering fire for the withdrawal of the two columns.

A favoured tactic of the frontier tribes was to press hard on a withdrawing British force and this is what followed, giving the rear-guard of the two British columns a hard fight to extricate themselves from the Dargai position and fight their way back down the route taken by the second column in its advance that morning.

The rear-guard is reported as ‘showing so steady a front and were so well supported by the accurate fire of the mountain guns that the advance of the enemy was soon checked and the further retirement of the main column to Shinawari via the Chagru Kotal was unmolested’.

Major R.D. Jennings Bramly of the Gordon Highlanders was killed with two soldiers. 3 officers and 10 men were wounded.

The Second Attack on Dargai:

It was clearly a major miscalculation for the British force to capture Dargai and then withdraw from the position when it lay on the route to be taken once the invasion of the Tirah got underway two days later.

The immediate result of the British attack was to draw substantial numbers of Afridi tribesmen to Dargai.

These tribesmen would now have to be displaced and Dargai captured again, with the tribesmen fully aware of the likely plan for the British approach to the position.

It is not clear whether the British plan for the attack on the 18^th October 1897 included consideration of maintaining a force in Dargai until the invasion proper began on 20^th October.

The official Indian Government account of the campaign states that it would not have been possible to maintain the position due to the lack of a water supply or fire wood and that the troops had no supplies or equipment other than what they carried.

It could be thought that it required little insight to ensure that once the strong Dargai position had been taken relatively easily and with few casualties it should be held until the British force marched through.

The tribesmen were now occupying the Dargai position in strength. As Dargai overlooked the route for the transport column through to the Khanki River valley, considerable effort having been expended in improving the path for the transport animals, additional troops were made available to General Yeatman-Biggs; 3^rd Sikhs, the Derbyshire Regiment and No 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery.

Presumably addressing this snag, on 19^th October 1897 General Yeatman-Biggs changed the force’s line of advance away from the Chagru defile, which would require a retaking of the Dargai position and orders were issued to this effect.

At midnight on 19^th October and within hours of the commencement of the march, General Lockhart reversed this decision on the basis that once the troops emerged from the Chagru ravine the Afridis would retire from Dargai as their flank would be threatened.

Lockhart’s reasoning was undermined by the decision then taken that the troops should not advance beyond the Chagru Kotal until Dargai had been again taken from the tribesmen.

The political officer, Mr Donald, informed locals, who he knew would pass the information on to the tribesmen, that a substantial British force would repeat the flank march from the west. The information was passed on, causing a considerable number of tribesmen to be positioned to the west of Dargai, where they took no part in the defence to the actual attack on the village.

The British left Shinawari Camp to begin the invasion of the Tirah on 20^th October 1897.

The British advanced guard marched out of Shinawari Camp at 4.30 am, comprising 3^rd Gurkha scouts, 1^st/2^nd Gurkhas, 1^st Dorsets, No 4 co Madras Sappers and Miners, Nos 8 & 5 Mountain Batteries, Maxim Det, 1^st Gordons and 15^th Sikhs.

The main body followed, comprising No 1 Mountain Battery, 2^nd Derbys, 3^rd Sikhs, 21^st Madras Pioneers, sappers and a rocket troop.

The baggage train followed the main body.

The rear guard was found by the KOSB and 3^rd Gurkhas.

The length of the column was such that the rear guard did not clear Shinawari camp before nightfall.

The advanced guard reached the Chagru Kotal at around 8am. At about the same time No 9 Mountain Battery, escorted by the Northamptons, arrived in position on the Samana Sukh.

The tribesmen could be seen to be in considerable strength around Dargai and on Narikh Sukh, behind the village.

29 standards were counted among the tribesmen and a ‘reliable spy’ brought in the information that among the tribesmen were Ali Khel, Mamuzai and Alisherzai Oarakzais, Malikdin Khel, Kambar Khel, Kamrai, Zakha Khel, Sipah and Kuki Khel Afridis.

Later information gave the gathering as amounting to some 12,000 tribesmen, over half being Afridis.

At 9am, General Yeatman-Biggs came up with the main body and ordered Brigadier General Kempster to clear the Dargai ridge.

The attacking force moved off at 9.30am, following the same route as the assault on 18^th October 1897, comprising 1^st/2^nd Gurkhas and 3^rd Gurkha scouts in the first line with the Dorsets in support and Derbys in reserve.

The Gordons and the maxim detachment provided fire support from the Mama Khan ridge, 1,100 yards to the rear, with the Nos 1, 5 and 8 Mountain Batteries laying down artillery fire from the northern side of Chagru Kotal at 1,800 yards and No 9 Mountain Battery firing from Samana Sukh, 3,300 yards distant.

At 11.45am, the Gurkha scouts, led by Lieutenant Tillard, with men from 1^st/2^nd Gurkhas rushed towards the base of the cliff beneath Dargai.

The tribesmen opened a heavy and accurate fire on these men who were followed by a second party of 1^st/2^nd Gurkhas led by Major Judge.

Both parties suffered heavily from the tribesmen’s fire.

A third party was led forward by Captain Robinson, who was mortally wounded.

The Gurkhas now began to take casualties from a flanking fire from cliffs to the west as well as the fire from in front and above, leaving them pinned down.

Gurkha casualties stood at 3 officers and over 50 men lost.

At 2.15pm the Dorsets advanced to relieve the Gurkhas.

A small party dashed across the fire-swept zone, but virtually every man was hit, including the leading officer, Captain Arnold.

Another party followed, but every man was hit except the officer, Lieutenant Hewitt.

Further small parties from the Dorsets and Derbys continued to dash across the exposed area, but suffered heavy casualties.

During the battle, parties of tribesmen came up from the Khanki Valley and opened fire on the troops on the Samana Sukh, but were driven off by the 36^th Sikhs.

At 2.20pm, Lieutenant Colonel Piercy of the Dorsets heliographed to General Yeatman-Biggs that such was the fire they were under, no further advance was possible without reinforcements.

In response to this message the Gordons and 3^rd Sikhs were ordered forward, with a wing of the 21^st Madras Pioneers taking over the position on the Mama Khan, and additional troops taking on the protection of the mountain batteries.

Arrangements were made for the guns to lay down a concentrated fire on the tribesmen’s positions for 3 minutes on a given signal, to be followed by an assault by the Gordons on Dargai.

At 2.45pm, following the artillery bombardment, Lieutenant Colonel Mathias led his Gordon Highlanders, with their pipers playing, in an attack across the exposed area at the base of the cliff and up the steep slope into Dargai.

The tribesmen did not await the final assault but withdrew towards the Khanki Valley, pursued by volleys from the troops.

For the assault on Dargai, Victoria Crosses were awarded to Lieutenant Colonel Mathias, Lance-Corporal Milne leading the Gordon pipers, Piper Findlater and Private Lawson of the Gordons, Lieutenant Pennell and Private Vickery of the Derbyshire Regiment.

British casualties amounted to 4 officers and 34 men killed and 14 officers and 147 men wounded.

No further advance towards Kharappa was made on 20^th.

Overnight, the Dargai heights were occupied by the Dorsets, Derbys and 3^rd Sikhs. The ridge was held by the Gordons and the Samana Sukh was held by the 21^st Madras Pioneers.

The rest of the force encamped around the Chagru Kotal.

The Northamptons, 36^th Sikhs and No 9 Mountain Battery returned to the Samana Forts.

March to Kharappa:

The advance of the British force was resumed on 21^st October 1897.

The advanced guard reached the Khanki River, where the tribesmen fired a few shots, otherwise offering no resistance.

General Lockhart brought up a contingent, joining the rest of the force at Kharappa, on the north bank of the Khanki River.

Due to the difficulty of the mountain tracks much of the baggage did not finally come up until midday on 23^rd October 1897.

On 25^th October 1897 a foraging party comprising half-battalions from the Devons, the Derbys and 2^nd/1^st Gurkhas with No 1 Mountain Battery marched some 3 ½ miles up the Khanki River. As they returned, the party was attacked by tribesmen who followed the troops up closely, a favoured tactic on the frontier.

The foraging party reached the camp at 4.30pm where the pursuit turned into a full raid, the tribesmen firing into the camp, causing casualties among the troops and the transport animals.

British casualties were 2 officers wounded, 1 soldier killed and 36 wounded.

As a precaution against further incidents of this type, the next morning working parties built sangars on the surrounding heights, the effect of which was to keep marauding tribesmen away from the camp.

March to Ghandaki:

On 28^th October 1897, the force, now numbering 17,600 troops with the same number of followers, marched out to Ghandaki, a distance of only a couple of miles, from where it would storm the Sampagha Pass.

In the afternoon, Brigadier General Hart, having taken over the 1^st Brigade of the 1^st Division on the injury of General Hamilton, advanced with a strong reconnaissance party to the base of the Sampagha Pass.

Large numbers of tribesmen were found to be holding the lower reaches of the pass and Hart’s reconnaissance party was fired on as it withdrew to camp.

Storming of the Sampagha Pass:

On 29^th October 1897 the attack on the Sampagha Pass began at 5am, the 1^st Division with all the artillery leaving camp.

The Devons marched out to the right to take the village of Nazeno and the neighbouring spurs. The Derbys escorted the artillery to take an isolated hill at the base of the Sampagha Pass and the 2^nd/1^st Gurkhas advanced on the Kandi-Mishti villages on the left.

With daylight it could be seen that the tribesmen were in greater force to the west of the pass than in the pass itself, having decided the British attack would be in that direction, the advance of the 1^st/2^nd Gurkhas against them apparently confirming that mistaken view.

In fact, the British command considered the sides of the pass to be too steep to be assailed.

At 7.30am the 1^st Division artillery came into action, firing straight up the valley at the tribesmen’s advanced sangars positioned on an isolated hill about a mile into the valley.

The main body of troops advanced up the centre of the pass and took this isolated hill, from which the other batteries shelled the summit of the pass, until the position was masked by the advancing British infantry.

The Queen’s regiment took the summit of the pass, but the tribesmen continued to occupy sangars to the north-west and north-east, from which they fired on the troops climbing the main path through the pass.

The 5^th and 9^th Mountain Batteries advanced to the top of the pass and put down a supporting fire while British infantry regiments stormed these sangars; the Queen’s and 3^rd Sikhs on the right and the KOSB and 36^th Sikhs on the left.

By 11.30am, all tribal resistance in the Sampagha Pass was overcome.

British casualties in the day’s action were 1 officer (Captain DeButts, commanding No5 Mountain Battery) killed, 1 officer wounded: 1 soldier killed and 29 wounded.

Advance to the Arhanga Pass:

After the storming of the Sampagha Pass, the troops rested before the advance was resumed.

With the resumption of the advance, the 3^rd Brigade led, with the 15^th Sikhs as advanced guard and companies from the Yorkshire Regiment and the 3^rd Sikhs occupying the heights on each side of the top of the pass.

The whole force advanced some two miles into the Mastura Valley where a new bivouac was formed.

The 1^st Brigade under General Hart remained at the southern end of the pass until all the baggage had gone through.

The steepness of the Sampagha Pass hindered the movement of the baggage train causing the force to remain halted in the Mastura Valley camp while the baggage came up.

The time was well spent, gathering in forage from the valley and inspecting the villages, largely destroyed by the tribesmen, and mapping the area.

In the meantime, General Lockhart reconnoitred the Arhanga Pass with the 3^rd Brigade, five miles further on, finding the pass lightly held by the tribesmen.

On 31^st October 1897 the British force resumed the advance to the Arhanga Pass, the 4^th Brigade under General Westmacott leaving to make the frontal attack on the pass, with Gurkha scouts, the KOSB, 1^st/3^rd Gurkhas, the Northamptons, 36^th Sikhs and a company of Sappers and Miners.

The KOSB took the village of Unai at the foot of the pass, which was occupied by the 2^nd Division artillery and a fire opened on the main tribal position at the summit of the pass at a range of 1,350 yards.

Lockhart reported that the path up the pass was the ‘steepest and worst yet encountered’.

The artillery of the 2^nd Division was reinforced with the three batteries of the 1^st Division and under cover of a bombardment by all these guns, the 4^th Brigade moved up the pass to the attack, while the 2^nd Brigade climbed a ravine on the east side of the pass and the 3^rd Brigade threatened the west side.

There was little opposition and the pass was in British hands by 10am.

Casualties were 1 officer and 1 soldier wounded and a driver from No 8 Mountain Battery killed.

The hills on the far side of the pass were occupied and piqueted and the advance resumed.

The advanced guard reached Maidan at 3pm where the next camp was established.

In spite of efforts to hurry the baggage, much of it failed to reach camp by nightfall and were subject to raids in which drivers were killed and the tribesmen captured rifle ammunition.

The occupation of Maidan and Bagh:

On 1^st November 1897 an advanced guard of the KOSB, 1^st/3^rd Gurkhas and No 8 Mountain Battery marched a further 3 miles to Bagh, the political centre of the Tirah, with the Mosque of Mullah Said Akbar, a prominent leader in the tribal insurgency.

A further skirmish took place against tribesmen coming down from the hills to collect supplies.

The Mosque of Mullah Said Akbar was said to have been the place where the tribal uprising was decreed and was an important symbol for both sides.

The official history of the Tirah, contained in Volume 2 of the government record of military ‘Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India’ reports of the Mosque that being a place of worship it was not damaged, but a grove of trees surrounding it was ‘ringed’ by cutting the bark, ensuring the death of the trees.

The caption for the illustration from the contemporary Graphic illustrated newspaper (see above) states that the mosque was ‘blown up by General Hart’s troops’. Major A.C. Yate in his biography of Lieutenant Colonel John Haughton published in 1900 and himself an Indian Army officer expressed considerable outrage at the ‘ringing of the trees’ by Gurkha and other Hindu troops, considering it to be a religious desecration, but made no mention of the Mosque building being physically damaged.

On the other hand, the Mosque was clearly looted as the pulpit and other artefacts were photographed in the British/Indian camp.

From Maidan, the British political officers sent messages out to the various tribes summoning the tribal jirgas to negotiate terms of surrender.

The messages conveyed the threat that in the absence of submission the tribes faced the destruction of their villages and crops.

On 12^th November 1897 the Orakzai tribes, which had shown little fight following the battle at Dargai, came into the Maidan camp and accepted the British peace terms, with substantial fines to be settled in money and firearms. The payments agreed were made by 20^th November 1897.

Other than keeping a watchful eye on them, the British discounted the Orakzais as a further threat in the campaign.

Matters were less easy with the Afridis. Many of the Afridi clans negotiated a settlement reluctantly and after a considerable period of bargaining.

The Zakha Khels remained irreconcilably hostile to the British and prevailed on the smaller Aka Khel clan also to continue the fight against the British.

The line of communication for the British force stretched 100 miles from Kushalgarh to Maidan. During the period of negotiations, the tribes launched almost daily attacks on the supply columns coming up to Maidan, although these attacks were confined to the section of the route north of the River Mastura in the proximity of Maidan.

Two officers were killed, one wounded and several drivers and transport animals were killed and injured.

The attack on Saran Sar:

From the Maidan camp the British could see the tribesmen were using a track leading to the mountain of Saran Sar, at the eastern end of the Maidan valley, to pass into the next valley and down to the Bara River, a significant area of Afridi Zhaka Khel population.

The mountain of Saran Sar rises to some 8,000 feet.

The track across the Maidan to Saran Sar lay along a nullah or river bed, which at this time of year was dry. Along the length of the nullah subsidiary stream beds fed into it. In places the sides of the nullah rose to 70 to 100 feet.

At the base of Saran Sar, the nullah curled around the northern side of a conical hill and petered out.

From the nullah, the track continued up the mountainside to near the top of Saran Sar, where it ran around the southern side of the final sheer cliff leading to the mountain peak and descended on the far side of the mountain into the Bara valley.

The distance from the British camp to Saran Sar was only 3 miles but the route was difficult, with numbers of hills on which stood the abandoned homes of the tribesmen, many of them fortified towers, past which the subsidiary nullahs worked their way down to the main nullah in the bottom of the valley.

Progress through the valley involved either marching along the bottom of the main nullah, or moving across the hillside, with frequent crossings of the subsidiary nullahs.

In the face of the Zakha Khel intransigence, on 9^th November 1897, a reconnaissance was mounted to Saran Sar, to survey the area prior to an advance into the Bara valley.

The reconnaissance force, commanded by General Westmacott, comprised 1^st Dorsets, 1^st Northamptons, 15^th Sikh Infantry, 36^th Sikh Infantry, Nos 5 and 8 Mountain Gun Batteries and No 4 Co Madras Sappers and Miners.

This force marched out of Maidan Camp at 7am on 9^th November1897 heading east for the Saran Sar Mountain.

Within two miles of camp the British force encountered opposition from the tribesmen and dispositions were made for the assault on Saran Sar.

The Dorsets were directed to advance on the left flank, up a spur to the north of Saran Sar Mountain, while the Northamptons and Sappers advanced up Saran Sar, supported by the 36^th Sikhs on the right.

The gun batteries marched to the top of the conical hill at the bottom of the mountain, escorted by the 15^th Sikhs.

Tribesmen, occupying well-built sangars at the end of the nullah, opened rifle-fire on the Northamptons as they debouched from the nullah and began to climb the mountain.

General Westmacott became concerned with the lack of progress of the Dorsets, whose role was to cover the left flank of the Northamptons as they climbed and occupied Saran Sar.

The general despatched several members of his staff to find the Dorsets and urge them up the mountainside.

It emerged later that the Dorsets had become lost in the difficult country.

Fire from the mountain batteries on the conical hill forced the tribesmen to abandon the sangars and withdraw up the mountainside, enabling the Northamptons to continue the climb.

A thousand feet further up, the Northamptons reached a knoll on which a single tree stood. They here came under rifle-fire again.

The Northamptons pushed on up the steep mountainside and reached the base of the final ridge, where five of their companies circled around to the left and onto the peak, while the other three companies followed the track around the base of the final ridge to the right, emerging onto the far side of the mountain, where the Bara valley opened in front of them.

Throughout this advance the mountain battery guns on the conical hill fired in support of the Northamptons.

The top of Saran Sar was covered with the remains of an extensive campsite where the tribesmen were living. It was clear that the tribesmen had abandoned the camp on the approach of the British reconnaissance force.

Westmacott was considerably concerned at the failure of the Dorsets to appear on the Northampton’s left flank, leaving unoccupied an area of thick woods near the top of the mountain, from which the tribesmen could be heard calling to each other.

It was notorious that the tribes on the North-West Frontier awaited the point at which punitive forces began their withdrawal to camp, particularly down a difficult mountainside, to launch their most aggressive and persistent attacks, harrying the troops downhill, sniping and following them up closely so that parties that became isolated could be overwhelmed before the main force was aware of their difficulty. The attacks became additionally dangerous if the British force was unable to complete its retreat in daylight.

Soldiers wounded in these attacks had to be rescued, to save them from mutilation and death, often involving a halt and a counter-attack. Each wounded man took several soldiers to carry him, creating a vulnerable bunching, removing the rescuers from the firing line and slowing the retirement.

Each wounded man could take up to five soldiers out of the firing line, depending on the nature of the wound suffered.

These were the occasions when inexperienced troops were particularly vulnerable and several of the English county regiments fell into this category: officers had little idea of how to fight in this unforgiving country and the soldiers easily became disorientated and demoralised.

There seems to have been no formal arrangements for training British regiments due for service on the North-West Frontier, such training taking place through the initiative of the senior ranks of the battalions concerned, if at all.

The Indian Army regiments, being permanently based in the country and with many of them regularly taking part in such operations, did not have the same handicap.

By 12.15pm, General Westmacott considered that sufficient surveying work had been conducted and it was time for his force to withdraw from Saran Sar to the camp in the Maidan.

It was an essential precaution for a reconnaissance of this sort on the North-West Frontier to leave ample time to return to camp before darkness fell.

The 36^th Sikhs began the withdrawal at 12.30pm, reaching the first cover point, the knoll with the solitary tree.

Information then reached Westmacott that General Lockhart was coming up to the top of Saran Sar to conduct a personal reconnaissance, causing the withdrawal to be halted, it being necessary to provide cover for the general’s mounted party.

Lockhart spent time on the summit before riding back down the mountain with his staff, enabling the withdrawal to resume at around 2pm.

The three companies of Northamptons on the track withdrew down the mountain at the double, joining the 36^th Sikhs at the solitary tree.

Once these three companies were clear, the five companies of Northamptons on the summit were directed to withdraw.

Of these five companies, G Company was nearest to the wooded slope that should have been occupied by the absent Dorsets.

The tribesmen opened a sudden fire on G Company, inflicting casualties and thereby placing them in the situation where withdrawal became so difficult, even for experienced frontier troops, which the Northamptons most definitely were not.

A Company attempted to provide covering fire but could not see the tribesmen in the woods.

It was clear that the Northampton companies on the peak were in considerable difficulties, unable to retreat with their casualties.

Westmacott sent the 36^th Sikhs back up the hill and the experienced Sikh Regiment brought the Northampton companies to the bottom of the mountain, albeit under a continuing and damaging rifle-fire from the tribesmen.

At this stage, the Northamptons were encumbered with around a dozen casualties, each requiring the assistance of several other soldiers, who were thereby taken out of the firing line.

Groups of soldiers assisting a wounded man moved slowly and were particularly prominent targets for the tribesmen.

It was almost dusk when the troops reached the bottom of the mountain.

The guns were withdrawn and the tribesmen crept forward in increasing numbers.

Encumbered by so many wounded, the Northamptons withdrew along the main Nullah with two companies of the 15^th Sikhs holding one side and the Dorsets holding the other. The 36^th Sikhs moved away to the left having the obligation to cover that flank.

The Northamptons became strung out along the Nullah, the rear part of the regiment lagging well behind the cover provided by the Dorsets and the 15^th Sikhs.

It was only once Westmacott’s force reached camp at 7.30pm and the rolls were called it was discovered that a party of the Northamptons, comprising Second Lieutenant Mcintyre, Colour Sergeant Luck and eleven privates was missing.

The official Indian Government history describes how, in the gathering darkness, the companies of Northamptons lost contact with each other and the battalion became strung out over two miles on its journey back along the main nullah, the rearmost companies being slowed down through having to carry their wounded. There was a failure to take the precaution of posting men on the rims of the nullah to keep the tribesmen away.

The tribesmen gathered along the nullah edge and fired down on the Northamptons making their way along the bottom of the nullah.

In the ensuing melee the battalion failed to keep in touch with all its units and Mcintyre’s group at the rear of the column became isolated and was overwhelmed.

Westmacott’s brigade marched out again the next morning and the bodies of Mcintyre and his men were discovered in the Nullah where they had been cut off and killed by the tribesmen, their rifles and ammunition taken.

Total casualties for the day were 2 British officers, 17 British soldiers and 1 Indian soldier killed and 3 British officers and I Indian, 35 British and 7 Indian soldiers wounded.

The infantry component of Westmacott’s reconnaissance force was 50:50 British and Indian infantry battalions (two of each) and yet the casualties were British 55 and Indian 9. This perhaps reflects the inexperience and lack of training of the two British battalions for North-West Frontier operations.

If the Northamptons had not been extracted from the summit of Saran Sar by Colonel Haughton’s experienced 36^th Sikhs their casualties would have been significantly greater.

Second Reconnaissance to Saran Sar:

On 11^th November 1897 General Lockhart conducted a second reconnaissance onto Saran Sar to complete the survey begun on 9^th November 1897 and to destroy more Zakha Khel property.

A further attempt to impede the British withdrawal to camp was beaten off with casualties inflicted on the tribesmen.

British casualties were one officer wounded and one soldier killed.

Foraging party from Mastura Camp on 13^th November 1897:

On 13^th November 1897 a foraging party of five companies of the Derbyshire Regiment commanded by Major Smith-Dorrien from Mastura Camp, situated between the Sampagha and Archanga Passes was attacked by Orakzai tribesmen.

The attackers were fought off with British casualties of two officers and four men wounded.

The Orakzai Jirgas had accepted peace terms the day before and it was explained that there had been insufficient time to warn the tribesmen in the hills of the settlement.

Raid on the Zakha Khels:

Also, on 13^th November 1897 a force left the Maidan Camp to carry out a raid on the Zakha Khel villages near Tseri Kandao. The force was commanded by Brigadier General Kempster and comprised 1^st Gordon Highlanders, 1^st Dorsets, 1^st/2^nd Gurkhas, 15^th Sikhs, 36^th Sikhs, Nos 5 and 8 Mountain Gun Batteries and two companies of Sappers.

Part of the purpose of the raid was to overawe the subordinate Aka Khels.

Leaving the 36^th Sikhs to hold the Tseri Kandao pass into the Waran Valley, Kempster’s force camped in the valley.

The Aka Khel Jirga had the day before conceded that they would accept the peace terms offered and that they had no objection to the British troops entering their valley.

Aka Khel tribesmen could be seen on the mountainsides watching the passage of the troops, but offering no resistance.

During the evening of 14^th November 1897 numbers of Zakha Khel tribesmen came into the Waran Valley with the aim of inciting the Aka Khels in attacking the British camp.

A reconnaissance took place on 15^th November 1897 and as the force retired to camp and during that night the British troops were fired on by Zakha Khel tribesmen.

The assumption of the British senior officers was that the Zakha Khel intended the British to assume they were being fired on by the Aka Khel and to take revenge on the Aka Khel villages, thereby causing the Aka Khel to resume their resistance to the British troops.

On 16^th November 1897 General Kempster’s force marched to the Maidan Camp.

The transport and main body of the force reached the Maidan Camp without difficulty.

Matters were otherwise for the rear-guard.

For the final withdrawal, the 36^th Sikhs moved from the top of the Tseri Kandao pass to a position on the Maidan side, while the 15^th Sikhs took up position on the heights on either side of the pass.

The rear-guard of the 1^st/2^nd Gurkhas was to move through the pass, when the 15^th Sikhs would take over as the rear-guard and on moving through the 36^th Sikhs would in turn pass the duty of rear-guard to that regiment for the rest of the journey to the Maidan Camp.

As the 1^st/2^nd Gurkhas approached the pass they were attacked by increasing numbers of tribesmen and by the time the regiment reached the pass, it had lost one officer and three soldiers killed and four wounded.

Once 1^st/2^nd Gurkhas passed the Tseri Kandao pass, the 15^th Sikhs were positioned with two companies to the south of the pass, two to the north of the pass and two on the edge of the forested spur down from the Saran Sar.

The commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Abbott, held the pass itself with one company, the remaining company holding raised ground to the rear.

The two Sikh companies on the edge of the forested spur, as they began their withdrawal were now attacked.

These Sikh companies inflicted heavy casualties on the tribesmen who were driven off, but the Sikhs suffered a number of casualties, leaving the companies unable to move without abandoning their wounded.

Colonel Abbott’s company was joined by a number of other companies of his regiment and came under an attack in force.

Abbott found himself with a number of wounded who could not be safely withdrawn without assistance.

On being informed of Abbott’s situation, General Kempster ordered the 36^th Sikhs and two companies of Dorsets to return and assist the 15^th Sikhs in their withdrawal.

Lieutenant-Colonel Haughton of the 36^th Sikhs was already moving his men back to the Tseri Kandao pass to assist the 15^th Sikhs.

One of the Dorset companies was posted in a house overlooking the road to cover the eventual retreat.

With the reinforcement, the rear-guard was enabled to withdraw to the bottom of the hill with its casualties, who were then sent on to Maidan Camp while the rear-guard, commanded by Colonel Haughton, Colonel Abbott being wounded, collected its stragglers. It was now dark.

The remaining rear-guard, numbering only some 200 men, was surrounded by the tribesmen, who occupied a group of ruined houses overlooking the road in the rear.

Haughton’s men fixed bayonets and charged the houses, driving the tribesmen off.

The Sikhs spent the rest of the night occupying one of the houses and in the morning continued their withdrawal to Maidan Camp, meeting a relieving force on the way.

The company of Dorsets that had occupied the house overlooking the track seems to have left the building during the night and been promptly attacked and overwhelmed by tribesmen. The two officers and nine men were killed, with several wounded. The surviving soldiers were brought into camp by the senior sergeant.

Total British casualties in this reconnaissance were 4 British officers and 25 men killed, with 3 British and 3 Indian officers and 38 men wounded.

Tribal losses were estimated at 300 among the Zakha Khels, Aka Khels, Kamrai and Sipah clans.

On 17^th November 1897 General Lockhart gave a briefing to some of the troops on how to conduct operations against tribesmen in the mountains. The briefing was published in written form on the next day.

British move to a new camp at Bagh:

On 18^th November 1897 a move was begun of the British camp to Bagh at the western end of the Maidan valley. Bagh being the religious centre of the area it was considered that the new siting of the camp would put pressure on the local tribes to come to an accommodation with the British.

Brigadier General Penn Symons’ 2^nd Brigade with some divisional troops began the move.

In the expectation that the British would at the end of the day withdraw to the Maidan camp the tribesmen offered no resistance to the advance, intending to mount their usual attack when the force returned to camp.

Once it became clear that this was a permanent transfer the tribesmen launched a full out assault on the troops and later on the new camp at Bagh.

During the heavy fighting the troops suffered five killed and 19 wounded with the loss of some transport animals.

Between 19^th and 21^st November 1897, the whole British force with its supplies moved to the new camp at Bagh.

On 20^th November 1897, the 15^th Sikhs, much reduced by casualties and sickness and considered too weak for continued duty with the force, returned to Shinawari with a special complimentary order issued by General Lockhart.

On the same day the terms proposed for the tribes to agree peace were published by the British (a fine, surrender of a number of rifles with the return of all rifles and equipment captured by the tribesmen). The tribes were given a week to accept the terms.

The reconnaissance to Dwatoi:

On 22^nd November 1897 General Lockhart took a force on a three-day reconnaissance down the Bara River to Dwatoi in Kuki Khel country.

The main body reached Dwatoi on the Bara River at 4pm and came under fire from the hills to the north, which were stormed by the 28^th Pioneers.

The baggage failed to catch up with the troops and was parked for the night on the road, protected by piquets formed from the 36^th Sikhs, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Haughton.

The force spent the 23^rd November 1897 in destroying Kuki Khel fortifications and improving the pathway along the river.

On 24^th November 1897 the force left Dwatoi for the return to Bagh.

The force marched at daybreak with the 1^st/2^nd Gurkhas and the Yorkshire Regiment holding the flanking mountains. The tribesmen did not develop their attack until the 36^th Sikhs, forming the rear-guard, marched out of Dwatoi. Attacks were also made on the flanking regiments.

The 36^th Sikhs suffered a number of wounded and hospital mules were sent back to provide transport.

The force returned to the camp at Bagh having suffered losses of 1 British officer and 4 men killed and 2 British officers and 28 men wounded.

The advance to the West:

Correspondence from some of the Afridi clans suggested that they might negotiate a settlement, but they also made threats designed to prevent the making of a road along the bank of the Bara River that would make their territory more accessible to British troops advancing into their territory from Kohat.

The Orakzais showed clear signs of wanting a settlement, other than their most westerly clans which appeared to assume they were beyond the reach of the ‘Sirkar’.

General Lockhart considered that from the new camp at Bagh it was entirely feasible to reach these western clans and on 26^th November 1897 he marched against them.

The force left Bagh, commanded by Brigadier-General Gaselee, for the Khurmana valley, comprising Gurkha scouts, 2^nd/4^th Gurkhas, 1^st Queen’s Surreys, 3^rd Sikhs, 28^th Bombay Pioneers, the Kohat 1^st Mountain Battery and 2 companies of Sappers and Miners.

The column was attacked soon after leaving camp and a running fight developed with the Kambar Khels and Malikdin Khel Afridis, although their jirgahs were in camp discussing terms with the British.

Camp was pitched about four and a half miles from Bagh after a day in which the British suffered 1 killed and 8 wounded.

On 27^th November 1897 the column continued over the Durbi Khel Kotal with little opposition.

The road was difficult and required considerable work by the Sappers and Miners, part of the force reaching Tambu while the remainder camped on the summit, most of the baggage remaining at the base of the kotal.

During the day General Lockhart came up from Bagh Camp with an additional force comprising 2^nd Yorkshire Regiment, 4 companies of Royal Scots Fusiliers, 1^st/2^nd Gurkhas and No 2 Derajat Battery of mountain artillery. This march was contested by the tribesmen throughout and 25 Kambar Khel villages were destroyed in retaliation.

On 28^th November 1897 General Gaselee reached Dargai, 5 miles from the summit of Durbi Khel Kotal. (This is not the Dargai, scene of the battles on 16^th and 19^th October 1897).

General Lockhart on the same day reached Tambu. The difficulty of the route meant that his troops were strung out from Tambu back to the summit of the Kotal and down the eastern slope, the rear-guard being harassed by the Kambar Khel tribesmen.

On 29^th November 1897, General Lockhart, escorted by 2^nd/4^th Gurkhas joined General Gaselee at Dargai where a Samil Massuzai Jirgah came in and promised to comply with the settlement terms on offer.

Communication by heliograph was established with the Kurram Moveable Column coming up from Sadda and arrangements made for the two forces to meet the next day.

During the day, the rear-guard commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Spurgin was repeatedly attacked as it climbed the wooded eastern side of the Durbi Khel Kotal, reaching the camp at Dargai at 2am on 30^th November 1897, suffering two men killed and 3 officers and 14 men wounded. Tribal casualties were reported as 100.

Fortunately for the British column the tribal attack ceased once the troops crossed the summit of the kotal.

General Gaselee took a force of 1^st/2^nd Gurkhas with companies from the Queen’s and 3^rd Sikhs with No 2 Derajat Battery into the Lozaka defile where the Gar Massuzais handed in rifles as an instalment for the settlement fine.

At the same time, Colonel Hill marched a column to the Khani Khel Chamkanni principal village of Thabai, before retiring under heavy attack in the afternoon.

Gaselee’s force resumed the occupation of Thabai the next day, destroying buildings and stores. The Chamkanni tribesmen put up a ferocious resistance in a succession of sangars from which they were driven by the Gurkha scouts, leaving some 30 dead.

A further raid was carried out on the Lozaka valley against the Massuzais which was not resisted.

On 3^rd December 1897 the two British columns parted, Colonel Hill marching for Sadda and General Gaselee marching for Khanki Bazar.

General Lockhart advanced to Miran Khel where he took the submission of the Alisherzai jirga.

Move to the Bara valley:

Before leaving for the Chamkanni area, General Lockhart issued a proclamation to the Afridis warning them that he proposed to move his force out of the Tirah to avoid the worst of the winter weather, but that he had not finished his punitive actions against them.

During the raid on the Orakzais and Chamkannis the baggage at Bagh camp was packed up and moved back to Shinawari for despatch to the Kohat area and back up the Bara valley to meet the 1^st and 2^nd Divisions marching down the Mastura and Bara River valleys.

On 7^th and 8^th December 1897, the British troops left Bagh camp. Brigadier General Gaselee’s brigade joined the rest of the 1^st Division under Major General Penn Symons in the Mastura valley for the march north to the Bara River.

General Lockhart accompanied the 2^nd Division, comprising what were now designated the 3^rd and 4^th Brigades, for its march north to the Bara River and along the river to the east to link up with 1^st Division advancing up the Mastura valley from the south.

Brigadier General Westmacott’s 4^th Brigade reached Dwatoi, where the Shaloba River, running north from Bagh, flowed into the Bara River, during the morning of 7^th December 1897. The advance was unopposed.

The 4^th Brigade remained at Dwatoi the next day to allow the 3^rd Brigade to march up from Bagh.

The track was slippery from the rain and progress was slow, the 3^rd Brigade being held up by the 4^th Brigade rear-guard, the whole division assembling at Dwatoi by nightfall on 9^th December 1897.

While the force was advancing to Dwatoi, General Lockhart, on 9^th December 1897, took a force of 1,000 men and a battery of mountain guns on a march up the Rajgul valley west from Dwatoi, foraging and destroying fortifications.

On 10^th December 1897 the 2^nd Division marched out of Dwatoi, the 4^th Brigade in the lead heading for Sandana, the 3^rd Brigade making for Karana, 3 miles short of Sandana. The fortified villages passed through on the journey were destroyed.

Both brigades reached their destinations, from where they marched out on 11^th December 1897, heading east along the Bara River for Sher Khel, ten miles from Sardana.

Rain fell steadily and the steep paths out of Karana became difficult for the baggage animals, leading to significant delays.

The plan was for the rear brigade to begin its march ¾ hour before the leading brigade, with the baggage to its front, thereby causing the column to close up during the march.

Due to the delays with the baggage column in the saturated conditions, the rear-guard of the 3^rd Brigade was unable to leave camp until 11am

Notice of the delay could not be passed by heliograph to General Westmacott at the head of the column due to a thick mist that accompanied the rain.

The Afridis took advantage of the breakdown in the British march plan by ambushing the baggage column. Under a heavy fire many of the baggage drivers abandoned their animals and headed on up the track to Sher Khel.

British march practice was for the leading brigade to leave its piquets on the mountains overlooking the track until their positions were taken over by piquets from the following brigade.

Finding there were no troops following ready to take over the 4^th Brigade piquet positions, Westmacott simply withdrew his brigade’s piquets and continued his march to the camp at Sher Khel, which he reached in good time, having no opposition to delay him. This left the 3^rd Brigade with the difficulties of shepherding the disintegrating baggage train along the muddy track under heavy attack and having to re-picquet the hill-tops that the 4^th Brigade was expected to be holding, leading to repeated delays with resulting casualties and losses among the baggage animals and handlers that would have been avoided if the 4^th Brigade piquets had remained in place.

Many of the mule drivers and doolie-bearers left the main column and attempted to find their own way into camp, causing them to become bogged down in the rain-soaked hillsides and eventually overtaken by darkness.

A message was passed back to Brigadier General Kempster giving him the discretion whether to press on to the Sher Khel camp in the dark or halt and camp where he was.

Kempster chose to press on rather than impose on his troops the additional burden of making a separate camp.

Most of Kempster’s force reached Sher Khel, other than the rear portion of the rear-guard, comprising soldiers from the Gordons, Dorsets, 2^nd Punjab Infantry and 1^st/2^nd Gurkhas under Major Downman of the Gordons.

This party reached a point 3 miles from Sher Khel (not that they knew how far out they were), where they found numbers of transport animals caught in the rice-fields, where their drivers had left them in their flight.

Downman’s party stormed a nearby house in which they established themselves for the night and where they were subject to constant rifle-fire by the tribesmen.

With dawn on 12^th December 1897, General Kempster returned with two battalions and a battery and brought Major Downman’s party and the missing transport animals in to Sher Khel camp.

Otherwise, the force remained halted at the Sher Khel camp on 12^th December 1897.

Combatant casualties on 11^th and 12^th in the British regiments were 7 killed and 35 wounded.

The 2^nd Division continued its march on 13^th December 1897 from Sher Khel to Shinkamar.

The piqueting strategy was adapted to deal with the problems that had arisen on 11^th December 1897.

The 3^rd Brigade lead the advance with the 4^th Brigade as the rear-guard and having to cope with the difficulties of the baggage column between the two brigades.

A battalion from the leading brigade piqueted both flanks, keeping the picquets in place until the whole force had passed. Once that battalion was fully deployed another battalion provided the additional piquets required, so that battalions were kept together.

Additional guards were attached to the baggage train to keep the civilian drivers in place.

The distance to Shinkamar was expected to be about 7 miles, but turned out to be much further, around 12 miles, with the result that the 2^nd Division did not reach camp by the end of the day’s march.

The first three miles of the march to Galli Khel were along the river bed. The track then turned to the north, over the Lakarai Kotal and down to Sawaikot. A junction was planned with the Peshawar Column, which had marched up the river from the opposite direction, at Barkai a couple of miles short of Sawaikot.

The tribesmen launched their first attacks with great determination as the rear-guard of the 4^th Brigade left camp at the beginning of the march.

A halt was forced on the column as the baggage struggled to emerge from the track in the river bed at Galli Khel.

The tribesmen charged across the river bed to attack the baggage train, but were repulsed with heavy casualties by a cross fire from the artillery and infantry of the two brigades.

As the march continued the tribesmen pressed their attack on the column.

The fall of darkness caught the Second Division well short of its intended destination for the day of Shinkamar.

Westmacott’s 3^rd Brigade halted on a ridge crossing the line of march, a couple of miles behind the 4^th Brigade, which had stopped half a mile short of Lakarai Kotal.

The 3^rd Brigade was there rushed by the tribesmen in a determined attack which was driven off with considerable loss.

The 2^nd Division suffered some 70 casualties during the day’s heavy fighting.

Neither brigade’s overnight camp was near a water source and, as the baggage drivers had been too panicked to fill their carriers, the troops suffered a night largely without water.

For the 3^rd Brigade, their discomfort was increased by much of the brigade baggage being mixed with the leading brigade’s column and going on to its camp.

The Peshawar Column commanded by Brigadier General Hammond was already at Sawaikot, where communication was established by heliograph with the 2^nd Division. Hammond immediately marched out with 300 doolie-bearers to assist in bringing in the 2^nd Division wounded.

On 14^th December 1897, the 3^rd Brigade marched at daybreak for Sawaikot without being attacked.

Having passed through Barkai on the riverbank, the 3^rd Brigade water-mules were sent back to the 4^th Brigade, which was attacked by the tribesmen until it reached Lakarai Kotal. From there the brigade was subjected to limited attack by small numbers of tribesmen.

The 3^rd Brigade met the advanced piquets of the Peshawar Column 4 miles from Sawaikot, before marching on to its camp at Mamanai without interference from the tribesmen.

On 17^th December 1897 the 3^rd Brigade marched on to Bara, where it remained until 12^th February 1898, while the 4^th Brigade remained at Mamanai.

Actions of the 1^st Division from 9^th December 1897:

While the 2^nd Division moved eastwards down the Bara River, the 1^st Division’s route was initially eastwards along the more southerly Mastura River, before following that river north to rendezvous with the 1^st Division and the Peshawar Column on the Bara River, into which the Mastura flowed, in the area of Mamanai.

Before the 1^st Division moved off to the east along the Mastura River on 9^th December 1897 it was resolved to conduct a punitive raid into Aka Khel country in the Waran Valley to punish the tribe’s decision to throw its lot in with the hostile Zakha Khels in their operations against the British columns.

On the same day a force commanded by Brigadier General Hart VC, comprising companies from the 2^nd/1^st Gurkhas, the Derbys, the Devons, the Nabha Regiment, 21^st Madras Pioneers, 30^th Punjab Infantry and Bengal Sappers and Miners with two Mountain Gun Batteries marched out from Haidar Khel on the punitive raid, heading for the Waran Valley, the crest of the Kokanni Pass being seized by the 1^st Gurkhas earlier in the morning.

Hart’s force destroyed around 150 fortified houses belonging to different sections of the Aka Khels.

The troops then withdrew down the valley to Hissar, followed by Aka Khel and Zakha Khel tribesmen who were kept at a distance by artillery and rifle fire.

Casualties of the raid were 1 dead and 4 wounded.

The 1^st Division continued its march down the Mastura River to its junction with the Bara River at Mamanai, the 1^st Brigade arriving on 13^th December 1897, with the division concentrating at Ilamgudar on 17^th December 1897, a further 15 miles along the Bara River to the east.

Operations in the Khyber and Bazar Valleys:

As the 2^nd Division had been heavily engaged during its march along the Bara River, it was left to guard the line of the Bara valley while the 1^st Division and the Peshawar Column undertook operations in the Bazar and Khyber Valleys, carrying out punitive raids on the Zakha Khel and Malikdin and re-opening the Khyber Pass with the re-occupation and repair of the Khyber forts taken and destroyed by the tribesmen.

The Peshawar Column was allotted the Khyber Pass while the 1^st Division marched into the Bazar Valley.

Of the 2^nd Division, the 4^th Brigade remained at Mamanai and the 3^rd Brigade moved to Fort Bara, some 20 miles to the east along the Bara River.

The 1^st Division and the Peshawar Column concentrated at Jamrud Fort at the base of the Khyber Pass.

Major General Yeatman-Biggs was invalided to Peshawar and replaced in command of the 2^nd Division by Major General Sir Power Palmer.

On 25^th December 1897 the 1^st Division entered the Bazar Valley in two columns. After destroying houses and towers the Division returned to Jamrud on 28^th December 1897.

Between 18^th and 28^th December 1897, the Peshawar Column re-occupied Fort Maude and Ali Masjid and advanced up the Khyber Pass.

Between 1^st and 3^rd January 1898 engagements took place at the entrance to the Bori Pass from the Khyber, in which the Peshawar Column suffered a small number of casualties.

Engagement at Shinkamar on 29^th January 1898:

In late January 1898 General Lockhart received information that the Afridis were bringing their cattle down to graze on the Kajurai Plain, immediately to the north of the Bara River at Mamanai.

General Lockhart resolved to bring the Afridis to terms by capturing these cattle.

His plan was that the 1^st Brigade would occupy the line of the Chora River to the north-west of the plain, while the 2^nd Brigade held the Ghakhe Pass and the heights to the west of the Besai Hill at the north-eastern entrance to the plain. The 4^th Brigade at Mamanai would send out a column to block the Shinkamar Pass at the western end, with the 3^rd Brigade marching out of Bara to drive the herds westwards across the plain to the Shinkamar Pass.

The orders were that the positions were to be taken up early in the morning and that if nothing was seen by 1pm the columns were to return to camp, giving plenty of time for the withdrawal before darkness.

There was little opposition to the columns, but no cattle were found on Kajurai Plain, the troops returning to camp after an uneventful day. That is other than the Mamanai column, which found itself fighting what the official government history described as ‘one of the hardest actions of the campaign.’

The 4^th Brigade column comprised 427 men of the King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, 200 men from the 36^th Sikhs and 2 guns from No 5 Mountain Battery RA.

The column was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Seppings of the KOYLI with Lieutenant Colonel Haughton of the 36^th Sikhs.

The column set out from Mamanai Camp at 5am and reached the crest of the Shinkamar Kotal by 8am without major resistance.

The high points to the west of the pass were piqueted by the 36^th Sikhs and the high points to the east by two companies of KOYLI. A company of 1^st/3^rd Gurkhas held a position between the column and Mamanai Camp to provide cover for the withdrawal of the column at the end of the day’s operation.

Colonel Haughton, commanding the advance guard, pushed on down the reverse side of the pass to some caves from where he dispatched an orderly to bring forward more men from the main body of his regiment in the pass.

The orderly mistakenly delivered Haughton’s order to join the advanced guard to the Indian officer commanding the piquet on the west side of the pass. The Indian officer complied, bringing his piquet down into the pass and forward to join the advanced guard.

The high ground to the west of the pass, now without a piquet, was quickly occupied by tribesmen who brought a heavy fire down on all the troops in the pass.

Colonel Seppings ordered a company of KOYLI under Lieutenant Dowdall to retake the high point abandoned by the Sikhs.

Dowdall advanced up the hillside but the heavy fire from the tribesmen brought his company to a halt 150 yards from the crest and the officer was killed.

A second KOYLI company was sent to reinforce Dowdall’s, but could get no further forward, its company commander Lieutenant Walker also being killed.

The two companies were now in considerable difficulties, unable to advance and unable to retire due to the number of wounded men that had to be carried back.

Colonel Haughton at this point returned from the far side of the pass with his advanced guard.

Ordering his regiment to take up positions to provide cover, Colonel Haughton with his adjutant Lieutenant Turing, advanced with one of his companies to extricate the two KOYLI companies.

The tribesmen were rushing in on the KOYLIs, now without officers. Haughton’s Sikhs fixed bayonets and charged the tribesmen, but both Haughton and Turing were shot dead, Haughton fighting with one of his men’s rifles.

Further reinforcements from the KOYLI enabled the two companies to be withdrawn to the hillside to the east of the pass before a general retirement was carried out.

Due to the difficulties of the steep ground and the confusion the column was in, it was not possible to bring down the bodies of the soldiers killed in the action including the four officers.

Hearing the heavy firing, General Westmacott marched out of Mamanai Camp with a strong force from the 3^rd Brigade and brought the column back into camp.

On 30^th January 1898 General Westmacott marched out of Mamanai Camp with a column reinforced with troops from the 4^th Brigade at Bara, while a further column advanced towards the eastern entrance of the Shinkamar Kotal from Bara. Westmacott was able to recover 22 bodies of casualties from the fighting on the previous day.

The casualties of the 3^rd Brigade column on 29^th January 1898 were 5 officers and 28 men killed and 3 officers and 34 men wounded.

One badly wounded KOYLI was returned by the Afridis, but died of his injuries.

Follow-up to the Tirah: 
During the rest of 1898 the various Afridi clans largely came to terms with the British authorities and the Tirah campaign was concluded.

Casualties in the Tirah:  Theseare set out in the narrative above.

Battle Honour and decorations for the Tirah:
The battle honour ‘Tirah’ was awarded to these regiments: Queen’s, Devons, Yorkshire, Royal Scots Fusiliers, King’s Own Scottish Borderers, Dorsets, Derbyshire, Northamptons, Gordon Highlanders, 18^th Bengal Lancers, No 1 Kohat, No 2 Derajat, No 5 Bombay Mountain Batteries, Bengal Sappers and Miners, Madras Sappers and Miners, Bombay Sappers and Miners, 15^th Ludhiana Sikhs, 30^th Punjab Regiment, 36^th Sikhs, 3^rd Sikhs PFF, 2^nd Punjabis PFF, 21^st Madras Pioneers, 28^th Bombay Pioneers, 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th Gurkha Rifles.

The Indian Medal was issued to all troops who took part in the Tirah operations.

Anecdotes and traditions from the Tirah:

• The 21 Sikh soldiers of the 36^th Sikhs killed in the attack on Saraghari Post on 12^th September 1897 were awarded posthumous Indian Orders of Merit, the highest decoration available to non-commissioned soldiers of the Indian Army.
• The 3^rd Gurkhas in the storm of Dargai on 16^th October 1897 were led by Lieutenant WGL Beynon, the author of ‘With Kelly to Chitral’, the campaign in 1895 for which he was awarded the DSO. Beynon in his early career was reputed to have had more experience of fighting on the North West Frontier than any other British officer.
• Following the assault on Dargai on 20^th October 1897, HM Queen Victoria sent a telegram to the force commander stating: Balmoral, 22^nd October 1897 ‘Please express my congratulations to all ranks, British and Native troops, on their gallant conduct in action on 18^th and 20^th. Deeply deplore loss of precious lives among officers and men of my army. Pray report condition of wounded, and assure them of my true sympathy.’
• Colonel H.D. Hutchinson in his book published in 1898 stated of the proceedings on Saran Sar on 9^th November 1897: ‘. the simple truth is that the Northamptons themselves had not the training and experience, and the practical knowledge of the enemy’s methods and tactics, necessary to enable them to carry out successfully that most delicate and difficult operation of war, namely a retreat closely pressed by a savage foe, and conducted, encumbered by wounded, through a terribly difficult country. It was no question of dispositions by the General, of support by other troops, or of valour shown by themselves. It was simply lack of the right kind of experience which led into errors, such as entering the ravine at all. The result was disastrous….’
• Major A.C. Yate of the Indian Army in his biography of Lieutenant-Colonel John Haughton of the 36^th Sikhs wrote of the Saran Sar incident: ‘Had the retirement not been delayed, darkness would not have overtaken the troops before they reached camp, and the mishap of the Northamptons would not have occurred. It must, however, be noted that the 36th Sikhs, who covered the retirement of the Northamptons, suffered scarcely any loss. Several of the mishaps in the Tirah campaign were undoubtedly due to the inexperience and ignorance of frontier warfare of the officers and soldiers of our British regiments.

• A young officer with the KOSB in the Tirah, who later rose to the rank of general in the Indian Army, wrote home saying ‘The Northamptons, I see, are having a great fuss made over them at home for some reason. They are a perfectly rotten Regiment and unable to look after themselves. On the 13^th and 14^th when we had that rear-guard action, & were retiring by companies etc, the Northamptons did not cover us, the Sikhs or Gurkhas at all, but immediately we retired on them they used to retire at the same time, & they were absolutely helpless with their wounded men.’
• Lieutenant Colonel John Haughton of the 36^th Sikhs wrote in a letter from Mamanai Camp to Sir Charles Gough on 16^th January 1898, shortly before his death: ‘I think the general impression in the force is that things would have been better managed had Sir W. Lockhart not been in such bad health. He has constantly been down with fever, etc., and I believe has really been ill all the time….….I was also very much struck with the unfitness to march of most regiments, especially British regiments, at the beginning of the campaign. Of course, at the end of the hot weather, there is some excuse for this, but not in the case of regiments that have been quartered in the hills. I think the King’s Own Scottish Borderers and the Gordons had benefited much by the Chitral campaign, although there was so little fighting in it..’
• Major Horace Smith-Dorrien, who led the companies of the Derbyshire Regiment on the 11^th November 1897 reconnaissance, in the opening year of the First World War commanded the British II Corps. Smith-Dorrien was one of the British officers to escape from the disaster at Isandlwana in the Zulu War of 1878. In 1898 Smith-Dorrien commanded a battalion of Sudanese infantry at the Battle of Omdurman. He served as one of the few general officers in the Great Boer War to emerge with an enhanced reputation. His military career was ended in 1914 due to the enmity of Sir John French the British Commander-in-Chief.
• Piper George Findlater achieved considerable fame in Britain for his role in the Gordon’s attack at Dargai on 20^th October 1897, continuing to play his pipes after being incapacitated by a rifle shot in the leg. Findlater’s wound caused him to be invalided out of the army. Findlater supplemented his pension and Victoria Cross gratuity by playing the pipes in London Music Halls, to the outrage of the military establishment. After a tour of the USA and Canada, Findlater took to farming in Scotland. Findlater re-joined the Army in the First World War and served as sergeant piper to the 9^th Battalion, Gordon Highlanders, before again being invalided out after the Battle of Loos.
• The pipe tune ‘Heights of Dargai’ celebrates the battle at Dargai. The Gordon Highlanders pressed the authorities to make ‘Dargai’ a battle honour in its own right, rather than being subsumed into the campaign battle honour of ‘Tirah 1897’. This was refused.

References for the Tirah:

The Campaign in Tirah 1897-1898 by Colonel H.D. Hutchinson

The Indian Frontier War 1897 by Lionel James

Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India Volume 1 published by the Government of India

North West Frontier by Captain H.L. Nevill DSO, RFA

The North-West Frontier by Michael Barthorp

The Frontier Ablaze, the North-West Frontier Rising 1897-1898 by Michael Barthorp

The previous battle of the North-West Frontier of India is the Mohmand Field Force 1897

The next entry in the British Battles sequence is British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in the First World War

To the North-West Frontier of India index